Egyptian Armor – Sixth Day War
After Action Review (AAR) – Operations of the 16th Mechanized Infantry Brigade at Rafah Junction, 12:00 Hours, June 5, 1967.
Summary:
Mission: Egyptian delay vs. Israeli advance
Result: Draw.
Egypt Israel
Men 208 107
AFV 28 18
Aircraft 3
Score 3510 3816
Enemy Forces: The Israeli 7th Armored Brigade with air support. The 7th Ar will attack from the NE with the main force attacking from the North. The 7th Ar will fain a frontal assault from the NE, while the main force conducts a pincher movement from the North extending to the NW.
HQ
2x Fouga Masiter
1x Ouragan
1x Mystere IV
1X Mirage III CJ
1x Super Mystere
1x Tank Platoon Sh’ot Meteor
1x 155mm Howitzer Bn
Armor
3x Tank Company
1x Sh’ot Metero
1x Mag’ach
1x Sherman
Infantry
1x Armored Infantry Company
Experience: 76
Morale: 79
Formations: 25
Units: 86
Force Value: 6152
Terrain: Sinai desert along the Mediterranean Sea with sand dunes, ridges, and pockets of soft sand.
Weather: Summer with visibility 47
Friendly Forces: Elements of the 16th Mec Bde with two companies of T-54’s from the 14th Armored Battalion.
HQ
14th Ar Bn
2x T-54B Tank Company
1xRifle Company
16th Mech Bde
1x T-34/85 Tank Company
1x AA Gun Section
1x AT Gun Platoon
1x Hvy Tank Platoon
1x Rifle Company
2x Fortifications
Experience: 64
Morale: 64
Formations: 30
Units:77
Force Value: 2906
Time: 25 Turns or 50 minutes approximate.
Civilians:There are no civilians at Rafah Junction.
Background:
Force deployment: After careful survey of the terrain and position of forces at Rafah Junction, it became evident the Egyptian forces prepared substantial reinforced fighting positions, trenches, and mines for an Israeli assault. The 16th Mech Bde positioned the old T-38 with good line of sight of probable enemy advance routes in good fighting positions dug deep into the ground. However, I was alarmed that the T-54 Tanks were left open in exposed territory without AA support or anti-tank assets. Also, the platoon leaders were scattered and removed from their respective platoons in a manner that I thought would dramatically reduce the rally effect and combat effectiveness of the individual platoons. Although, I suspected this would hamper plans to get the platoons into defensive positions before the arrival of the enemy as the platoons would struggle to form up, I did not fully realize the speed of the enemy’s advance; thereby as a result of ordering the T-54’s to form up, the T-54’s were largely exposed in open ground as the lead elements of the 7th Armored Bde came into view around turn 3.
Commander’s Intent: The T-54 Tanks will perform movement to contact north of the 16th Mech Bde defensive positions. The T-54 Tanks will delay the advance of the enemy enabling the remaining units of the 14th Ar Bn to arrive in time to destroy enemy units in the AO. The 16th Mech Bde will remain in their fighting positions and kill all enemy units within range.
T-54 Tank Maneuver
As the battle unfolded very early in the fight, I ordered the T-54’s and supporting infantry to halt movement and seek cover where appropriate when lead elements of the 7th Ar came into our view. A platoon of the Mech Infantry Company attached to the T-54’s provided screening of the northern T-54 platoons, to engage enemy infantry units and attrite enemy tank units with AT weapons. E and I platoons of the T-54’s were exposed in the open just west of their objective. G and H platoons took cover in the ravine west of their movement objective. C and D platoons failed to reach a ridgeline and were caught in the open. Infantry platoons took cover to the NW along the ridgeline with MMG sections covering. I ordered the T-54 Tanks not to move once the lead elements of the enemy were spotted, and to open only Opportunity fires.
First Sightings
E and I tank platoons sighted enemy units to their North and halted movement as ordered. C and D platoons dashed ahead to the Victory Objective east of their position and halted. G and H platoons raced to the ravine for cover to await ambush opportunity. I ordered all units to open opportunity fires only. M and N infantry platoons raced North to the nearest Victory Objective while K and L platoons and the AT section made a screen north of E and I tank platoons. I set appropriate filter orders to the T-54 Tanks and attached infantry. We did not encounter enemy aircraft at this time, although they were much anticipated.
Early T-54 Tank Operations
E and I tank platoons caught six Mag’ach tanks flat footed on their run to the ridge line east of tank platoons C and D. I platoon killed a half track and disabled another one as well. Although C and D platoons suffered tremendous losses, having halted as ordered the platoon killed a number of the remaining Mag’achs as they drove down over the ridgeline.
Securing Defensible Positions
The enemy Sh’ot tanks came in upon our tank platoons from the North and Northeast. They cautiously avoided the infantry screen and pressed a hard drive against E and I tank platoons. However, platoons E and I managed a few kills while losing one tank. The speed and maneuver of the enemy units, both and tank and mech infantry overwhelmed E and I and C and D platoons, but not without a price. Unfortunately, the enemy air strikes devastated E and I and C and D platoons significantly reducing their effectiveness or killing them outright. Although it was a blow, it made the Israeli’s concentrate their air strikes on the exposed tanks and not soften the AA units, tank units, and fortifications of the 16th Bde in Rafah Junction.
