[Siddhi]

a perspective from a neutral country "green slime"

reg. "russian tanks rusting outside"
never heard of such a thing. most tank barracks in the world have a bunch of old tanks standing around in a lot for basic training purposes, or even simply as a memorial. the idea that a category A or B unit, which spent all of their recruits time in mind-boggling "make work" tasks, would let their critical combat equipment go to hell is just wrong. until the mid 1980s, where corruption/embezelement of supplies as well as "moonlighting" of NCOs became an increasing problem, soviet and some WP (especially GDR ans CSSR) readyness was first rate, better in our view then most NATO equipment.

- tank training for soviet and cssr was absolutly first rate, and superior to many NATO countries, especially in gunnery and formation keeping (battle drill). given the two-year enlistment periods common nearly no tanker trained in one tank and was expected to fight in another, although o/c this is not valid for C formations whose expected mob time included training with "new" equipment. B-formations still had refresher courses and were familiar with their equipment

- "warsaw pact advancing along two roads" i have no idea what that is supposed to mean. norway, perhaps, and wouldn't have that been 1 road unless they crossed finland?

- "logistics, etc." this is the biggest myth of all - that soviet logistics was a nightmare or a mess. o/c after 1985 everything slowly went downhill, but the soviets beforehand were true masters of the art - more importantly, they were ther first to employ "computurised" logistic systems - basically big calculators - first at front then at army level, from 1975 onwards. these systems were so advanced they AUTOMATICALLY could issue (print orders ready for signing or teletype reley) movement and priority orders on supply coloums and MSRs. the fact that they were less "flexible" then NATO is completly irrelevant - if you do not resupply a regiment but simply pull it from the line and put in another you do not need flexibility. this approach was brilliant as while they knew it cut combat capability in some ways (lack of experienced NCOs, commanders, etc.) in allowed the "same" factors to be considered fresh each time in the battle management computers, i.e. they knew exactly what equipment would be how worn out over how much time, and could therefore pre-order supplies, unlike the NATO system, which was "pull" rather then "push". finally the WP has a defence mobilisation scheme that only countries such as norway, austria and sweden have - every vehicle could be commandered for the front - effectivly the entire country could go to "war industy" at the flip of switch.

- "small-unit inflexibility" who cares? when the vast majority of your engagements are going to be regiment-size, that is what you train for. that they are "set-piece actions" is only marginally negative, if at all, if it is a true combined arms assault. that fire strikes "could not be adjusted" or similar is complete nonsense. battilion-sized task groups could immidetly form after breaking the line and were perfectly able to fullfill their main mission - push deep and disrupt.

i can't really comment on technical/ equipment matters as others prolly know more about it here, except for one minor detail: the older t-72 varaints vibrated so much that crews routinely fell asleep on the march and would roll of the roads - none combat attrition rate for an tank regiment road march was many times higher then for nato equiviliant (brigade without supply arm).

between 1975-85 the WP would have given NATO a serious challange, and depending on circs, it would have been a tight thing. given that the most likely "threat of war" scenario was due to Operation RYAN (look it up if you don't know it) in the 1982-83/84 timeframe i think everyone in the west should be a lot more thankfull that it never happened.