[Unknown_Enemy]

Stratfor's point of view.

Israel: Bombings To Force Palestinian Crackdown May 19, 2003

Summary

A recent bombing spate in Israel will force new Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas to redirect his energy toward policing the Palestinians.

Analysis

Five suicide bombings in Israel between May 17 and May 19 killed at least 21 people and wounded scores of others. The al Aqsa Martyr's Brigade, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) all have claimed responsibility for the attacks. Hamas claimed responsibility for the first four attacks -- including a suicide bombing May 17 that killed two settlers in Hebron and two bombings in Jerusalem on May 18, one of which left six Israelis and a Palestinian dead. Hamas also claimed a May 19 attack in the Gaza Strip that killed three Israel Defense Forces members, and both the PIJ and al Aqsa claimed responsibility for a May 19 suicide attack in which three people were killed in the northern Israeli town of Afula.

In effect, the bombings also have killed the U.S.-backed "road map" for peace. The failure of the Palestinian government's new leader, Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas, to prevent Hamas, the PIJ or even al Aqsa -- backed by Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat -- from launching suicide attacks, lets Washington off the hook and will throw the Palestinians into an internecine confrontation in the coming weeks.

The United States, as part of a deal with Saudi Arabia, supported the plan to push forward a peace deal in Israel. An Israeli-Palestinian peace deal, however, requires that all of the Palestinian factions agree to halt suicide attacks. The recent spate of bombings makes clear two things: First, neither Hamas, the PIJ, nor al Aqsa back the peace talks. And second, Abbas can't bring them to the negotiating table or keep them in check.

The Palestinians are divided into three camps. One camp is willing to accept a partial return of the land seized in 1967 in exchange for recognizing Israel's right to exist. A second camp might accept these terms for negotiation but will continue to fight even with a peace deal on the table, and a third camp will refuse outright to accept that Israel has a right to exist. Hamas and the PIJ fit into the third Category, but the stance of al Aqsa, which has been closely tied to Arafat's Fatah Party and is known to conduct joint operations with Hamas and the PIJ, is unclear.

From Israel's standpoint, it cannot negotiate peace as long as there is a Palestinian faction that opposes it. The ability of Hamas, the PIJ, al Aqsa or any other group to continue to launch suicide strikes and the Palestinian National Authority's inability to halt those strikes limits the desire of Israeli leaders to cut a deal.

From Washington's standpoint, it has tried to make peace, and the Palestinians are rejecting it. That means the United States acted in good faith in its agreement with Saudi Arabia, and it can now back off and let the Israelis do what they need to do.

The losers in the end are Arab states that hoped to tie up the United States in Israel by getting Washington bogged down in peace negotiations. These Arab governments -- like Saudi Arabia -- also wanted to show their domestic constituencies that they could influence U.S. policy and that cooperation with the U.S. military in Iraq could result in something positive. A flare-up in Israel translates into an aggravation of an already angry Arab population, large segments of which see the governments as weak and corrupt. Domestic backlash will fuel militancy in countries like Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt.

Inside the territories, Abbas has been proven a paper tiger. Until the new prime minister can prove that he can contain Hamas and other factions that oppose peace negotiations with Israel, he has no legitimacy.

Both Israel and the United States have said in response to the bombings that peace talks will continue. The problem is that no substantive deals will be reached: Israel cannot trust that Abbas, regardless of his intentions, can ensure security.

Abbas, knowing this, now has a decision to make. He seems isolated inside the Palestinian political landscape. If al Aqsa participated in the latest spate of suicide bombings, then logic suggests that Arafat does not back the peace talks either. Already the two have clashed repeatedly over the construction of Abbas' Cabinet. Israel and the United States hope to use Abbas to sideline the aging Palestinian guerrilla leader.

The bombings will return Abbas to the underlying issue that so far has defined his short tenure as prime minister: the inter-Palestinian dynamic. Hamas' goal is not just to derail these particular peace talks, but all peace talks. It denies that Israel has a right to exist, and this principle is what gives Hamas its power. Its followers are willing to die in suicide bombings, because they believe in the goal: a Palestinian state after the destruction of the Jewish one. This stance cannot be moderated if Hamas hopes to retain its current support base, and therefore Hamas cannot participate in the peace process and cannot be open to negotiations.

Because of this, Abbas will have no choice but to find a means of cracking down or containing the militant group and other Palestinian factions blocking peace efforts. In effect, this is much of the Palestinian political spectrum. Given Hamas' prominence both politically and in its claims of responsibility for suicide bombings, Abbas likely will turn his attention to the Gaza Strip. With former Palestinian Security Chief Col. Mohammed Dahlan now acting as Abbas' security minister, the prime minister has an advantage in Gaza that he lacks in the West Bank. Now the test will be how he uses that advantage. In a first reaction, officials with Abbas' government said May 19 that he would shake up the Palestinian security apparatus. What he does with that security force, once it's reshuffled to his liking, will be the decisive factor. If he takes the hard line, a bloodbath inside Gaza -- between Dahlan's men and Hamas -- is almost a certainty.