Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

It details how the Soviets failed and why we are not them. We are not using terror tactics to try and beat the people into submission. Also, the vaunted SPETSNAZ were never trained as American Special Forces are to do, they were only trained to bash things.

Read the whole thing, might help with scenario design:
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Conten...qadbb.asp?pg=1

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

Some times I wonder how a modern USSR under Stalin or a Hitler's Germany (today's technology) would cope with Afghanistan.
What I mean is, perhaps the soviets were not harsh enough and that is why they lost. I hope the alliance wins, but I don't see it happening any time soon.

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

The main differance between the Red Army of 1979 and it's Western counterpart was the quality of it's training and the focus of the doctrine. The Red Army was never designed for COIN, it was a heavy army designed to bash through NATO defenses. It also had no NCO corps in the definition that we understand it, the lower officers were tasked with what should have been an NCO's job.

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

Mr Scott,
Be patient,
Military operations and "state building" or "regime change" initiatives are judged by their results. We know that the Soviets failed in Afganistan. We don't know what will the US/West accomplish in the end.
All we know, though, is that the clock is ticking ...
In comparison our more professional and equipped armed forces (both in hardware/training and doctrine)are tunning down their presence in Iraq. Our we satisfied by our results there? Is Iraq stable? Would you take your family for vacations there? :ahh:

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

More like a horrendous article that cannot get its facts straight:

"One could not have designed a military less well-prepared to deal with such a conflict than the Red Army of 1979. The Soviet military had not fought a war since 1945. Soviet company, battalion, brigade, division, and even army commanders had no experience in combat."

If you fought in the war from 1944 - 1945, you would be roughly 19 in 1945. In 1979 you would be 54 or 55. You'd be leading the army, and would still have experience, you don't retire at 55. Vyacheslav Borisov commander in the 2008 South Ossetia War at the age of 54. In addition, the Soviet divisions did fight in Hungary, Vietnam, parts of Africa, etc.

"Soviet conscripts were notoriously brutal, drunk, and unprofessional." - that just sounds like a pointless Ad Hominem that's unsourced.

"But SPETSNAZ units were not equivalent to our Special Operations Forces." - that's odd, and not true. Even this game points out it's not true.

"There was no Soviet doctrine for counter-insurgency because Soviet ideology could not foresee the USSR fighting against a revolution." - oh really? What about counter-revolution? What about Hungary in 1956? What about Nazi insurgency in 1944?

"The Red Army had recognized the limitations of its soldiers since the 1920s. It addressed them by requiring operational-level headquarters to design missions that would be relatively easy at the tactical and sub-tactical levels." - yet another fallacy, for instance see Operation Bagration.

It's a common myth I see, where the Russian Army is always underestimated. Hitler in the 1940's. Chechens in 1999 (Dagestan War). Georgians in 2008. Allies in 1920's. And that's just in the past 100 years.

The real reason for the Red Army's defeat was two-fold. The initial Red Army strategy in Afghanistan, to use shock forces to take key points and expand Soviet influence from these keypoints with the use of artillery, was not accepted by the Brezhnev Government. This left gaping holes in Soviet supply lines. The second reason was that the central government, under Brezhnev and later Gorbachev, made the same error that Nicolas I government made in the Russo-Japanese War, the army could not be properly supplied.

I want to see Al Qaeda defeated, I don't think there's a sane person out there who's rooting for Al Qaeda. But in order to defeat Al Qaeda, we cannot have military articles being called "excellent" - especially articles that constantly underestimate other armies. Pat MacArthur, the American General that brought the Phillipines under American control stated: "Never underestimate your enemy". (I think someone said that before him too.) If people constantly write articles underestimating the Red Army for political purposes, what's to stop the same people from underestimating Al Qaeda's abilities? Poor research is poor research, irrespective who you write about. We already made that mistake with Fallujah, with the Sunni Triangle, let's not make the same mistake again Al Qaeda, where it really counts. Let's stop writing crap, at least until bin Laden is toast and Al Qaeda is destroyed.

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

I respectfully disagree on several points, all of them technical. first of all, even at the height of Red Army liberties during the Great Patriotic War, they still suffered from a truly adequate professional NCO corps. Although the Red Army in 1943 and onward did allow lower ranked enlisted personnel more leeway, in the end it was the sheer numbers of men and tanks that made the destruction of Army Group Centre so decisive. Many experienced NCOs were lost due to attrition and the brutal Red Army discipline. It was a war within a war to keep experienced NCOs around to teach the raw new conscripts even the beginnings of soldiering that their Wehrmacht or Western Allied forces took so seriously.

Soviet strategy in Afghanistan was motivated by chronic supply shortages as you noted but also by a lack of effective dismounted infantry training, appropriate air assets and doctrine, and the evre-present unprofessional nature of the Soviet conscript, whose main intrests were drinking and getting home as soon as possible. Also, the STAVKA itself was out of it's element fighting a war like what they had in Afghanistan instead of fighting the mass tank war that it had trained for versus NATO. Again, Soviet military training was always more about tanks than fighting insurgents and also the last time the Red Army has to fight a counter-revolution was in the 1920's.

The ongoing lack of a truly dedicated NCO corps continues to plaque the Russian Army and that hardly seems to have gotten better. I have known individual NCO's from Russia who were utterly competent, professional, and dedicated professionals much alike our own here in the US. Day to day operations seem to be run by subaltern officers who seem to be filling billets meant for seargents and corporals. The vaunted SPETZNAZ are one of the few truly professional elements in the Russian military and they have indeed made changes to their training since Afghanistan but when they went into Afghanistan. Their training had not prepared them for what American and British specops training has always prepared for, namely creating friendly forces with locals and then using them to fight the war themselves. From the article:

Finally, the Russians were incredibly vicious during the war. Their only recourse to failed operations seemed to be dropping mines and sowing terror amongst the Afghan populace which only caused more anger and resentment. The tales of wholesale destruction of villages and violations of Afghan women have passed into legend. With such conduct it seems only logical that the Afghanis would respond in kind. Our soldiers, airmen, Marines are fighting with far different tactics and our special forces are using far more effective methods. See these articles for more:

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...rinsurgency-o/

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...sting-afghani/

The Soviet Army of 1979 was totally incapable of doing what our specops guys are doing now because of a fundamental difference in training ethics and styles of Western and Russian Armies. Russian commanders just did not have the training or resources to nation-build.

