[Marcello]

My quote was that the Stavka failed to supply the escalation. Your counter-argument is that "they did supply the limited contingent". Your counter-argument fails to address my argument.

I wrote

Note: they DID supply their limited contingent, they DID supply the DRA army and security forces AND they DID supply the afghan population under their control, Kabul included. They had to ship half million of tons of wheat for civilian consumption during a single year. There certainly was no mass starvation in Kabul, to the best of my knowledge.
HOWEVER every single source on the matter notes that they had a hard time doing all of this. Adding, say an half million of troops or a massive reconstruction program of the 40.000 km of roads in Afghanistan or similar massive efforts would have in all likelyhood broken the back of the logistical system, even as it was the Salang pass had to be run on a one way system for example.

They did not fail to supply the escalation. There was no escalation in part (not exclusively but in part) precisely because they knew if there had been one THEN there would have likely been supply issues. Please take note also of the fact that the limited contingent was not the only thing they had to worry about supply wise. The afghan population under their control had to be supplied too and so the afghan army.

Now let’s examine the cases you brought up

Why couldn't the Red Army do something similar? It took the Red Army under three months to bring over one million men, all the way across the USSR to help take out the Japanese Army in Manchuria and capture 600,000 POWs, and destroy the previously undefeated Japanese Army in a matter of weeks.

The Red Army enjoyed secure rear areas and line sof communications in that theater of operations. Had the transiberian railroad been crawling with japanese constantly blowing it up all the day then it would not have been so easy.

In the Vietnam War, the US had over 550,000 men in Vietnam.

Which raises two points:

First of all: it did not work, so why do the same?

Second: in Vietnam the americans had safe access to several sea ports along the coast (and Vietnam was mostly coast), their overland lines of communications were much shorter than soviet ones in Afghanistan and not as heavily harrassed.Close air support could be operated even from aircraft carriers off the coast which could be then resupplied elsewhere. Close air support in Afghanistan relied on planes that were based in the country and whose bombs/fuel had to be shipped by convoys which were constantly attacked.And so on.
Had there been, say an efficient submarine campaign against US shipping and more active Vietcong in the South then, again, it would not have been so easy

Are you serious?

Ever heard something about “Able Archer” or “operation Ryan”, if not Google is your friend. Yes afterwards it is pretty damn easy to say that “obviously” nothing was ever going to happen but the soviet leadership could not afford to play armchair strategist with hindsight benefit. There was little to gain in Afghanistan and a lot to lose elsewhere. If things turned hot the western theater forces needed everything at hand, it could not be magically teleported back from Afghanistan.

On the other hand, the Red Army leadership opposed it fiercely

I have never heard anything about the Red Army leadership specifically suggesting to gut (meaning, taking away the gunships,trucks and others items needed in the afghan theater) the western theater forces for Afghanistan sake.If you have any source on that, please provide it. Asking for more resources, well they did. Some asked for some additional troops or going after Pakistan but it questionable they had fully worked out the implications, these were the same dudes who initially believed the afghan army could handle the guerrillas by itself after all. Armies seldom feel they have enough of the cake. Problem was that the soviet cake was small.

I still don't see why the Red Army couldn't switch support from an unpopular leader to a popular one.

Simple: because said leader would tell soviets to go and screw themselves.If not he would cease being popular.
Afghani tribes hated the Kabul regime and hated the soviet troops. Communist ideology was fundamentally at odds with traditional afghan way of life. Foreign communist troops were doubly unwelcomed.
This was such a basic reality of the afghan war that your inability to grasp it is beginning to make me wonder if I am not just wasting my time.
Kabul tried to enlist religious figures in support for example. It was a total failure.

If tanks aren't useful, you make them useful.

Actually the logical thing is doing what they did: use something else which is more useful.

Have tanks with less wear and tear.

It does not work. Heavy tracked vehicles are inherently bad for roads and are inherently more maintenance intensive. It is a engineering reality. You might as well ask for tanks which run on cow dung.

You also failed to address my point of giving the local Afghani forces that were pro-USSR more responsibility.

No simply the previous post was getting long winded so I wrote

I could go on on the other points if you are interested but really, the 90% of the things you are touting as solutions or that you seem to think were never done fall into three categories:

1)They actually were the standard tactical repertoire.
2)They were tried and did not work.
3)They were obviously unworkable.

But I see that you are not convinced so let's examine it.
Giving the local Afghani forces more responsability is exactly what they wanted to do. The idea was that the soviet forces would provide support and the afghans would have most of the responsibility for actual operations. It did not work so the soviets were forced to undertake combat operations by themselves. Nobody wanted to fight for the USSR sake. When the soviets finally leaved THEN the DRA security forces started to put on a decent performance.

You still failed to address my point about using third world country militaries, in the manner that I've described, that is SpetzNatz training, fight a year in Afghanistan.

That’s why I wrote:

The remaining 10% may or may not have worked but were not enough to make a difference.

So they get a few additional battalions of Spetnaz.Big deal. Note they would still have to deploy helicopters gunships and logistical support for them.
Really they tried nearly all of the things you have suggested so far, plus some you probably don't even know about. Bribing militias? Check. Bombers based off country? Check. Shooting SCUDs at insurgents strongholds (OK more an afghan army thing actually)? Yep that was done too.

US in the Persian Gulf War

Really? I take you never heard all the polemics about the army failing to encircle the republican guard divisions for example?