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Re: OT:US don\'t qualify for EU membership, don\'t spank children, WW2 history.
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Re: OT:US don\'t qualify for EU membership, don\'t spank children, WW2 history.
First the Lousiana purchase... can't say how that would have gone without a US. Unlikely it would have been sold to England as the French and English were big rivals, which is one reason it went to the US, since at the time relations between England and US were very strained (War of 1812, smuggling, piracy, stopping American commerce vessels etc, colony that just gained independence with French help etc etc etc...)
As for Spain. Very unlikely since large tracks of that land had been Spains just a little while ago which they gave to France due to not being able to afford to garrison it, and of course it came with certain agreements attached, such as we will not under any circumstances sell this land to the United States, blah blah blah. Too bad Spain wasn't a big enough power at the time (a decling power as it where) to enforce the agreement when Napolean sold the land anyway. It fact it could be argued that without the US purchasing it however that Napolean could not have fully funde his invasions of other countries and might have been forced to stop early... say without Russia in the fold. Which might have allowed for a big change in history with France as a major power. Alternatly however the USSR almost certainly would still have arisen as a power the British held American colonies probably wouldn't have been as advanced industrialy wise and very doubtfully would have gone any further than the eastern coast of Mississipi all of which would drastically changed the course of WWI and might have superceded WW2 and made it never come to be with a German victory instead of Allied in WWI. People always seem to forget that though the US didn't enter WWI until very late they profited off of it a great deal as the "Arsenal of Democracy" selling to the British. With British Colonial doctrine being what it was it is unlikely that the USA as colony would have had that kind of production capability, just look at India and Egypt and Australia or other British colonies for what it probably would have been. A source of raw materials for export to the British manufacturing base and a source of young men to be used as cannon fodder, sorry, artillery and heavy machine gun fodder... In short without a USA the world would either be dominated by Germany, England, France, or the USSR depending on how things went. Despite what many of my fellow US citizens would like to think the US had very little impact on global affairs *read European affairs* until the late 1800's early 1900's. See the Spanish American War and the Chinese open door policy for notes on early US interest in global affairs. So in conclusion the events of Europe would likely be much the same without a US as they where with a US until WWI or just before it. Then things can get very confusing. PS: There is no reason Communism and Marx wouldn't have occurred without a US. Marx was based on the European Experience of Industrialization and the Russian Revolution was during the same year that the US entered into WWI. Other than a small expeditionary force that had little affect on the Soviet Revolution the US would not have influenced its outcome or happening in any meaningful way. So there is no reason the USSR wouldn't have formed, just no cold war between it and another Super Power afterwards. |
Re: OT:US don\'t qualify for EU membership, don\'t spank children, WW2 history.
OT:
This is the worst picture I have seen from Iraq to-date http://www.robert-fisk.com/030401AlKindi6.jpg |
Re: OT:US don\'t qualify for EU membership, don\'t spank children, WW2 history.
GAH!!!!
A bit more warning in the future, please. [ August 25, 2003, 19:54: Message edited by: Loser ] |
Re: OT:US don\'t qualify for EU membership, don\'t spank children, WW2 history.
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Re: OT:US don\'t qualify for EU membership, don\'t spank children, WW2 history.
Something doesn't jive about those pictures. Maybe its just the low quality..
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Re: OT:US don\'t qualify for EU membership, don\'t spank children, WW2 history.
> >Now that Uday & Qusay have been eliminated, a lot of the
> >lesser-known family members are coming to the attention of > >American authorities. > > > >Among the brothers: > > > >Sooflay ............the restauranteur > >Huray...............the sports fanatic > >Sashay..............the gay brother > >Kuntay & Kintay.....the twins from the African mother > >Sayhay..............the baseball player > >Ojay................the stalker/murderer > >Gulay...............the singer/entertainer > >Ebay................the internet czar > >Biliray.............the country music star > >Ecksray.............the radiologist > >Puray...............the blender factory owner > >Regay...............the half-Jamaican brother > >Tupay...............the one with bad hair > > > >Among the sisters: > > > >Lattay..............the coffee shop owner > >Bufay...............the 300 pound sister > >Dushay..............the clean sister > >Phayray.............the zoo worker in the gorilla house > >Sapheway............the grocery store owner > >Ollay...............the half-mexican sister > >Gudlay..............the prostitute > > > >Finally, there is Oyvey, but the family doesn't like to talk about him. |
Re: OT:US don\'t qualify for EU membership, don\'t spank children, WW2 history.
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10 points and a piece of toast http://forum.shrapnelgames.com/images/icons/shock.gif to the person who answers my riddle correctly! |
Re: OT:US don\'t qualify for EU membership, don\'t spank children, WW2 history.
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10 points and a piece of toast http://forum.shrapnelgames.com/images/icons/shock.gif to the person who answers my riddle correctly!</font><hr /></blockquote><font size="2" face="Verdana, Helvetica, sans-serif">And what a world power they became! |
Re: OT:US don\'t qualify for EU membership, don\'t spank children, WW2 history.
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Re: OT:US don\'t qualify for EU membership, don\'t spank children, WW2 history.
I did?
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Re: OT:US don\'t qualify for EU membership, don\'t spank children, WW2 history.
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Re: OT:US don\'t qualify for EU membership, don\'t spank children, WW2 history.
What?
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Re: OT:US don\'t qualify for EU membership, don\'t spank children, WW2 history.
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Re: OT:US don\'t qualify for EU membership, don\'t spank children, WW2 history.