I hope this was not too long-winded. The nature of the Russian Army continues to be one of my passions and I have a great amount of respect and admiration for the Bear. I also know that we still have so much to learn about one another.

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

While the Red Army had no official NCO corps, I think you will find this true story interesting, it comes from "My Just War" by Gabe Temkin, who was a Polish Jew fighting in the Red Army, and who later became an American Professor, publishing one of the best books on the Red Army in the English Language. If you want to know what life was like for the average Russian infantryman, it is a must read. ISBN: 0-89141-645-5. Anyways, back on topic, the particular summary starts on page 169 and goes until page 172:

Sixteen Red Army Scouts crossed the Prut River, fully equipped at night. They were looking for "tongues" - enemy soldiers who would tell the Red Army what's going on. They caught two sleeping Romanian soldiers in a machine gun pit. They tried to ambush the rest of the Romanian soldiers in the village, but failed to do so, when one of the Red Army soldiers decided to kidnap a pig for dinner, and the latter protested very loudly, waking up the whole village. After a brief firefight, where no one was hurt, the Romanian soldiers fled. After the Colonel, on the other side of the river, recieved the two "tongues" he ordered the contingent back. However the contingent's leader had too much initiative to just turn back.

The Red Army Scouts then set up the HQ, the perimeter, and instead of going back as ordered, went scouting. Temkin was placed in charge of finding and holding an HQ suitable building, and given six men. Temkin wasn't an official officer. Soon the villagers were surrendering. Far from the myth-driven Red Army brutality, the relations between the villagers and the Red Army were as warm as they could be.

Another order came from the Colonel, stating "you have accomplished what you were supposed to, no point in sitting there, drinking and resting..." Instead of following the order, the commander (who was a senior Lt.) of the sixteen scouts promoted himself to Colonel, and stated that he will now be accepting Romanian POWs. He sent his scouts, to every building, telling them about the HQ "where the Colonel was now resting". Not only did he establish good will with the villagers, but he also captured a total of nineteen Romanians.

The punishment for disobeying two direct orders? None.

Stories, such as the one described above, happened with great frequency in the Red Army, especially after Stalin gave the Red Army a free hand in conducting its own affairs. For instance, the Red Army also operated Churches, with Stalin telling the NKVD to lay off; examples included rumored quotes such as "with the Nazis nearby we have no time to examine whether that's a Church or a military HQ". The Churches were shut down in 1946, and the repression of religion began again, but in 1942-1945, there was freedom of religion in the Red Army.

So while the Red Army may have lacked an NCO system, after the Battle of Stalingrad, the Red Army had initiative, and allowed men who were not officers to lead. It was very open minded to experimentation. In addition, after the Battle of Stalingrad, senior men taught the new recruits the basics of fighting, combat, and what not to do.

In Operation Bagration for instance, the casualty rate (of irreversible casualties, not including lightly wounded and those sick with malaria and other deceases) was two to one in favor of the Red Army. In other words, for every Red Army soldier killed, the Wehrmacht lost two soldiers. At the Battle of Belgrade, the rate was three to one. Moreover, the Red Army did not enjoy a 2 to 1 numerical advantage over the Wehrmacht, until 1945, except in a few cases.

Now as for Afghanistan. The extreme major of Red Army soldiers serving in Afghanistan volunteered. They weren't looking to go home ASAP. I will concede that the STAVKA in Afghanistan, performed horrendously. However the American version of the STAVKA in Vietnam, also performed quite poorly. Back than niether the US, nor the USSR could fight and win such a war, with the strategies that they were employing.

The problem with the current Russian Army training is that Russia has all kinds of units, from the GRU SpetzNatz, such as Battalion Vostok that took out Georgian units three times their size and suffered two light wounded casualties, to the conscripts. The tales of destruction of Afghan Villages are a bit embellished though, and it wasn't done on a wide and systematic level. Nor were the Red Army casualties in Afghanistan severe. The whole "terror" claims of the Red Army in Afghanistan are severely exaggerated.

There are some reasons why the US may succeed. First and foremost, is that unlike the USSR, the US can lead a coalition against bin Laden. Second is that scouting techniques are improved. Third is that the US has experience that they can rely on, from the lessons of Vietnam. I agree with the part you quoted. And the Red Army does need to improve it's dismounting techniques.

However the Russian Army of today, could have tackled and won the Afghan War. Few people realize how poorly the Brezhnev and Gorbachev leadership perforemed at the strategic level, which was the number one cause for the Red Army's loss in Afghanistan. I cannot use words to describe their poor performance. If one was to study the Russian Army in action in the Second Chechen War, one would see that the problems of reconnaisance, of dismounted combat have shown great improvement. In the 2008 South Ossetia War, the Russian Army broke all expectations, for the first time since the Battle of Vienna. (Actually occured on May 8th, there are other reasons that Russians want May 9th to be Victory Day then Stalin's politics.)

An intelligent debate can never be long winded, and you are partially correct in the Russian/Red Army's lack of NCOs. However I hope that Temkin's story sheds new light on why the Red Army may not have needed that NCO knowledge as much as their British and American counterparts.

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

Also, I'd like to point out that the Red Army did very well against Japan, and not only at Lake Khasan and Khalkin Gol, but also during the Invasion of Manchuria, where in a matter of weeks the Red Army captured more men then the allies in a matter of years. But they had a high quality overall strategy, excellent scout reports and stellar coordination. The Red Army that attacked Japan in 1945, could have also defeated Afghanistan.

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

Wholly agree & guess what US of this era were not much good at it, they still leave it to others like the Brits if they can.
Its just so much flag waving Hollywood style taking known issues with the Soviet Army & saying they applly uniformly across the board. If I wrote as I suspect is these guys viewpoint you could say virtualy everything said applies equally to the USAs efforts in Vietnam a bit earlier.
The diffrence is simple USSR as think Snipey said were cripled by supply (Kremlin) while we go in with total overkill. Do you think the Soviets used a helo gunship to take out one man. Its mad I have seen videos planes or multiple vehicles shooting at a group of 4 or 5 men. They never saw this sort of firepower it was a more traditional war man against man & when the USSR did try using helos the MANPADS good old USA supplied them with were used.
That & the time that has passed & hence yes changes in training means they should do better, whether its enough we will have to wait & see.
In fact if I was a Russin journalist I would be urging for massive arms programs as 5 years from now the Likes of USA will be good at fighting terrorists but stopping big armoured forces could be a problem. They have way to many specialists great at what they do but thats it period.

