Quote:
Originally Posted by narwan
Hi Charles,
for armor I prefer platoons of 4 tanks for medium and good quality troops and platoons of 3 for low quality troops.
I use the command units to command the others; ie to use their rally to keep the subordinates as effective in fighting as possible. By keeping the command unit within 5 hexes behind the others it automatically becomes a sort of tactical reserve unit. Also very handy to deal with suprises.
While you're right in the percentages of vehicles being fearless, fearless and blind (low experience combined with even a little suppression) makes for a very bad combo. You need as many combat capable fearless units as you can get. Don't forget that the game uses a three step fire sequence with the third shot on the same target in sequence gives you the highest hit percentage. That means you need a ROF of at least 3 for your main gunat the moment of firing (which often means after moving one or two hexes, not a ROF 3 before moving those hexes).
Narwan
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Hello Narwan,
Yes, I think I have come to agree on that point, that you are better off with the lower subordinate ratio with the weaker forces. With weaker forces over the course of a campaign, you can see that if you preserved your CO's that it's becomes more and more inportant not to lose them. With that in mind, I have to hope the nation I'm playing has some early fairly easy battles (USSR and Germany for example) in order to get CO's to ratings that will be a loss should they be destroyed.
While we have been talking only about platoon CO's rallying subordinates, realize that the majority of the rallying will come from the subordinant itself. What would that ratio be for early USSR units? I have only now been applying any sense to this matter, but have observed things along the way nonetheless.
In the case of the Germans, it seems clear that the CO's have a higher rate of success of rsllying themselves and subordinates, than the subordinates do of rallying themselves. It also seems that the USSR is so poor at doing it, that if the CO has a greater rato of success, it didn't seem very apparent.
This brings us back to the importance of preserving leaders. IF the early USSR, for example, is as pathetic as I say in rallying and the leader so very bad in doing it that it isn't noticeable, then isn't the contrary line of wisdom better off? In other words, at least for the short haul, aren't the USSR's units better off for having ALL of them fighting and to have a higher ratio of subordinates to leaders whereas we have drawn the opposite conclusion? With the USSR, as time progresses, there should be less of a critical need for preserving any early CO's, in fact losing one in one month, may see the next month's replacement with better ratings.
So far, I draw the conclusion that a mixture of platooon sizes is best overall. While the extremes of the ratio might make us draw back in horror, they're not without purpose, even if just for a limited time and situation. The one or two unit formation has very little of a fearless unit element to it, and certainly isn't the sizes for preserving CO's, but is also good for independent action, because they are somewhat more dispensible.
I think I tend to favor the 4 or 5 subordinate to CO ratio, but I also have a place for the sections, and indeed plan to have 1 10 unit platoon when I play the USSR; if not for novelty and experimentation than anything else.
Let's say the following is true, that the majority of rallying comes from subordinates rallying themselves (a higher subordinate to CO ratio making this more true) but that the CO rallies better than anyone. You have to ask the question, that if the platoon is that much better off for the leader being out of it in bad situations. It seems that where a CO is really needed that much more, he often should not stay close enough to rally and also, a destroyed CO can help nobody.
So I think we can see that, the lower the subordinate to CO ratio, the more likely the CO will get destroyed, but also that should any real preservation of the CO be employed, that the platoon suffers greatly in terms of fire effectiveness, that is if you think that the CO staying behind and not getting too involved is the wise course. Is the increased subordinates ratio, supposing a great desire to preserve the CO, worth the decreased ability for the leader to rally, as, I pointed out before, more true in larger platoons, that the subordinates themselves account for the greatest amounts of rallying? For example, a five tank platoon with all suppressed to buttoned, may on average, with the Germans, see three or four successful rallies from the subordinates, while the CO may rally an additional couple of times. The early USSR, OTOH, may see only 1-2 total successful rallies, one of which probably came from the CO.
I don't know, but it just seems to me that, in general, you're better off with the majority of your platoons are in the 4-5 category, whereas the extremes are helpful in limited situations in limited times. A lower subordinate to CO ratio would encourage more daring, in a sense, since the unit is so small it's almost worthless without the CO sticking his neck out any, and then you have the other extreme, the 6 or 10 unit platoon, where preserving the leader holds a greater importance for it to be a good functioning platoon over time.
At this point, I would like to clear up what I meant about preserving the CO if I hadn't made that perfectly clear. By that I mean that it's not that he doesn't fight any, or takes part only in mop-ups, but that he only fires when it's apparent there is little chance of his destruction from return fire, and that he does takes steps to be less enchanting of a target. So you might say when comparing the CO to any of his individual subordinates, that he will fire far less at direct competition, such as tanks firing on tanks. I suppose the way I have used them the majority of the time, that is true, but they're also sort of the last straw. He is there to join the fight, if he's sure the AI will target him very little with direct competition, but he is also there once things become clearer. Either things get more desperate or they're more well in hand that he must fire in either case. In delaying fire during the opening firefight, he holds his fire, or at least waits till the other units have fired first, such that they draw the majority of counter attacks, so that his subordinates can hopefully whittle down the enemy by then, a factor further increasing his chances of survival. Over the course of a few turns he may lose some of his subordinates, and clearly, if the position is desired to be held and more enemy keep appearing, he must then be more willing to throw more caution to the wind. Clearly, even if he has only one subordinate left, he should never be the first one to fire, and when he does fire, and gets return fire, he should hope there's a unit somewhere, perhaps not even of his own platoon, which will drive any counter-fire back onto themselves, therefore upsetting the fix the unit he fired on had, possibly thereafter continuing that fire on that unit. The leader is about the only unit I would bother being that touchy about, that he doesn't keep firing at a unit, that could destroy him, without some other unit breaking the return fire's fix.
Should you get into very experienced units, while your new units performance weakens over time, like the Germans, then it becomes possible that you will have some subordinates which are more worth preserving than their leader, which throws a monkey wrench into all of this. It would be quite ironic to have a subordinate which is more important than the leader, though with a great deal of diligence the leader shouldn't be worth terribly much less.
BTW, when I used the word fearless a number of times, I only used it in relation to the CO. I'm not talking about weak units just looking to get destroyed, but that when something comes along that they can possibly have a positive effect against, then they will do so with no qualms. IOW, they fight as though they will succeed, whereas the leader fights as though he may fail.