Indeed. Funny. http://forum.shrapnelgames.com/images/icons/icon12.gif
[quote]Originally posted by jimbob: Quote:
Now to some numbers! While Canada did indeed make large contributions to both WWI and WW2 I don't think you can put it on the same footing as the US at the same time in regards to industrial output and manpower mustered. A few quick statistics. Sorry no numbers on hand for WW1 and as it is almost midnight here no inclination to go on a web search to find some. But here are some handy dandy ones for WW2. Top Canadian Contribution to WW2 - Monetary, Millions of US dollars = 20,104 Max Military Size at Peak = 780,000 Naval Vessels #'s = 32 Total Tonnage = 23,811 Top US Contribution to WW2 - Monetary, Millions of US dollars = 288,000 Max Military Size at Peak = 12,364,000 Naval Vessels #'s = 19,034 Total Tonnage = 5,457,000 The numbers do not equate. Now look at an alternate history with US as British Colony... Royal Proclamation of 1763 which restricted colonial expansion beyond the Appalachian Mountains to almost nothing and was a leading cause of the revolution. Extreme dislike of English and French for each other during Napoleonic times + English with own monetary problems = No Louisiana Purchase = No expansion that way. No Mexican American War = No Texas / Arizona / California / etc lands. So at best the US under British control would likely only have had as much production power as Canada all over again. Twice the Canadian contribution to WW2 does not = US contribution to WW2. In fact my calculator says Monetary US > 14 x Canada Military # US > 15 x Canada Ship # > 594 x Canada Ship Tonnage > 229 x Canada So I stand by my statement that without the US in existence save as a colonial holding WW1 maybe and WW2 certainly would have been lost. Save maybe for Soviet intervention, however a strong case can probably be made that without the US threat the Japanese would not have hesitated to support German war efforts against the Soviets, in which case bye bye Soviets, as one of the things that kept them going was unaffected Eastern Soviet production power (No German bombers with great enough range and no war declared against Japan, thus no worries there) and eastern military reserves arriving just in time. Throw Japan in the mix and that goes bye bye. Oooo... I just realized I need to update my profile. I am no longer a student of history/political science but now a degree holding Bachelor of History/political science... PS: If you want my sources I can post them. But the numbers are easily verified through any number of sources, even a bunch of Online ones. http://forum.shrapnelgames.com/images/icons/icon7.gif [ August 28, 2003, 06:16: Message edited by: Cyrien ] |
Re: OT:US don\'t qualify for EU membership, don\'t spank children, WW2 history.
It is my duty to make sure this thread stay completely out of topic.
So, here is the following article about....Saudia Arabia. http://forum.shrapnelgames.com/images/icons/icon10.gif STRATFOR'S GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT http://www.stratfor.com 27 August 2003 Saudi Arabia: The Fracture Widens Summary Saudi Arabia is scrambling to save collapsing relations with Britain and the United States. However, Riyadh's unwillingness or inability to dismantle the financial networks supporting al Qaeda will limit chances for saving these alliances. Analysis The United States and Britain are giving Saudi Arabia the cold shoulder, prompting a high-level aide to Crown Prince Abdullah, Adel al Jubair, to go on the diplomatic offensive. Jubair recently told The Associated Press that Saudis were not crossing the border into Iraq -- days after U.S. officials blamed Riyadh for not securing the border in efforts to prevent terrorism. Last week, the senior Saudi spokesman gave another interview to BBC Radio 4, trying to counter bad publicity in connection with the six British citizens recently deported from the kingdom. The citizens had been imprisoned there since 2000 in connection with a bombing campaign against Westerners in Riyadh. London and Washington now are pressing the Saudis both to prevent militants from crossing the border into Iraq and to close the financial networks funding al Qaeda. Riyadh apparently is doing neither. Because targeting al Qaeda's Saudi backers undermines the kingdom's economic and political structure, Riyadh can neither ignore the demands from Washington and London nor comply. This means the quandary will further erode the kingdom's relations with Britain and the United States. A cornerstone of the House of Saud's stability has been its relationship with London and Washington -- and with Houston. However, the Sept. 11 attacks fundamentally changed Riyadh's alliance with Britain and the United States. Since then, the government of de facto ruler Crown Prince Abdullah has scrambled to develop a cohesive strategy for regaining U.S.-British confidence. Squelching al Qaeda in the kingdom, sharing intelligence about the militant network's global operations and cooperating with the U.S. invasion of Iraq all have been intended to revive the deteriorating relations. The strategy hasn't worked. U.S. officials have claimed that Saudi fighters are crossing the border into Iraq to wage war against the U.S. military. The Saudi government denies this, but it is logical to conclude that some militants in the kingdom might move into Iraq to escape Riyadh's crackdown. Riyadh is quite happy to push the militants into Iraq and complicate the U.S. military occupation, and the situation has intensified the the diplomatic problem. Saudi Arabia's approach is a public relations offensive combined with a ride-the-storm-out attitude. Jubair's press offensive is meant to stake out a Saudi position of innocence, while the government sets up a joint task force with FBI, IRS and U.S. Treasury officials to investigate the financial networks connected to the May 12 suicide bombings in Riyadh. The task force's mandate will mean little unless Riyadh follows the investigation by seizing the assets of al Qaeda's supporters. Riyadh has taken a few tentative steps toward gaining control of alleged or suspected al Qaeda financial networks. For instance, the commercial Saudi American Bank (SAMBA) closed the account of Jeddah-based businessman Khaled bin Salim bin Mahfouz, the London-based al Sharq al Awsat daily reported Aug. 25. The wealthy Saudi businessman is the former owner of the National Commercial Bank in Saudi Arabia and also is named as a defendant in the lawsuit brought by the families of those who died in the Sept. 11 attacks. The decision to close the account likely originated in Riyadh, since the report said the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency was aware of the decision but that bin Mahfouz knew nothing of the closure until SAMBA notified him. However, the move will do little to satisfy Washington, since SAMBA returned to bin Mahfouz the entire value of his deposit. U.S. intelligence and government