Thats taking a few facts & washing over it just like this article, not really the place for this it tells you nothing for scenerio design tactics are controlled by you & forces used there are far better sources.

Ha just read the previous 2 posts phone went while doing this.

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

Oh my...
First of all I would not call the first article posted "excellent". It may be excellent by the Weekly Standard
standards: while still being a propaganda piece and superficial at least it does not regurgitate the typical clichè or is "in your face" with the propaganda. Still, it's a bunch of political hacks with big agendas to push (everyone is biased of course, but there is a question of degree).
For scenario design it is clearly useless. For such purpose I would suggest the far more relevant and professional link:

The Bear Went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan

It describes neatly (maps included) and in a well organized manner several engagements which fit well with SPMBT game scale (company and battalion level actions).

To be fair Iraq is probably as good as it gets. It is not like that before big evil Saddam came to power everything was fine and dandy. Iraqi history is a history of military coups, permanent insurgency (give or take the odd temporary truce) and generally people not being nice to each other.

After all it was not Saddam who was quoted saying:

More on the rest later...

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

While I can see how creating friendly forces from the local population could be one solution (Alexander the Great did it just fine), I disagree that pure violence wouldn't do the same. IF, USA wasn't at least trying to save innocent lives, IF USA was there to capture the land and IF there wasn't much democracy back there, an extermination strategy would work. Sure, it wouldn't make many friends elsewhere, but fear is a great motivator for peace.

I hope I am proven wrong, but I don't see any real long lasting victory in the area unless suddenly the population changes beliefs.

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

If you are implying that the western armies have been doctrinally focused on COIN, sorry that does not fly.
Since WW2 the doctrinal focus was on stopping the Red Horde From The East: that was the primary task, sometimes pursued at expense of everything else (see for example the emphasis put on nuclear forces at the severe expense of conventional ones in the early Cold War).
COIN was an after thought most of the time; yes there were the green berets etc but it was a small niche and did not really influence deeply the Army as a whole.
Vietnam, the only major COIN (and mind you, COIN was just a fraction of what was going on there anyway) experience before Iraq, left the US Army with a sour taste when it came to COIN and the general reaction afterwards was "let's forget about and focus on the Fulda Gap".
The upper side of that was the US Army splendid performance in 1991. The downside was the mistakes post 2003, when the US military had essentially to relearn COIN from scratch.
Now COIN is a primary mission but it is just because of contemporary circumstances.

You could easily define a lot of what was going on in Afghanistan in the 80's as "terror tactics" and "beat the people into submission". But then a lot of what was going in Vietnam would fall under that category. From the liberal use of massive amounts of firepower in populated areas to the relocation of population.

Legend is a apt term. As you will probably recall the US was engaged in a proxy war against the USSR which included, shocking suprise, heavy use of propaganda. And Afghanistan is not a great place for fact finding missions after the fact.
No doubt there was an extremely indiscriminate usage of firepower by the soviets, at least by current standards, and lots of atrocities to boot. But contemporary tales were filtered throught the anti USSR propaganda and that cannot be overlooked in a critical analysis.
Mining operations for example were extensively carried out by the mujahedeen too (mines were one of the most sought after weapons back in Pakistan).

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

The Najibullah regime outlasted (if briefly) the USSR itself while the US & Co were pumping aid to the Mujahedin even after the soviet withdrawal years earlier. Which means that at a minimum that the Army that the soviets had trained was at least somewhat effective. I would not bet much on the current crop in Kabul faring better.

I doubt it. Any source for that?

It should be note that Hungary did not put up an organized resistance and the local conditions were not favorable to an eventual insurgency.
Whatever "Nazi insurgency" may have been around in 1944 was a small scale thing, just like anti soviet leftovers in the Baltics and such which were not eliminated until years later. Such things barely registered on the radar, if they did register at all. Large scale COIN abroad was something new indeed.

Soviets did fight in Vietnam, Korea and others places, but not as divisions or in major force generally.

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

Unlikely, except perhaps for SPETZNAZ units. Recall the Soviet military was a conscript force in it's majority and it would be unthinkable for men to volunteer to return to the war zone.

Both invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia were considered "internal affairs" of the Warsaw Pact, and at any rate were "classic" operations, ie a permissive country with extant communist infrastructure and the local resistance was doomed from the start.
Sources:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warsaw_...Czechoslovakia

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hungari...lution_of_1956

The abortive Nazi resistance of 1945-1946 were handled with great efficiency and ruthlessness by the occupation forces of the allies and also suffered from not having the support of the German people. One would suppose 12 years of Nazi brutality was enough.

Soviets did fight in Vietnam, Korea and others places, but not as divisions or in major force generally.[/quote]

Indeed, Soviet aviators did fly combat missions over Korea during the war in the 1950's, although they were forbidden to speak Russian and had orders not to be taken alive. During the stress of combat against USAF Sabres the pilots would quite naturally forget the former and use Russian freely.

Sources:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MiG_Alley
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikoyan-Gurevich_MiG-15

In Vietnam Soviet troops numbered some 3,000 and the Soviets provided material, including the SA-2 that shot down USAF B-52 bombers. Their role in combat is unknown, although it is known that during the Son Tay raid that some Soviet advisers may have been killed but that has never been determined with any certainty.

Source:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam_War#Soviet_Union
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Ivory_Coast

Soviet operations in Africa were the Ogaden War, involvement in Angola, and operations during the Congo Crisis of 1962, although personnel deployments were nowhere near those seen in the above mentioned Hungarian and Czech operations. Socialist interventions in Africa were largely proxy affairs, with Cuba providing the bulk of the land forces.

Sources:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ogaden_War
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mozambican_Civil_War
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angolan_Civil_War
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_African_Border_War
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congo_Crisis
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_War_(1985–1991)

During the Cold War, if you said you were socialist or communist and hated the USA then the Soviets would support you, which is why Afghanistan is such a one-off. The US pretty much dropped Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal, with Pakistan being left
with the job of relocating the refugees.

