[Snipey]

While the Red Army had no official NCO corps, I think you will find this true story interesting, it comes from "My Just War" by Gabe Temkin, who was a Polish Jew fighting in the Red Army, and who later became an American Professor, publishing one of the best books on the Red Army in the English Language. If you want to know what life was like for the average Russian infantryman, it is a must read. ISBN: 0-89141-645-5. Anyways, back on topic, the particular summary starts on page 169 and goes until page 172:

Sixteen Red Army Scouts crossed the Prut River, fully equipped at night. They were looking for "tongues" - enemy soldiers who would tell the Red Army what's going on. They caught two sleeping Romanian soldiers in a machine gun pit. They tried to ambush the rest of the Romanian soldiers in the village, but failed to do so, when one of the Red Army soldiers decided to kidnap a pig for dinner, and the latter protested very loudly, waking up the whole village. After a brief firefight, where no one was hurt, the Romanian soldiers fled. After the Colonel, on the other side of the river, recieved the two "tongues" he ordered the contingent back. However the contingent's leader had too much initiative to just turn back.

The Red Army Scouts then set up the HQ, the perimeter, and instead of going back as ordered, went scouting. Temkin was placed in charge of finding and holding an HQ suitable building, and given six men. Temkin wasn't an official officer. Soon the villagers were surrendering. Far from the myth-driven Red Army brutality, the relations between the villagers and the Red Army were as warm as they could be.

Another order came from the Colonel, stating "you have accomplished what you were supposed to, no point in sitting there, drinking and resting..." Instead of following the order, the commander (who was a senior Lt.) of the sixteen scouts promoted himself to Colonel, and stated that he will now be accepting Romanian POWs. He sent his scouts, to every building, telling them about the HQ "where the Colonel was now resting". Not only did he establish good will with the villagers, but he also captured a total of nineteen Romanians.

The punishment for disobeying two direct orders? None.

Stories, such as the one described above, happened with great frequency in the Red Army, especially after Stalin gave the Red Army a free hand in conducting its own affairs. For instance, the Red Army also operated Churches, with Stalin telling the NKVD to lay off; examples included rumored quotes such as "with the Nazis nearby we have no time to examine whether that's a Church or a military HQ". The Churches were shut down in 1946, and the repression of religion began again, but in 1942-1945, there was freedom of religion in the Red Army.

So while the Red Army may have lacked an NCO system, after the Battle of Stalingrad, the Red Army had initiative, and allowed men who were not officers to lead. It was very open minded to experimentation. In addition, after the Battle of Stalingrad, senior men taught the new recruits the basics of fighting, combat, and what not to do.

In Operation Bagration for instance, the casualty rate (of irreversible casualties, not including lightly wounded and those sick with malaria and other deceases) was two to one in favor of the Red Army. In other words, for every Red Army soldier killed, the Wehrmacht lost two soldiers. At the Battle of Belgrade, the rate was three to one. Moreover, the Red Army did not enjoy a 2 to 1 numerical advantage over the Wehrmacht, until 1945, except in a few cases.

Now as for Afghanistan. The extreme major of Red Army soldiers serving in Afghanistan volunteered. They weren't looking to go home ASAP. I will concede that the STAVKA in Afghanistan, performed horrendously. However the American version of the STAVKA in Vietnam, also performed quite poorly. Back than niether the US, nor the USSR could fight and win such a war, with the strategies that they were employing.

The problem with the current Russian Army training is that Russia has all kinds of units, from the GRU SpetzNatz, such as Battalion Vostok that took out Georgian units three times their size and suffered two light wounded casualties, to the conscripts. The tales of destruction of Afghan Villages are a bit embellished though, and it wasn't done on a wide and systematic level. Nor were the Red Army casualties in Afghanistan severe. The whole "terror" claims of the Red Army in Afghanistan are severely exaggerated.

There are some reasons why the US may succeed. First and foremost, is that unlike the USSR, the US can lead a coalition against bin Laden. Second is that scouting techniques are improved. Third is that the US has experience that they can rely on, from the lessons of Vietnam. I agree with the part you quoted. And the Red Army does need to improve it's dismounting techniques.

However the Russian Army of today, could have tackled and won the Afghan War. Few people realize how poorly the Brezhnev and Gorbachev leadership perforemed at the strategic level, which was the number one cause for the Red Army's loss in Afghanistan. I cannot use words to describe their poor performance. If one was to study the Russian Army in action in the Second Chechen War, one would see that the problems of reconnaisance, of dismounted combat have shown great improvement. In the 2008 South Ossetia War, the Russian Army broke all expectations, for the first time since the Battle of Vienna. (Actually occured on May 8th, there are other reasons that Russians want May 9th to be Victory Day then Stalin's politics.)

An intelligent debate can never be long winded, and you are partially correct in the Russian/Red Army's lack of NCOs. However I hope that Temkin's story sheds new light on why the Red Army may not have needed that NCO knowledge as much as their British and American counterparts.