officials are looking for substantive measures, and failure to seize Mahfouz's assets -- or those of any alleged financier -- will not build confidence in Washington. Al Qaeda's financial backers in the kingdom pose a clear and present danger to the ruling House of Saud. Exiled Osama bin Laden's primary goal is the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in the Arabian Peninsula. He denies the legitimacy of the House of Saud and has encouraged its downfall. The al Qaeda presence in the kingdom, the enouncements of the kingdom's leaders and its ties with the U.S. military all are intended to lead to the House of Saud being overthrown -- to be replaced by a radical Wahabbi Islamist government that is friendly to bin Laden. The men who provide the network with money are vital to al Qaeda's ability to continue operations inside the kingdom and around the globe. Given this, it is startling that Riyadh isn't eager to seize the assets of alleged or suspected al Qaeda backers. However, Riyadh is trapped in a nightmarish catch-22. At its core, the House of Saud might be intimately intertwined with the Saudi businessmen and merchants, religious leaders, tribal chieftains, public officials and philanthropists funding al Qaeda. For instance, behind every major business leader in Saudi Arabia is a prince from the House of Saud. The relationship is profitable for both Groups and critical to the Saudi economy. Without the business relationship, many princes could not maintain their wealthy lifestyles -- and without the princes' influence, many businessmen would not win the government contracts that fuel the economy's growth. Despite the establishment of the joint task force, there are few indications that Riyadh is ready to redraw the country's economic and political landscape, which is exactly what tackling the moneymen would entail. However, both the United States and Britain are growing impatient. The guerrilla war in Iraq is making things worse, but it is the fundamental dispute over al Qaeda's finances that is causing the rift. Until Riyadh takes serious steps to stop the cash flow, the kingdom's relations with Britain and the United States will continue to disintegrate. [ August 28, 2003, 13:27: Message edited by: Unknown_Enemy ] |
Re: OT:US don\'t qualify for EU membership, don\'t spank children, WW2 history.
UE, I'm guessing this came from Stratfor, right?
It gets even better. Turns out the Ambassador's wife (Saudi Amb to US) is a real Wahhabist firebrand... Quote:
EDIT - correct spelling of "Wahhabist" [ August 28, 2003, 13:01: Message edited by: General Woundwort ] |
Re: OT:US don\'t qualify for EU membership, don\'t spank children, WW2 history.
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I am really glad I do not live in that part of the world. Their future will probably not be a peaceful one, even if NO ONE can allow chaos to spread in that country. Too much oil there. |
Re: OT:US don\'t qualify for EU membership, don\'t spank children, WW2 history.
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had the US remained a member of the Commonwealth (ie subordinate to the Imperial master, Britian) it would not have been as helpful in the battle against Germany I'm not yet convinced of two things: 1) that the USA would not/could not have attained a high population, and subsequently high industrial base, if it had remained a British Colony. Granted, Canada did not become a world power, but it had a different immigration policy (and damn cold weather to boot http://forum.shrapnelgames.com/images/icons/icon10.gif ) that hindered the degree of immigration as compared to the United States. I do not know my American history well enough to comment on the royal proclaimations visa vie the expansion of the colonies beyond the original borders, but I think it is interesting to note that the Canadian colony(s) were allowed to expand beyond their original boundaries at a later date (which yes, one could argue, was allowed by the Crown as an attempt to check American expansion into the west. Though I may be mistaken, I don't think the Crown was still calling the shots by this time, as Canada had developed a very independent legislative lower-house fairly early in it's history. This would argue that membership in the Commonwealth would not have been a long term hindrance to the American colonies expansion). So, while Texas may have managed to remain independent of the United States of America, I don't easily accept that renunciation of the British colonial system would have cost the USA the west. It could be noted at this time that, had the USA not rebelled against the British yoke, slavery would have been banished at an earlier date. This may have reduced the construction of the American industrial giant, but that too is another arguement... 2) that the USA would have contributed less had it jumped in earlier. Many have commented that the USA best contributed to the war by staying uninvolved in the early years, building up it's military, and then jumping in for a decisive ending action. However, had the US remained a British colony, and then evolved an independance as some other countries had (ie Canada, Australia) it would have joined in the battle from the very beginning. This may well have had a more profound effect, as this would have allowed a more concerted effort from many nations, rather than allowing for the complete exhaustion of individual countries before others joined in. Even had the US not remained a non-beligerant state, and supplied the UK with it's 1000 or so dry-docked destroyers, the battle of Britian could have turned out quite differently. This earlier involvement may well have cost the USA more, but it would have left the other combatants (ie the UK) in better shape post-WWII. Had Britian not been so damaged by it's drawn-out, nearly solo battle with the German forces, it would have been far more effective in the subsequent cold war against the USSR. Hey, nothings perfect in historical recreationism, but I think that the USA could still have played an important role in the outcome of WWI and WWII, regardless of the revolution several hundred years prior to these conflicts. |
Re: OT:US don\'t qualify for EU membership, don\'t spank children, WW2 history.
All is not well in the kingdom. The king is a drooling invalid who has been known to foul himself in public. His favorite son would appear to have been fathered by Saddam [sic], and at the moment seems to have the most influential position in the family.
When the king dies, his brothers and adult sons will choose a new king. And you can bet that there will be outside influence brought to bear upon this process. The US has someone in mind, and would probably take what ever steps are needed to put him on the throne. It should also be noted that the royal family is well on the way to insolvency. Stipends now far out run income. |
Re: OT:US don\'t qualify for EU membership, don\'t spank children, WW2 history.