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

The volunteer quote comes from a Russian movie about the Afghanistan War. Also, I'd like to point out that even if said movie is incorrect, the Red Army never had more than 10 percent in Afghanistan. One out of ten volunteering for glory, for a better wage, for excitement, for heroics, it's not that far fetched.

In Hungary there was an actual anti-Soviet Revolution, bankrolled by the US. In Czechoslovakia it was more of a "we're defending out lands" kind of event. Don't mix the two.

Also, you may be forgetting this, but the Soviets only took 15,000 losses in Afghanistan. In the Battle of Berlin, the Red Army lost over 80,000. In other words, it wasn't the devastating losses that made the Red Army withdraw from Afghanistan, and the Red Army could have kept on going. The major problem, the reason why the Red Army lost in Afghanistan, was the Brezhnev-Gorbachev Government. But to Americans, who are crazy about "Gorby Mania" this is hard to understand. The main problem is that Gorbachev was a disaster for the USSR, but only Gorbachev's "sunny side" was shown in the American Press, his treatment of the Red Armed Forces, of the USSR's farmers, of factory workers, of, well pretty much the common man, was rather poor.

And while you do cite all of the data, the Red Army/Red Air Force bashing aside, "combat stress" - well that happens to everyone and the Red Air Force spoke Russian even when they weren't in combat and flying over Korea. Also, you are just proving my point, and disproving the article's initial point, which was that the Red Army didn't have combat experience going into Afghanistan.

Also, I agree with Marcello on Soviet Atrocities: "Legend is a apt term. As you will probably recall the US was engaged in a proxy war against the USSR which included, shocking suprise, heavy use of propaganda. And Afghanistan is not a great place for fact finding missions after the fact. No doubt there was an extremely indiscriminate usage of firepower by the soviets, at least by current standards, and lots of atrocities to boot. But contemporary tales were filtered throught the anti USSR propaganda and that cannot be overlooked in a critical analysis. Mining operations for example were extensively carried out by the mujahedeen too (mines were one of the most sought after weapons back in Pakistan)."

Also of note, the Russian Army has had three successful wars, Dagestan War, Second Chechen War, and the 2008 South Ossetia War.

In order to be great at understanding any military, one must separate politics from military, or one is doomed to failure, as your "hurrr durrr 'Semper Fi Georgia' thread" shows.

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

I'll refrain from any personal response, but I will answer professionally:

1. Military history is not, nor will it ever be, seperated from the politics of the era. Politics have played a central part in the wars of the latter half of the past century.

2. I will never bash either purposely or inadvertantly the fighting prowess, ability or pride of such a vaunted army as the Russian one. It serves no use. And it is the height of disrespect to minimize the average Russian Army conscript. The Germans did that in 1942 to their undoing.

3. All data on the personnel losses were broken down in the wikipedia article and, to the best of my knowledge, takes into account battle fatigue as well. See the bottom part of the article.

4. I have not the foggiest idea as to pay, bonuses, hazard pay, or any of the ways the Russian military may or may not compensate their combat troops. Your assertion of troops volunteering may be correct but to assume that they have the same bonus pay as we do is not a correct course. I just don't know how their pay scales work.

And Lastly:

Please consider reading John Keegan's excellent work A History of Warfare and Suz Tzu The Art of War. Both these tomes and some truly excellent military history professors have made very sure that I have absorbed the lessons of history. John Keegan's work continues to occupy pride of place on my desk and every Marine that walks into my office sees it every day. My long association with Marines and soldiers has given me a rare insight into the way one fights and warfare.

I would agree with you that my Georgia thread was ill-considered largely the result of not thoroughly reading the subject or the article and for that I apologize.

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

Isn't that Keegan's book the one where he tries to look good by bashing Clausewitz?

Anyway, I think Snipey was more referring to propaganda and subjectivity when he talked about "politics".

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

1. My point is this: you have to understand the difference between military historians writing articles and politicians writing articles, and treat them as such. You have to know the purpose behind the article. Something written about Russia's army by the Jamestown Foundation is a joke, but something written about Russia's army by the Moscow Defense Brief, or even found on the CIA World Factbook is to be taken seriously. You have to learn the difference between the two.

2. I consider some of your posts, particularly about Russian discipline and Russian drunkenness to be bashing, as they come form sources who focus on hype and sensation, rather than reality. I am not saying you do it intentionally.

3. Battle Fatigue is a factor in every war. It was certainly a factor in Afghanistan, but not the deciding factor.

4. I never said Russian troops had the same bonus pay as US troops. That would be a silly assumption. If one was to merely look at the average wages in the US vs. Russia or the USSR, one would see that US wages are generally higher, so the bonuses would be greater.

If you want to know more about the Red Army, read David Glantz and John Ericson. And Sun Tzu is a must read, no questions here. As for John Keegan, I would agree with the Christian Science Monitor that the comparison of the Iraq War to WWII are innapropriate.

The thing about your Georgia thread, it happened many times, and you weren't the only one, so apology accepted :D You just happened to mention it on what I would consider to be a military website, so I had to say something about it.

The part that annoys me the most, is that the bashing is still going on to this day, and not just in the case of Russia. Many Marines unjustly get called Baby Killers. Russians are now calling "butchers of civilians" - even though their acts saved civilians. The media, politics, will drive anything, "if it bleeds, it leads". Political articles must be ignored, they must be trashed, and until people realize that political articles are written for the sole purpose of someone's monetary gain, and not to inform the read, we will have misunderstandings. I mean people are thinking that Russia will be invading Ukraine soon, which is the biggest bull**** I've heard.

I try to stay out of political forms, which is why I like this forum, but my main point remains: you have to separate politically written articles from those written by military professionals. And sometimes, credentials are a tricky business, as credentials are not hard to get at all. One must look at the content of the article itself, and not the credentials of the writer. The articles that I've seen you put up for discussion here, albeit I've only seen two, have been primarily politically-driven articles, rather than complex military analysis. And to me, that is the most dangerous path of them all, articles with a political purposes, disguised as military analysis. It's like a guy selling you a lemon and telling you it's the greatest car in the World.

An easy way to tell the difference, is to read their previous articles. If a person was wrong 20 percent of the time or more, he is not a professional military analyst, and should be ignored. Focus on the article itself, rather than the writer. Look for content, more political crap, or more military analysis. That's just my two cents, because I see you, and not just you, making the same mistake, trusting that crooked car salesman, and buying their articles, hook, line and sinker. I want to assist you by giving you a guide, I don't want a flame war, and I thank you for avoiding the latter; it is my hope that you follow the former.

