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Originally Posted by Marcello
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In the Siege of Leningrad there was limited supply that the Soviets could give to the city, because, uhhh geez, I don't know, maybe the Great Patriotic War was still going on?
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You made a pretty clear statement to support your point (and not an unimportant one) which was factually wrong. If you cannot admit to be wrong and prefer backtracking and pretending to have said something else, then sorry I have no interest going further and I will cut it here.
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I have no wish to go further, because this isn't about the Siege of Leningrad. You want to go off-topic, I don't. As you can see from the previous 3 posts, I admit my mistakes and I can easily counter your claim, but this from is for wars from 1946 until today. I already had several off-topic threads locked, because someone else went off-topic. Why is this so hard for you to understand?
Now, back on topic:
Once again, are you telling me that the USSR could not produce enough supplies and enough men to fight the Taliban? My point wasn't that the Stavka smoked weed 24/7. My point was that the Stavka did little to nothing to support the war. The fact that there was no escalation is a failure in itself. To claim that, if the Soviet Logistics system was devoted fully to the Afghani War, it was going to be broken over an escalation, contradicts reality. The USSR's production capacity was enough to defeat the Wehrmacht Armies, was enough to field and equip armies of millions of men. Here you are arguing that supplying half a million would have broken it's back. Really?
And if you are worried about the supply roads being attacked, why not set up ambushes at every single kilometer along the supply lines. Have more battles. Do what Grant did to the South. For every Soviet soldier that died, roughly 5 to 20 Mujaheedin died, (estimates vary). So keep on fighting. The Mujaheedin had 500,000 men at most. So you take the 100,000 casualties, and you win the war. The USSR could afford to take that many casualties.
If the Red Army was given time to set up proper supply roads, as the Red Army Doctrine dictated, instead of rushed to take Kabul, as politicians dictated, than the supply lines would not be a problem. During World War II, Chuikov wanted to rush to Berlin, but Zhukov cautioned against it. Had Chuikov's tactic been employed, the Red Army supply lines would not have been secured. The reason that the Red Army supply lines were secure in WWII is because the Red Army secured them! The same wasn't done in the Afghani War.
It didn't work in Vietnam because the troops weren't used properly. The troops were used for humping, often having to take the same peice of land over and over again, land that had no strategic value. The troops were often rotated, based on guesswork, rather than an actual strategy. The people, in both cases, were ignored, and that's a crucial mistake made by both, the Soviets in Afghanistan and the American in Vietnam. However, that mistake was made by the Stavka in case of Afghanistan, or the White House, in the case of Vietnam, not by the troops and their commanders.
Just read all about "Able Archer" and "Operation Ryan". Shouldn't it be "Operation RYAN"? Anyways, the premise of troops making a difference in the nuclear war between the USSR and US, in the 1980's is a delusion. If the US and USSR go to a nuclear war, the non-nuclear armed forces won't make the difference. Also, it delusional to think that the American or Soviet Citizens would be supportive of such an effort, or that the leaders, of both USSR and US were that much bat**** insane. There are other explanations, that are sane, such as Andropov trying to use fear to bring the Politburo under his command, or the US promoting the Military Industrial Complex. As for USSR and US going to nuclear war over exercises, or Reagan's plans that were in the developmental stages, I don't buy it.
The Red Army's initial plan of invading Afghanistan was to attack all along the Soviet-Afghan border, akin to what happened in Manchuria in 1945. The initial blitz would catch the Taliban off-guard and would enable the Red Army to unite with the Afghan Army, and the non-Pashtu tribes, placing a sizable chunk of Afghanistan under Soviet control, in the first few weeks of the war. It is similar to what the Americans did in Afghanistan in 2001-2003, until the Iraqi detour, and that campaign yeilded remarkable results, for the first breaking the Taliban. And then Bush the idiot went into Iraq and the Taliban rebuilt.
As for the Red Army leadership, they didn't specify which front the units would come from, but they repeatedly asked for more units, to stabilize the situation, to stop the unnecessary loss of men, requests that were repeatedly denied by the Stavka of Brezhnev and Gorbachev. Nor was the Red Army's cake small. They had over a million men in uniform, that's not small to me.
You can always relax the ideology. During WWII Red Army was all about freedom of religion. The fact that the ideology wasn't relaxed is yet another Stavka mistake, another moronic act of Brezhnev and Gorbachev.
More men always make a difference. A few additional battalions of SpetzNatz is a big deal. The few additional battalions of SpetzNatz made a huge difference in Chechnya. Nor do they need helicopters for support. They can be dropped as parachute units and they'll act on their own.
Nor were enough Soviet Innovations geared towards the Afghani War. During WWII there were massive Soviet Innovations, the AK, the T-34, the Katuysha, the... I could just keep on going and going. What were the innovations during the Afhgani War?
My point remains. The Stavka must have done more. Take a look at the Second Chechen War. You know the one that the Russians won. What's the difference between Chechnya and Afghanistan? Aside from Afghanistan being larger? In between the two Chechen Wars, Chechnya had a heavy indoctrination of Talibanism and Wahhabism. However the Russian Army, equipped with much less than the Red Army, won the Second Chechen War.
Initially it was 93,000 Russian and allied soldier, vs. 22,000 Chechen insurgents. These men weren't as good as the Red Army troops, so the ratio was 1 to 3. The Russians went in, not afraid of the deaths, and after taking out 14,000 out of 22,000 - won the war. Sure they lost roughly 5,000 but the war was won. If your troops are constantly being killed, your leaders liquidated by a few battalions of SpetzNatz, you lose morale. So it was 93,000 vs. 22,000, but for simpler math, let's say 4 to 1. In Afghanistan it was 1 to 2. See the difference?
Not to mention in the Second Chechen War there were new military tools used. The T-90 sent the Chechens into panic. New fire teams did their jobs. New tactics were applied.
In short, if Russia could win in Chechnya, which they did, USSR could have won in Afghanistan.