That is possible though even if the Proclomation hadn't held and expansion was later allowed there would have still been conflict over the Lousiana territories which where in French control who at that time and for a great deal of time afterward until the rise of Germany as a power were not close friends at all and far closer to being enemies than anything else in regards to the UK. Also the French could not really afford the Lousiana areas, neither could the Spanish and even if the English had been inclined there is no way that the French would sell to them. So the Lousiana purchase area remains rather underdeveloped, in keeping with Spanish/Mexican ideas and culture most of the west remains mostly subsistence farming and wild indian lands.
Thus expansion of the US is cutoff by the French territories, which would also block any access to Spanish and later Mexican Territorial claims. This at the very least cuts off the western coast from US claims. Assuming US production capacity for the rest of it is still developed you lack the developed Western field of operations against the Japanese. This frees them from worries there and allows them to focus on aiding there German ally against the USSR. In the case best case scenario... Hitler betrays the Japanese as he did the Soviets. Worst case... most of the world would then speak German or Japanese, or I would hope you have many many years of occupations and eventual overthrows of occupying forces. Either way nothing is the same. Also worth noting is that if the US remained a colony then there is no reason for it to have its own large navy that is just under the total strength of the British navy. At best you probably have a British navy only a little larger than it would otherwise have been. It is worth noting that combined British and US naval might were barely enough to defeat Germany and Japan naval might in the first place. British and US Naval might being the first and second best but spread thinly and Japan and Germany being third and fourth largest but concentrated in small areas. As for population. Most of the US population was gained through imigration through the promise of endless lands to expand to in the West (no longer the case) the land of Freedom and Religious Choice (most likely, no longer the case as many colonies before hand had their own religions established as did England) and lets not forget the several gold rushes in the west and the massive influx of people that those caused, no longer in the US. No doubt the US would have been industrialized and had some impact. My arguement isn't that it wouldn't. My arguement is that looking at the most probably things it probably wouldn't have been enough to stop what they were up against. You make a case for it being better off in the outset with all of them working together, but it is unlikely that they could have coordinated fast enough to make a difference in the initial stages and with Japan now an unchecked power in the Pacific everything is different. Quite simply the possibilities are staggering and I get a slight headache just thinking about them. Suffice to say it could possibly work out either way. No way to know without going through it. But knowing what I know and seeing the way things worked out I tend to think that the changes would not have been for the better in terms of cost of life and outcome. Imagine having to fight two seperate wars first against the Germans then against the Japanese after the Japanese had time to solidify their pacific position unopposed without need for naval surprise attacks or major fleet actions or losses and cementing their control over the oil and steel supplies they wanted to gain. With the added possibility of putting the Soviets on a two front war that they likely could not have won. Another question? Who then finances the Panama canal? Is there even one? Does that make easy transit between the Atlantic and Pacific impossible? Endless questions and no way to answer them. Ah well... Time for sleep. |
Re: OT:US don\'t qualify for EU membership, don\'t spank children, WW2 history.
I think it would have been very interesting to live during those times. Think about it, the whole mass of the great unexplored territories. What a wonderment that must have been. I know what I would have been doing. I often wonder what it must have been like to have all of what is now the U.S. to roam, no borders, no taxes, no cops, just you, your people, and the great unknown. Of course there are those who believed this qoute, forget who said it or where it came from; "How dare the indians be on our land before we ever even knew it exsisted!"
In time all that is a national treasure, IE parks, will be comericallized and you will have to pay big bucks to go to them. They will become a business run by corperation and only SUV driving, cell phone additic, therapy going, spoiled rotten, self absorb, ultra yuppies will be allowed in. |
Re: OT:US don\'t qualify for EU membership, don\'t spank children, WW2 history.
More likely they'll be paved over, unfortunatly. It doesn't help that the various legislatures are too often run by idiots.
Want a good example? I'm in school in Arizona. If I graduated and moved to Oklahoma right now, I could be classified as a terrorist almost immediately. Why? Because in their 'wisdom', they've decided to pass a law that states anyone who causes more than $500 worth of economic damage for political reasons is a terrorist..even if the political reasons are just, say, pointing out that a factory is polluting far more than the law allows. |
Re: OT:US don\'t qualify for EU membership, don\'t spank children, WW2 history.
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... I like it. http://forum.shrapnelgames.com/images/icons/icon10.gif |
Re: OT:US don\'t qualify for EU membership, don\'t spank children, WW2 history.
Okay, I hadn't realized that the Louisiana purchase was so formitive/foundational to the maturation of the United State's industrial complex, though it definitely makes sense. I concede that you have some excellent arguments, and I stand enlightened by this debate! http://forum.shrapnelgames.com/images/icons/icon10.gif
cheers, jimbob |
Re: OT:US don\'t qualify for EU membership, don\'t spank children, WW2 history.
is the Great Game restarting ? Indeed we live in interesting times.