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

Without wishing to be drawn into the debate I would just like to post a couple of links to articles about the Soviet-Afghan War.

The Soviet-Afghan War: A Superpower Mired in the Mountains
by Lester W. Grau, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/doc...redinmount.htm

Humping a Ruck Across Sunny Afghanistan, Summer of 1986.
A Snipers Paradise interview with a Soviet Spetsnaz vet of the Soviet-Afghan War.

http://www.snipersparadise.com/articles/soviet.htm

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

The last article/interview is wonderful.
Read it.

The interviewee seems to have the same opinion as I. The war there is not going to gain anything. The people of the area will not change and become friends.

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

No, the book central theme is trying to view warfare through the Clausewitz view that warfare is a continuation of official state political policy through another means. Clausewitz understood that politics always motivated warfare.

I have bookmarked the links that were provided and will read them later.The Soviet war in Afghanistan is a virtual unknown and the more that I can learn about it the more I can enlighten my colleagues about it.

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

Michael Yon is currently in Afghanistan and is stomping about with British soldiers. He has posted this article along with excellent photos. Also, the Yon article has some excellent Google Earth screenies that might prove valuable for scenario design.

http://www.michaelyon-online.com/bad-medicine.htm

Also, I have come across an article detailing why training the ANA is taking so long. I especially like the latter part of the article where he goes a long way to demolish, in his view, many of the assumptions people have about the ANA.

http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/a...24.html#006507

Lastly, a big thank you to those of you who have posted civil and professional answers to this post. I have learned alot from the answers and hope that further articles I post will start many more robust learning sessions. We are here to learn.

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

The last article is truly a must read. Thank you :D Also, I remember someone here talking about Soviets not having NCOs, or something like that: "Andrei: Typically 22 people or somewhere around there. There were five officers, 4 NCO's, and the rest sergeants and privates. "

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

Thanks. Interesting article and photos.

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

Movies are entertainment and simply cannot be trusted as history sources. Else one could be led to assume that King Tigers look exactly like M47s...

Now I am certainly not an expert about the Soviet/Russian army (I am more interested in their clients) but every source I read
about them describe the 80's era Soviet Army as a conscript Army,
no Kontraktniki back them. You were called up and you showed up and were sent where the higher ups saw fit, which might be Afghanistan. You could volunteer for Spetnaz/VDV duty which might again land you in Afghanistan.
At no point I have ever found mention of ad hoc volunteer units raised for Afghan duty or any other mechanism that would ensure that the bulk (as opposed to some individuals) of the units posted there were manned with volunteers specifically wishing to be there.
I imagine that some officers and soldiers might have requested to go there and perhaps such requests might have been accepted but there is no mention of such a thing being widespread anywhere. Hence I would like to see something on it, if there is any.

The soviets got out because while they were not suffering devastating losses they were still suffering losses and using up resources while accomplishing nothing of substance.
As it turned out the DRA security forces were able to hold the line by themselves and the soviets could not do much more than that when they were around anyway.

In regards to Gorbachev, yes in hindsight it was a disaster.
But it was apparent by the early 80's that the system in its current form was going nowhere. Absent changes they would simply be overtaken by the West, with their economy, conventional forces etc. lagging further and further behind. Perhaps they might have managed to shield themselves indefinitively behind the nuclear arsenal and be content with running a stagnating and increasingly less relevant country. Not a pleasant thought unless you are of the Kim Jong-il ilk.
Do you think the rest of the soviet establishment would have let Gorbachev go as far as he did otherwise?

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

I am referring to the lack of long-service NCO's like we have in the West. Those men tend to be the backbone of a long-service army and RussianSoviet military doctrine of the time put many of the duties associated with low- to mid-ranking corporals and sgts into the hands of very junior lieutenant ranks. To my knowledge that practice has not changed.

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

In the early 1970's the Soviets reintroduced the praporshchik rank. Sort of an ensign or warrant officer. [Isby, weapons and tactics of the Soviet Army, p65]
Isby also mentions that there is also a route for NCO conscripts to remain in the army by enlisting for extended service, those not deemed quite good enough to become Praporishchiki remain as plain NCOs. However, only about 1-2% would extend after their 2 years conscript service. Most Russians would rather be out of the army!.

Isby gives 5% of the Soviet Army as being long-service NCOs. This is minuscule by comparison with Western armies, even those which bulked up their "other-ranks" volume with national service conscripts.

Also, Praporishchiki were often employed as e.g helicopter pilots, missile system operators or similar to-task specialists, rather than as line (e.g motor rifle) unit SNCOs. So the Soviets were not really using these as a "Backbone" to the army as Company(+) sergeant-majors etc.

Cheers
Andy

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

The quote was from more of a documentary, than an actual movie type thing, I should have clarified that earlier. From what I gathered, the people were conscripted, and out of those conscripted some volunteered to go to Afghanistan. Also there were Spetznatz volunteers.

There are whole articles and multiple viewpoints as to what the Soviets accomplished/didn't accomplish in Afghanistan. I will say that under Soviet rule Afghan women's lives improved. However, this is bordering on politics, so I won't go any further in that direction.

I was talking about Gorbachev's mishandling the army, and the domestic front. I don't buy the argument that one has to sacrifice the army in order to achieve political goals. I do know that the army was going to coup Gorbachev eventually, because of the War in Afghanistan. Gorbachev either had to pull out the troops, or supply the troops. Instead he did nothing. The army isn't a pushover in Russia, they have power. The could've prevented Yeltsin from couping Gorbachev. But he lost their trust. If you choose to, pardon my French, **** your fellow countrymen for your political ambitions, then you aren't a great leader, and quite frankly, you are a poor exuse for a human being. Gorbachev truly screwed the Red Army, almost as bad as Stalin.

The USSR was already overtaken by the West. US had FDR, while USSR had Stalin. US had no war fought on its soil, except Pearl Harbor, Alaska and minor incidents. USSR took the brunt of the war. Being overtaken by the West was nothing new to the USSR. It wasn't like there was a point in time where the Soviets were winning the Cold War, with the exception of America's disastrous War in Vietnam, but that mistake was American, not Soviet.