The Stand at the Ravine
The enemy unwittingly split its drive thereby losing a decisive point to mount an assault on Rafah Junction. Instead, they choose to pursue every Victory Objective. This enabled our guns to fire on them from fortifications and T-34’s. The enemy pursued M and N infantry platoons and this proved costly to them in time and maneuver as the MMG’s kept the enemy mech infantry units at bay. The H and G platoons picked off several Sherman tanks and many Sh’ot Metero tanks too. In a perverse way, the T-54 Tanks harassed the enemy units, killed a few, slowed them down, and dispersed their formations denying them a single focal point of assault, i.e. a decisive point, such that the enemy lost the initiative.
The enemy air strikes on the T-54 Tanks proved decisive in the battle. Their strike elements killed or disabled nearly 70 per cent of our tanks. Without mobile AA units our tanks were defenseless. Only one enemy aircraft was downed.
Several enemy infantry units approached the Ravine with little success. However, as a result of the air strikes, their infantry AT units killed one of our tanks.
The remaining tanks were loss to tank fires.
The Battle at Rafah Junction
Our Hvy T-10 tanks took up positions to the rear of Rafah Junctions just west of the fortifications to protect the rear of Rafah in Turn 14. But, the enemy was still foolishly chasing Victory Objectives and intend on killing mech infantry units rather than driving directly to Rafah. As a result several of our T-34’s killed or disabled several enemy tanks and half tracks. The AA units harassed the remaining air strikes with accurate fire. Fortunately, by the time the enemy turned their air strikes on the 16th Bde at Rafah Junction, they had deleted most of their stores and were left with cannon and gun fire. We weathered the enemy air strikes with minimal losses.
At turn 22, the enemy appeared to approach Rafah Junction. We were able to direct fires from multiple locations and halted their attack. Two Sh’ot and a Mag’ach approached our eastern defensive line near the roadway and were turned back. One of our infantry AT teams killed a Sh’ot with a single shot. Not one enemy unit breached our defensive lines.
Observations
I have listed a few observations on the enemy capabilities and our techniques to counter. Additionally, a few notes on the Egyptian army capabilities or lack thereof in this battle. Lastly, I will offer a few gameplay hints that others may find useful as well.
The Israeli 7th Ar Bde was highly mobile with deadly tank fire and a superb use of mechanized forces. They kept their formations tight giving every opportunity to return coordinated fire from multiple units in their formations, therefore, it is emphasized not to trade fire with them but to rely on maneuver, position, and opportunity fire against their armored forces.
The use of smoke to screen our units was highly valuable and enabled many of our tank crews to extend the fight into later turns. The smoke also seemed to dampen the air strike capabilities on our tank crews.
We found in this battle, that to move tank units condemned them to die.
The Egyptian forces with low Experience and Morale factors had a hard time to rally and a difficult time to level accurate fire on enemy units. I found the Egyptians had a chance if I could get units in defensible positions with clear lines of sight at least one turn before the arrival of the enemy within range.
Additionally, setting appropriate range and filter on units was extremely important especially given that the Egyptian Experience factor was low, therefore, holding fire until the enemy was closer in range increased the chance of a kill. Lastly, the Egyptian forces must be kept close in formation as the battle was fought and decided North of Rafah Junction with the T-54 Tank companies.
Historical Notes on Egyptian Forces
I was always skeptical of the AIW series for allotting low Experience and Morale factors to the Egyptian forces. Most other scenarios allot low factors as well. Commonly, scenario developers have bought into the superiority of the IDF over the Arab forces in the region as a sole consequence of planning, training, communication and control, and execution. While it is difficult to model these factors in our game, nonetheless it is a fact in history of the overwhelming if not stunning collapse of Arab forces in the face of the IDF. But, is the reason solely due on IDF capabilities or is it something else?
As this battle was fought on 5 June 1967 I wanted to play this scenario as it appealed to me in a strange way to research the Egyptian forces at that time to identify if possible a reason for the ineptness of the Egyptian forces in 1967. I found an interesting article by the Egyptian General Mohamed Fawzi titled: “Part II Reflections on mistakes made in planning, training, equipping, and organizing Egyptian combat formations prior to the 1967 Six-Day War.” The article is authored by Aboul-Enein Youssef, Cmdr USN, 1 September 2012 in the publication Infantry Magazine.
Therein, General Fawzi credits the collapse of the Egyptian forces to a lack of training, preparedness, illiteracy, and sound leadership at the higher headquarters. It is no longer a mystery why winSPMBT scenario designers continue to allot low Experience and Morale factors to Arab forces in the historic battles of 1967. Their forces were not, in a strange twist of fate, organized to fight Israel, but to maintain internal order defending their regimes against their own people.
I rate this scenario challenging. However, from an scenario developer view, the absence of Egyptian FA at Rafah is mystifying only if the battle is researched from the Israeli side. If we look at Egyptian sources, albeit they are few and far in between, we get a view of the battle with a interesting tidbits, a rather nuanced perspective of this great historical battle if not a repeat of 1956 certainly not a precursor to '73, but a stern struggle of wit, might, and strength against something far less.
Battle Report
14th Ar Bn - T-54B tanks at start of battle
General Fawsi's report with commentary by Aboul-Enein Youssef, Cmdr USN, Part III
Scenario 4. Egyptian armor - Six Day War
Re: Scenario 4. Egyptian armor - Six Day War
Re: Scenario 4. Egyptian armor - Six Day War
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