THE STRATFOR WEEKLY 02 September 2003 by Dr. George Friedman An Unlikely Alliance Summary Though the recent death of SCIRI leader Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim would appear to be raising the level of turmoil within Iraq, it might in fact help to push the United States and Iran toward a powerful -- if seemingly unlikely -- alignment. Analysis The death of Shiite Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), appears to have exacerbated the turmoil in Iraq. In fact, it opens the door to some dramatic shifts that might help stabilize the U.S. position in Iran. Indeed, it might even lead to a fundamental redrawing of the geopolitical maps of the region -- as dramatic as the U.S.-Chinese alignment against the Soviet Union in the 1970s. To understand what is happening, we must note two important aspects of the al-Hakim affair. First, though far from being pro-American, al-Hakim was engaged in limited cooperation with the United States, including -- through SCIRI -- participating in the U.S.-sponsored Iraq Governing Council. Second, upon his death, Iran announced a three-day mourning period in his honor. Al-Hakim, who had lived in exile in Iran during much of Saddam Hussein's rule in Baghdad, was an integral part of the Shiite governing apparatus -- admired and loved in Iran. We therefore have two facts. First, al-Hakim was engaged in limited but meaningful collaboration with the United States, which appears to be why he was killed. Second, he was intimately connected to Iranian ruling circles, and not just to those circles that Americans like to call "reformers." If we stop and think about it, these two facts would appear incompatible, but in reality they reveal a growing movement toward alignment between the United States and Iran. The United States has realized that it cannot pacify Iraq on its own. One proposal, floated by the State Department, calls for a United Nations force -- under U.S. command -- to take control of Iraq. This raises three questions. First, why would any sane country put its forces at risk -- under U.S. command, no less -- to solve America's problems if it doesn't have to? Second, what would additional outside forces, as unfamiliar with Iraq as U.S. forces are, add to the mix, save more confusion? Finally, what price would the United States have to pay for U.N. cooperation; for instance, would the U.N. presence place restrictions on U.S. operations against al Qaeda? Another proposal, floated by Defense Advisory Board Chairman Richard Perle, suggests that the way out is to turn Iraq over to Iraqis as quickly as possible rather than prolonging a U.S. occupation. The problem with Perle's proposal is that it assumes a generic Iraq, unattached to any subgrouping -- religious, ethnic or ideological -- that not only is ready to take the reins, but is capable of governing. In other words, Perle's proposal would turn Iraq over to whom? Putting the Kurdish issue aside, the fundamental fault line running through Iraqi society is the division between Sunni and Shiite. The Shiite majority dominates the area south of Baghdad. The Sunni minority, which very much includes Hussein and most of the Baath Party's national apparatus, spent the past generation brutalizing the Shiites, and Hussein's group also spent that time making certain that Sunnis who were not part of their tribe were marginalized. Today, Iraq is a fragmented entity where the center of gravity, the Baath Party, has been shattered and there is no substitute for it. However, embedded in Perle's proposal is a simple fact. If there is a cohesive group in Iraq -- indeed a majority group -- it is the Shiites. Although ideologically and tribally fragmented, the Shiites of Iraq are far better organized than U.S. intelligence reports estimated before the war. This is due to the creation of a clandestine infrastructure, sponsored by Iranian intelligence, following the failure of U.S.-encouraged Shiite uprisings in the 1990s. While Washington was worried about the disintegration of Iraq and the growth of Iranian power, Tehran was preparing for the day that Hussein's regime would either collapse or be destroyed by the United States. As a result, and somewhat to the surprise of U.S. intelligence, organizations were in place in Iraq's Shiite regions that were able to maintain order and exercise control after the war. British authorities realized this early on and tried to transfer power from British forces in Basra to local control, much to U.S. displeasure. Initially, Washington viewed the Iranian-sponsored organization of the Shiite regions as a threat to its control of Iraq. The initial U.S. perception was that the Shiites, being bitterly anti-Hussein, would respond enthusiastically to their liberation by U.S. forces. In fact, the response was cautious and sullen. Officials in Washington also assumed that the collapse of the Iraqi army would mean the collapse of Sunni resistance. Under this theory, the United States would have an easy time in the Sunni regions -- it already had excellent relations in the Kurdish regions -- but would face a challenge from Iran in the south. The game actually played out very differently. The United States did not have an easy time in the Sunni triangle. To the contrary: A clearly planned guerrilla war kicked off weeks after the conquest of Baghdad and has continued since. Had the rising spread to the Sunni regions, or had the Sunnis launched an intifada with massed demonstrations, the U.S. position in Iraq would have become enormously more difficult, if not untenable. The Sunnis staged some protests to demonstrate their capabilities to the United States, but they did not rise en masse. In general, they have contented themselves with playing a waiting game -- intensifying their organization in the region, carrying out some internal factional struggles, but watching and waiting. Most interesting, rather than simply rejecting the U.S. occupation, they simultaneously called for its end while participating in it. The key goes back to Iran and to the Sunni-Shiite split within the Islamic world. Iran has a geopolitical problem, one it has had for centuries: It faces a threat from the north, through the Caucasus, and a threat from the west, from whatever entity occupies the Tigris and Euphrates basin. When both threats are active, as they were for much of the Cold War, Iran must have outside support, and that support frequently turns into domination. Iran's dream is that it might be secure on both fronts. That rarely happens. The end of the Cold War has created an unstable area in the Caucasus that actually helps secure Iran's interests. The Caucasus might be in chaos, but there is no great imperial power about to push down into Iran. Moreover, at about the same time, the threat posed by Iraq abated after the United States defeated it and neutralized its armed forces during Desert Storm. This created a period of unprecedented security for Iran that Tehran exploited by working to reconstruct its military and moving forward on nuclear weapons. However, Iran's real interest is not simply Iraq's neutralization; that could easily change. Its real interest is in dominating Iraq. An Iranian-dominated Iraq would mean two things: First, the only threat to Iran would come from the north and Iran could concentrate on blocking that