However USSR could never have been isolated as North Korea is today? Having lived in Yeltsin's Russia, I can say that it wasn't worth it. Nothing was worth going through that. As for changes, I believe they would've happened, through this cool thing called a "series of tubes" aka The Internet. There was a war between the Russian Hackers and the Russian Government. The hackers won. With the exception of articles aiding Nazism, those aiding Al Qaeda, and those publishing explicit materials of child pornography, the Internet, in Russia, is uncensored. And quite frankly, I doubt that the Soviet Government could have defeated the Russian Hackers, because the Soviet Government failed to stop the importation of Rock and Roll, which I personally believe was a wonderful import. After the Internet was made available to the masses, the USSR Government would have to adopt, and free speech, would be allowed, except without the mass panic that was produced and that has killed, according to estimates, at least 3,000,000 to 5,000,000 Russians. To call it a disaster is a huge understatement.

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

I don't understand what you mean by "supply" here. Trasportation was a bottleneck, with a poor road network used by harrassed convoys where one truck every 3-4 had to carry a Zu-23 instead of cargo for self defense. It is questionable they could have shipped there much more stuff than they actually did. I suppose they could have brought more high quality stuff, say more SU-25s instead of older planes, more PGMs etc but that was 1)expensive and they were already overspending in the military 2) the more modern stuff was badly needed by the GSFG in case the balloon went up, which around 1983 or so was not an extremely remote possibility.

Or do you have something else in mind?

Perhaps being overtaken was the wrong choice of word. I will explain with an example: insofar such things can be gauged the soviet economy was still growing at competitive world rates in the 60's. It was believable back then that catching up with the developed world could have been possible at some point in the future.
By the 80's this was definitively not the case anymore.
Do you get what I am trying to say?

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

On the above, I am not so sure on the escort/transport ratio.
I remembered it was written somewhere in this website
http://www.ruswar.com/army.htm
But it might be just my memory playing tricks. Still it did not look like a walk in the park:
http://www.ruswar.com/RusWar/Automob...convoy-143.jpg

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

Then you improve to road network. If the Red Army could deliver supplies to Leningrad, you can be damn sure they can deliver supplies to Kabul. You also coordinate with allies, improve overall strategy, use bombs and air force in intense battles, take the casualties, but gain the ground. You don't just sit there and do nothing, like Gorbachev did!

I do, but I think you're wrong. Keep in mind that in the USSR there was no unemployment, everyone had jobs, and most people had a roof over their head and food to eat, as well as quality healthcare. There was also no massive depression during the Cold War in the West. I think that if the USSR lasted to this day, it would have been interesting, to say the least, and I know that scenario would be better for Russians, than the one that took place. It's about surviving, not about winning the Cold War. USSR couldn't have won the Cold War, but it could have given its citizens quality lives, which is much better than what Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's Russia did. The main reason that Putin is popular in Russia, is because under Putin the living standards of the average Russian, either doubled or tripled, depending on whose analysis you look at.

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

The USSR couldn't have won the cold war unless it went hot and won that one. It's simple a matter of numbers. You can't fight an opposite system and at the same time depend on it for your own survival.

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

They actually did. BUT they could not supply enough to prevent both mass starvation taking place in Leningrad or any hypothetical massive escalation in Afghanistan. In both circumstances being able to do something did not mean you could
arbitrarily do more of it.

They did what they could. Remember, it was the soviets who had built the bulk of the roads in the north of Afghanistan in first place. But there is only so much they could accomplish once the shooting started.
You would have to bring in more vulnerable convoys with construction materials and construction sites themselves would be vulnerable. This would be just part of the problem of course.

http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?s...&article=23577

See the issues described in the above article and remember that the soviets had it at lot worse on every count.

What allies?

They were fighting abroad to protect an unpopular government
which was fundamentally at odds with the way of life of most locals, in a country where terrain and tradition favored guerilla warfare and bordering with a state willing to provide santuary to the guerrillas. IOW a strategic nightmare.

And none of the above had any simple fix.

They did.

They did.Holding was the problem.

Hindsight.
All the people knew, back then , was that they had to wait for years for a cheap *** car and that there were always shortage of the most basic goods.
And they were pretty fed up about it (and Internet would only make things worse, as the knowledge that in the West they had no such issues would become even more widespread). And it was not going to get much better anytime soon because the economy was not growing anymore at decent rates.
They were not expecting an economic collapse.

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

In the Leningrad Case I was referring to the Road of Life. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Road_of_Life If the Red Army could have done that, over treacherous ice, under severe Nazi bombardment, than why are you telling me that they couldn't do the same for Kabul? Mass starvation took place in Leningrad, before the Road of Life was built, not afterwards. Preventing further mass starvation was the whole point of the Road of Life, and the plan succeeded.

Also, you're talking about the USSR not being able to overproduce Afghanistan? I'm sorry, but that's just plain silly. In addition, if your building projects are being harassed, then simply set up ambushes, coordinate, bombard, use the Rocket Corps, etc. Give the native Afghanis jobs in building the roads. Stop building, duke it out with the local forces, and continue. You can use tanks to escort convoys. You can have have scouts patrol the roads. And if you're the USSR, you can surely commit more than 118,000 men.

What allies? Offer a training program to third world militaries, where you get elite SpetzNatz training, but your unit has to serve a year in Afghanistan. How many do you think would sign up for that? Even if half of the unit survives, and it would have been much more than half, you would have elite units in countries like Angola. A win-win for both countries. Yet nothing like that was even offered.

It was a tough war, no one denies that. But the main losing factors must be considered, if one is to understand how the war was lost. And the main factors were the Brezhnev and Gorbachev Governments. If the leader you are supporting is unpopular, you simply switch support. Again, that order lay with Gorbachev, not with the Red Army.

If the Red Army can hold Kursk against the Wehrmacht onslaught, surely they can hold any ground against the Taliban.

Actually the USSR had a nice system of mass transit, so a car didn't qualify for a basic good. In addition, if one was willing to look, substitutes for basic goods were readily available. It's not like there was mass starvation. The low crime rate enabled people to grow their own crops in the gardens, which, until the 1990's, no one stole.

They were fed up about it? Oh puh lease. It's not like there was a massive revolutionary feeling in the USSR. The Internet could have made it worst, or could have made it better, cause honestly we don't know. People might have found out not only about owning a car, but also about things like traffic, car insurance, unemployment, health insurance, massive divorce rate, the public school system in the US, the lack of Sanatoriums for a low price, ethnic warfare, (which was unknown in the USSR) etc. Either way, that was a choice to be made by the people, and the Internet would have given the people that choice. Gorbachev rushed through, completely unprepared. The result was mass chaos.

And you can say that hindsight is 20/20, but can you name a single country that successfully transformed into a Capitalist economy without mass chaos? And if you cannot, doesn't chaos usually bring about ethnic warfare? Like Chechnya? Like Ossetia? Like Nagorno-Karabakh? If everyone gets a car, but there isn't a road expansion, doesn't that lead to traffic? If everyone has a car, won't there be more accidents and a need for car insurance? In a Capitalist system, like the US, which Gorbachev was modeling from, is healthcare granted to every citizen? All that stuff could have been easily predictable, had Gorbachev not been so headstrong and impulsive, saying "my way or the high way". Sound familiar?

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

As I have mentioned a couple of times, and people choose to ignore me lol, the problem was that since the population was hostile and impossible to switch over for more than a temp time, the soviets were not ruthless enough. It was a half *** attempt at intervention. If they sent far more troops and just massacred the population wherever there was trouble, the situation would be solved quickly.

It is the same reason that the current one will fail. It was the same reason (or at least one of the reasons) that the Vietnam war failed for the americans (and the french). If you are going to send occupation forces where the population don't want you, you better be ready to either KILL or leave in shame.

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

Not entirely true. You just have to take out the leadership, and teach a painful lesson to those that are attacking your army, but not to the villagers. You don't just wipe off villages from the map; once you get attacked, you counter-attack, and follow through on it viciously. If they choose to hide in the village, than you take out the village. That way the village gets burned AFTER the Taliban units hide there, not before. As per leadership, look at how much damage was done to the Taliban in Pakistan when the glorious US missile took out Meshud. I rarely animate non living objects, but the missile that got Meshud deserves the nickname "Glory".

You also have to coordinate better with the locals. Not everyone in Afghanistan is pro-Taliban. So you arm those that are anti-Taliban, and go after the Taliban.

But in one aspect you are correct. The Brezhnev and Gorbachev Administrations half-assed the Soviet War in Afghanistan.

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

I think we are saying the same thing (in your last post).

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

I was perfectly aware of the "Road of Life".
What you don't seem aware of is a few details that the Wikipedia article gloss over but I (wrongly) assumed would be common knowledge, at least in general terms.
Leningrad needed an absolute minimum of a thousands of tons of supplies per day. A month after the opening of the road the tonnage delivered was still only 700-800 tons per day.
About 120.000 people starved to death only during January 1942, two months after the opening of the road. Another 130.000 or so died on February. Eventually enough people died or were evacuated and the improved supply system could cope.
"not afterwards" indeed :re:

Source: The siege of Leningrad, 1941-1944 by David M. Glantz
Or if you really like Wikipedia

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Effect_...ad_on_the_city

More on the rest later.

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

Once again, that was during the first two months of it being established. In the end, Leningrad had a population of 640,000, that were supplied. In addition, you have to keep in mind that the Red Army couldn't devote all of their resources to the Siege of Leningrad, like they could to the path to Kabul. In addition, if they could supply 640,000 in Leningrad, that would be above the requirements of supply needed to carry out the operations in Afghanistan. And that was done with limited resources, which were much less than the resources the USSR had when the Red Army invaded Kabul. In other words, the USSR could have pulled it off, but didn't because of Brezhnev and Gorbachev, which was my initial point. So let's not go off topic, and focus on the task at hand.

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

It wasn’t me who brought Leningrad up. I previously said:

Emphasis added.

Note: they DID supply their limited contingent, they DID supply the DRA army and security forces AND they DID supply the afghan population under their control, Kabul included. They had to ship half million of tons of wheat for civilian consumption during a single year. There certainly was no mass starvation in Kabul, to the best of my knowledge.
HOWEVER every single source on the matter notes that they had a hard time doing all of this. Adding, say an half million of troops or a massive reconstruction program of the 40.000 km of roads in Afghanistan or similar massive efforts would have in all likelyhood broken the back of the logistical system, even as it was the Salang pass had to be run on a one way system for example.

You wrote

Then you backtracked to

Actually it was opened in late november, as per your source. People were still dying en masse three months later, in no small part because it failed to supply the planned tonnage in December when only a portion of the 2000 tons (and still below the 1000 or so which were the bare minimum) planned by Leningrad Front for delivery that month were actually delivered. It was a incredible effort, by any standard, but you cannot use it as a proof that every logistical problem can be handwaved away.
That is what I am trying to get across.
They could do only so much and a lot of peple died because that “much” was not “enough”.

What are you trying to say here? They did carry out operations Afghanistan after all. Or are you trying to say that the they could post there several additional hundreds of thousands of soldiers because they were feeding a similar number of civilians in Leningrad (and some troops engaged in defensive operations)?
Do you realize how massive is the difference in supply requirements between civilians on survival rations and modern mechanized troops engaged in offensive operations? If not, please read something about it.

But let’s assume for a moment that logistics was not an issue

Sorry, the Red Army still could not devote all of their resources to Afghanistan,regardless of logistics, for the very same reasons it could not concentrate on Leningrad during WW2: it had others, equally or more pressing priorities. Or are you suggesting to rob Peter (the western theater military forces, the strained economy etc.) to give Paul (a useless backwater ) when Peter is obviously far more critical than Paul ? Do you realize what was happening elsewhere during the afghan war? They could not afford to throw endeless resources at a secondary problem.

Now let’s examine what you are proposing that should have been done

Ambushing the Mujahideen? Do you realize that it was done ad nauseam?
Read the first link I posted to “The Bear went over the Mountain”. There is an entire chapter dedicated to examples of soviet troops ambushing Mujahideen. It was a standard operation.

Do you know how the whole adventure started ?
That’s right, overthrowing an unpopular leader. Does the name Hafizullah Amin rings any bells?