threat; second, it would make Iran the major native regional power in the Persian Gulf. Therefore, were Iranian-sponsored and sympathetic Shiite Groups to come to power in Iraq, it would represent a massive geopolitical coup for the United States. Initially, this was the opposite of anything the United States wanted. One of the reasons for invading Iraq was to be able to control Iran and its nuclear capability. But the guerrilla war in the north has created a new strategic reality for Washington. The issue at the moment is not how to project power throughout the region, but how to simply pacify Iraq. The ambitions of April have given way to the realities of September. The United States needs a native force in Iraq to carry the brunt of the pacification program. The Shiites, unlike the United Nations, already would deliver a fairly pacified south and probably would enjoy giving some payback to the Sunnis in the north. Certainly, they are both more likely to achieve success and more willing to bear the burden of pacification than is the United States, let alone any U.N. member willing to send troops. It is not, at the moment, a question of what the United States wants; it is a question of what it can have. The initial idea was that the United States would sponsor a massive rising of disaffected youth in Iran. In fact, U.S. intelligence supported dissident university students in a plan to do just that. However, Iranian security forces crushed the rebellion effortlessly -- and with it any U.S. hopes of forcing regime change in Iran through internal means. If this were to happen, it would not happen in a time frame relative to Washington's problems in Iraq or problems with al Qaeda. Therefore, the Iranian regime, such as it is, is the regime the United States must deal with. And that regime holds the key to the Iraqi Shiites. The United States has been negotiating both overtly and covertly with Iran on a range of issues. There has been enough progress to keep southern Iraq quiet, but not enough to reach a definitive breakthrough. The issue has not been Iranian nuclear power. Certainly, the Iranians have been producing a nuclear weapon. They made certain that inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency saw weapons-grade uranium during an inspection in recent days. It is an important bargaining chip. But as with North Korea, Iranian leaders know that nuclear weapons are more valuable as a bargaining chip than as a reality. Asymmetry leads to eradication of nuclear threats. Put less pretentiously, Tehran must assume that the United States -- or Israel -- will destroy any nuclear capability before it becomes a threat. Moreover, if it has nuclear capability, what would it do with it? Even as a deterrent, retaliation would lead to national annihilation. The value of nuclear weapons in this context is less real than apparent -- and therefore more valuable in negotiations than deployment. Tehran has hinted several times that its nuclear program is negotiable regarding weapons. Officials also have indicated by word and deed to the United States that they are prepared to encourage Iraqi Shiites to cooperate with the U.S. occupation. The issue on the table now is whether the Shiites will raise the level of cooperation from passive to active -- whether they will move from not doing harm to actively helping to suppress the Sunni rising. This is the line that they are considering crossing -- and the issue is not only whether they cross, but whether the United States wants them to cross. Obviously, the United States needs help. On the other hand, the Iranian price is enormous. Domination of Iraq means enormous power in the Gulf region. In the past, Saudi Arabia's sensibilities would have mattered; today, the Saudis matter less. U.S. leaders understand that making such an agreement means problems down the road. On the other hand, the United States has some pretty major problems right now anyway. Moreover -- and this is critical -- the Sunni-Shiite fault line defines the Islamic world. Splitting Islam along those lines, fomenting conflict within that world, certainly would divert attention from the United States: Iran working against al Qaeda would have more than marginal value, but not, however, as much as Saudi Arabia pulling out the stops. Against the background of the U.S.-Iranian negotiation is the idea that the Saudis, terrified of a triumphant Iran, will panic and begin crushing the extreme Wahhabis in the kingdom. This has delayed a U.S. decision, as has the legitimate fear that a deal with Iran would unleash the genie. But of course, the other fear is that if Iran loses patience, it will call the Shiite masses into the streets and there will be hell to pay in Iraq. The death of SCIRI leader al-Hakim, therefore, represents a break point. Whether it was Shiite dissidents or Sunnis that killed him, his death costs the Iranians a key ally and drives home the risks they are running with delay. They are vulnerable in Iraq. This opens the door for Tehran to move forward in a deal with the United States. Washington needs to make something happen soon. This deal might never be formalized. Neither Iranian nor American politics would easily swallow an overt alliance. On the other hand, there is plenty of precedent for U.S.-Iranian cooperation on a covert level. Of course, this would be fairly open and obvious cooperation -- a major mobilization of Shiite strength in Iraq on behalf of the United States -- regardless of the rhetoric. Currently, this seems to be the most likely evolution of events: Washington gets Tehran's help in putting down the Sunnis. The United States gets a civil war in the Muslim world. The United States gets Iran to dial back its nuclear program. Iran gets to dominate Iraq. The United States gets all the benefits in the near term. Iran gets its historical dream. If Roosevelt could side with Stalin against Hitler, and Nixon with Mao against Brezhnev, this collaboration certainly is not without precedence in U.S. history. But boy, would it be a campaign issue -- in both countries. |
Re: OT:US don\'t qualify for EU membership, don\'t spank children, WW2 history.
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[ September 09, 2003, 19:21: Message edited by: Imperator Fyron ] |
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There is something to be said to the effect of the Industirla Revolution, and even the socialogical changes that directly proceded it, on agricultural peoples. Men and skill may win battles, but economy wins wars. [ September 09, 2003, 19:36: Message edited by: Loser ] |
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Another reason that Cheney doesn't want the UN involved is that Haliburton et. al. wouldn't get some of that $87 billion dollars that the administration requested. It's funny how there is no money to deal with issues like the U.S. power grid - but plenty of money to pay Haliburton to fix Iraq's infrastructure. |
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According to the argument the Romans had the potential for an Industrial Revolution - there are technical schematics by Archimedes i.e. for the steam engine - but that Slavery made the development of these technologies uneconomical. |
Re: OT:US don\'t qualify for EU membership, don\'t spank children, WW2 history.
Wow... think of where the world would be today if the Romans had an industrial revolution! http://forum.shrapnelgames.com/images/icons/shock.gif
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[ September 09, 2003, 20:19: Message edited by: Imperator Fyron ] |
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[ September 09, 2003, 20:40: Message edited by: rextorres ] |
Re: OT:US don\'t qualify for EU membership, don\'t spank children, WW2 history.
they actually used the steam engine. But unfortantly for the Roman empire it was used to open doors at bath houses and temples ( yep pressure plates in the floors )
I studied them in University... |
Re: OT:US don\'t qualify for EU membership, don\'t spank children, WW2 history.
The Greeks did develop the first steam engines, but used them as toys for the most part. The Romans made the first use of it, but not for industrial use. As stated earlier by others the Roman economy was dominated by slaves and their simply was no need (in their view) to develop steam engines and other technologies.
As also noted this was also a draw back of the US slave states. So much capital was tied up in land ownership and slavery that very little was diverted to industrial development. |
Re: OT:US don\'t qualify for EU membership, don\'t spank children, WW2 history.
No-No-No...This thread is back on topic !
Here is my part to help it stay OT. THE STRATFOR WEEKLY 09 September 2003 by Dr. George Friedman Two Years of War Summary Two years into the war that began on Sept. 11, 2001, the primary pressure is on al Qaeda to demonstrate its ability to achieve its goals. The events of Sept. 11 were primarily intended to change the internal dynamics of the Islamic world, but not a single regime fell as a result of the Sept. 11 attacks. However, the United States -- unable to decline action -- has taken a huge risk in its response. The outcome of the battle is now in doubt: Washington still holds the resources card and can militarily outman al Qaeda, but the militant network's ability to pull off massive and unpleasant surprises should not be dismissed. Analysis Old military communiques used to read, "The battle has been joined but the outcome is in doubt." From Stratfor's viewpoint, that seems to be the best way to sum up the status of the war that began on Sept. 11, 2001, when al Qaeda operatives attacked U.S. political, military and economic targets. Though the militants were devastatingly successful in destroying the World Trade Center and shutting down U.S. financial markets, al Qaeda did not achieve its primary goal: a massive uprising in the Islamic world. Its attack was a means toward an end and not an end in itself. Al Qaeda's primary goal was the radical transformation of the Islamic world as a preface for re-establishing the Caliphate -- a multinational Islamic empire that, at its height, stretched from the Atlantic to the Pacific oceans. To achieve this end, al Qaeda knew that it had to first overthrow existing regimes in the Islamic world. These regimes were divided into two classes. One was made up of secular, socialist and military regimes, inspired by Gamel Abdul Nasser. This class included countries such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Libya. The second class comprised the formally Islamic states of the Arabian Peninsula, which Osama bin Laden referred to as "hypocrites" for policies that appeared Islamic but actually undermined the construction of the Caliphate. Finally, bin Laden had to deal with the problem of Shiite Iran, which had taken the lead in revolutionizing Islam but in which the Wahhabi and Sunni al Qaeda had little confidence. Al Qaeda's political objective was to set into motion the process that would replace these governments with Islamist regimes. To achieve this, al Qaeda needed a popular uprising in at least some of these countries. But it reasoned that there could be no rising until the Islamic masses recognized that these governments were simply collaborators and puppets of the Christians, Jews and Hindus. Even more important, al Qaeda had to demonstrate that the United States was both militarily impotent and an active enemy of the Islamic world. The attacks would serve to convince the masses that the United States could be defeated. An ongoing war between the United States and the Islamic world would serve to convince the masses that the United States had to be defeated. Al Qaeda had to stage an operation that would achieve these ends: 1. It had to show that the United States was vulnerable. 2. Its action had to be sufficiently severe that the United States could not avoid a counterattack. 3. The counterattack had to be, in turn, countered by al Qaeda, reinforcing the perception of U.S. weakness. The events of Sept. 11 were intended primarily to change the internal dynamics of the Islamic world. The attacks were designed so that their significance could not be minimized in the Islamic world or in the United States -- as had been the case with prior al Qaeda strikes against U.S. interests. Al Qaeda also had to strike symbols of American power -- symbols so obvious that their significance would be understandable to the simplest Muslim. Thus, operatives struck at the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and -- in a failed attack -- Congress. As expected, the attacks riveted global attention and forced the United States to strike back, first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq. The United States could not decline combat: If it did so, al Qaeda's representation of the United States as an essentially weak power would have been emphatically confirmed. That was not an option. At the same time, optimal military targets were unavailable, so the United States was forced into suboptimal attacks. The invasion of Afghanistan was the first of these. But the United States did not defeat the Taliban; Knowing it could not defeat U.S. troops in conventional combat -- the Taliban withdrew, dispersed and reorganized as a guerrilla force in the Afghan countryside. It is now carrying out counterattacks against entrenched U.S. and allied forces. In Iraq, the Islamist forces appear to have followed a similar strategy within a much tighter time frame. Rather than continuing conventional resistance, the Iraqis essentially dispersed a small core of dedicated fighters -- joined by an international cadre of Islamists -- and transitioned into guerrilla warfare in a few short weeks after the cessation of major conventional combat operations. However, al Qaeda did not achieve its primary mission -- Sept. 11 did not generate a mass uprising in the Islamic world. Not a single regime fell. To the contrary, the Taliban lost control of Afghanistan, and the regime of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein fell. Nevertheless, given its goals, al Qaeda was the net winner in this initial phase. First, the U.S. obsession about being attacked by al Qaeda constantly validated the militant network's power in the Islamic world and emphasized the vulnerability of the United States. Second, the United States threw itself into the Islamic world, adding credence to al Qaeda's claim that the country is the enemy of Islam. Finally, Washington drew a range of Islamic regimes into collaboration with its own war effort, demonstrating that these regimes -- from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan -- were in fact collaborating with the Christians rather than representing Islamic interests. Finally, by drawing the United States into the kind of war it is the least competent in waging --guerrilla war -- al Qaeda created the framework for a prolonged conflict that would work against the United States in the Islamic world and at home. Therefore, on first reading it would appear that the war has thus far gone pretty much as al Qaeda hoped it would. That is true, except for the fact that al Qaeda has not achieved the goal toward which all of this was directed. It achieved the things that it saw as the means toward the end, and yet the end is nowhere in sight. This is the most important fact of the war. Al Qaeda wins if the Islamic world transforms itself at least in part by establishing Islamist regimes. That simply hasn't happened, and there is no sign of it happening. Thus far, at least, whatever the stresses might have been in the Islamic world, existing regimes working in concert with the United States have managed to contain the threat quite effectively. This might be simply a matter of time. However, after two years, the suspicion has to be raised that al Qaeda calculated everything perfectly -- except for the response. Given what has been said about the Islamic world's anger at the United States and its contempt for the corruption of many governments, the failure of a revolutionary movement to take hold anywhere raises the question of whether al Qaeda's core analysis of the Islamic world had any truth, or whether other factors are at play. Now turn the question to the United States for a moment. The United States clearly understood al Qaeda's strategy. The government understood that al Qaeda was hoping for a massive counterattack in multiple countries and deep intrusions into other countries. Washington understood that it was playing into al Qaeda's plans; it nevertheless did so. The U.S. analysis paralleled al Qaeda's analysis. Washington agreed that the issue was the Islamic perception of U.S. weakness. It understood, as President George W. Bush said in his Sept. 7 speech, that Beirut and Somalia -- as well as other events -- had persuaded the Islamic world that the country was indeed weak. Therefore, U.S. officials concluded that inaction would simply reinforce this perception and would hasten the unraveling of the region. Therefore, they realized that even if it played directly into al Qaeda's plan, the United States could not refuse to act. Taking action carried with it a huge risk -- that of playing out al Qaeda's scenario. However, U.S. leaders made another bet: If an attack on the Islamic world could force or entice regimes in the area to act against al Qaeda inside their borders, then the threat could be turned around. Instead of al Qaeda trapping the United States, the United States could be trap al Qaeda. The central U.S. bet was that Washington could move the regimes in question in a suitable direction -- without their disintegration. If it succeeded, the tables could be turned. The invasion of Iraq was intended to achieve this, and to a great extent it did. The Saudis moved against al Qaeda domestically. Syria changed its behavior. Most importantly, the Iranians shifted their view and actions. None of these regimes fell in the process. None of these actions were as thorough as the United States wanted, either -- and certainly none were definitive. Nevertheless, collaboration increased, and no regime fell. But at this point, the battle is in doubt: 1. The United States must craft strategies for keeping both the Afghan and Iraqi campaigns at manageable levels. In particular, it must contain guerrilla activities at a level that will not be perceived by the Islamic world as a significant victory. 2. The United States must continue to force or induce nations to collaborate without bringing down any governments. 3. Al Qaeda must, at some point, bring down a government to maintain its own credibility. At this point, merely surviving is not enough. Both sides now are caught in a battle. The United States holds the resource card: Despite insufficient planning for manpower requirements over the course of the war, the United States is still in a position to bring substantial power to bear in multiple theaters of operation. For al Qaeda, the card is another massive attack on the United States. In the short run, the network cannot do more than sustain the level of combat currently achieved. This level is insufficient to trigger the political events for which it hopes. Therefore, it has to up the ante. The next months will give some indication of the direction the war is going. Logic tells us that the United States will contain the war in Iraq and, to a lesser extent, in Afghanistan. Logic also tells us that al Qaeda will attempt another massive attack in the United States to try to break the logjam in the Islamic world. What al Qaeda needs is a series of uprisings from the Pacific to the Atlantic that would topple existing regimes. What the United States needs is to demonstrate that it has the will and ability to contain the forces al Qaeda has unleashed. At this moment, two years into the war, the primary pressure is on al Qaeda. It has not yet demonstrated its ability to achieve its goals; it has only achieved an ability to mobilize the means of doing so. That is not going to be enough. On the other hand, its ability to pull off massive and unpleasant surprises should not be underestimated. |
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Re: OT:US don\'t qualify for EU membership, don\'t spank children, WW2 history.
Ahh but even the Talismans would be unable to overcome if the economy was too advanced. Say 10 Talisman battleships to 100 baseships. Or say a well placed star destroyer or ten. Doesn't matter how accurate your fire is when the star in front of you is going nova.
So I suppose what I am saying is enough technological and economic advantage and the power to use it and even talismans won't save you. For instance the Afghans could develop all the Talismans they want on their rifles, but in the end picture the US could still just drop a few nukes... or 50,000 more soldiers... etc etc... But it of course won't. The key difference in modern warfare is CAN and WILL. In the olden days of war, say Civil War and before and even upto World War I, there was no difference between CAN and WILL. If you had it you were free to use it. So discussions that equate those earlier conflicts with more modern ones are inherently flawed by overlooking a new fundamental that must be taken into consideration. I for one am thankful for this new fundamental. For something a little scary... http://nuketesting.enviroweb.org/hew.../Allbombs.html http://nuketesting.enviroweb.org/hew...ovwarhead.html |
Re: OT:US don\'t qualify for EU membership, don\'t spank children, WW2 history.
if it is developed the cia will have a hand in it.
Has anyone ever read the 9-11 time line from http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/ it is long long long.... but again another good read. As it is good to read from all sides. |
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