Bad idea. Tanks:
1)Wear the road fast
2)Wear themselves fast when used for prolonged road marches
3)Use up a lot of fuel
4)Could not often engage the enemy due to insufficient elevation of the main armament

This was practical experience. A lot of the tanks originally available with the units were sent back because they simply were found not useful and only a smaller number was needed. Which is not to say that they were never used for that purpose but they were not as useful as you seem to think.

I could go on on the other points if you are interested but really, the 90% of the things you are touting as solutions or that you seem to think were never done fall into three categories:

1)They actually were the standard tactical repertoire.
2)They were tried and did not work.
3)They were obviously unworkable.

The remaining 10% may or may not have worked but were not enough to make a difference. Find me a war where one side did 100% of what it could have conceivably done.
Really it seems to me your animosity towards Gorbachev and Breznhev is blinding you to the actual constraints the soviet leadership was operating under. Whatever you may think of them, they were not operating in a vacuum.

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

The didn't supply the Afghanistan contingent properly. Yes, there were supplies, but it wasn't enough. My quote was that the Stavka failed to supply the escalation. Your counter-argument is that "they did supply the limited contingent". Your counter-argument fails to address my argument.

Of course they had a hard time, this is war. Rarely do you see a war that's easy. The US war against the Iraqi Insurgency is no Operation Cakewalk.

I brought up Leningrad for a comparison to show what the Red Army could do. I didn't bring it up to start a debate over it. We both agreed that 640,000 civilians were supplied from scratch via a treacherous road.

In the Siege of Leningrad there was limited supply that the Soviets could give to the city, because, uhhh geez, I don't know, maybe the Great Patriotic War was still going on? When the Red Army fought against Afghanistan the USSR had no other wars. In the Vietnam War, the US had over 550,000 men in Vietnam. Why couldn't the Red Army do something similar? It took the Red Army under three months to bring over one million men, all the way across the USSR to help take out the Japanese Army in Manchuria and capture 600,000 POWs, and destroy the previously undefeated Japanese Army in a matter of weeks.

The Western Front was far more criticial then an actual war? Are you serious? After Hungary, and especially after Czeckoslovakia, it was pretty damn obvious that NATO was going to invade the USSR. On the other hand, after the Berlin Airlift and the Cuban Missile Crisis, it was obvious that USSR wasn't going to go after NATO. The War in Afghanistan started in 1979. The Western Front wasn't going to be an issue. Carter wasn't going to invade. Reagan's new program focused on providing a counter to USSR nukes, and then using US nukes to threaten USSR to give their natural resources to the West. Bush followed Reagan's foreign policy until the USSR collapsed. No ground invasion was even possible here. The front was idle, not because both sides balanced each other out, but because of the strategies employed by the USSR and NATO. Major powers tried to avoid going to war after World War II, for some strange reason, maybe total devastation of the agressor had something to do with that.

So according to your logic, you keep your best troops in an idle front, while you have your average troops fight an actual war. Gorbachev and Brezhnev both supported that logic and that's how you lose wars. On the other hand, the Red Army leadership opposed it fiercely. If you have an actual war and an idle front, you send your best troops to fight in the actual war. That's how you win wars. But now I see why you agree with Brezhnev and Gorbachev.

You think there were enough ambushes. I think more could have been set. It's a difference of opinion on what's enough.

I still don't see why the Red Army couldn't switch support from an unpopular leader to a popular one. On the local level (city, neighborhood, town) the USSR actually had honest elections. Could have done the same for Afghani tribes.

If tanks no work, get better tank. Have tanks with less wear and tear, and raise the main armament. The T-34 was a product of World War II. Surely if the Soviet effort was placed towards the War, something like the T-34 could have been done. If tanks aren't useful, you make them useful. The T-34's predecessor sucked. But the T-34 model that was used at Kursk, albeit with more casualties, was able to stop the Wehrmacht tanks in a tank v. tank battle for the first time.

You still failed to address my point about using third world country militaries, in the manner that I've described, that is SpetzNatz training, fight a year in Afghanistan. You also failed to address my point of giving the local Afghani forces that were pro-USSR more responsibility.

Find you a war where the army performed at 100%? US in the Persian Gulf War. Red Army from post-Stalingrad to pre-Berlin campaign. Ike's forces at Battle of Normandy. Suvorov's campaign in the late 1700's, early 1800's.

But you and I think differently. I think in the pure military mindset; I'm against the best resources in idle fronts when actual wars are being fought.

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

The best thing about the T-34 was that for every german panzer, the USSR could field 1.5 billion T-34s. (yes I am kidding about the numbers).

What are you drinking and where can I get some? How was NATO ever going to invade and with what?

Now, as for the rest of your post, I am ok more or less, but the above is a bit silly.

I agree that it was mainly a matter of leadership that cost the war to the soviets. They were just too civilized about it.

NATO today doesn't seem to be as confused, they kill civilians just fine, but the problem is that while the armed forces there have been trained to kill and destroy, they ask them to do police duties and, at least on the ground, be extra careful to whom the fire, since they want to earn the hearts and minds of the populace, which is where, unless there is some huge change somewhere, will be their undoing. You do not act civilized against an enemy that will gladly slaughter you and your family in a sec if they are given the chance.
I have to say, Alexander did the smart thing. Go in, make allies and whoever doesn't agree, destroy, burn, kill. Then let them keep peace on their own and get the fudge out of there.

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

Wow. That was retarded. I meant to say "It was pretty damn obvious that NATO wasn't going to invade the USSR". Thank you for catching that. :doh: If you read the context of the post, you'd pick it up. But I meant to say wasn't, gah! :doh: I just pulled a McLellan. :doh:

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

In my defense, I did say that the front was idle, which meant no one was going to attack. But...just thank you for catching that, I cannot :doh: enough for that error. :doh:

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

Oh wow, I'm on a :doh: roll! I accidentally inserted this "At least I made the comment about the Front being idle, so that might have clued people on. But that is a horrible mistake to make. I can't :doh: enough for that mistake :doh: " into Wdll's post. Sorry about that. Anyways, not to detract from all those posts, I'll repost my argument, as it should have been written, with the "wasn't". I just put too much thought into my previous reply, reposted here, and it took away from my thinking abilities for the rest of the day. And now I took a nap, so here goes:


The didn't supply the Afghanistan contingent properly. Yes, there were supplies, but it wasn't enough. My quote was that the Stavka failed to supply the escalation. Your counter-argument is that "they did supply the limited contingent". Your counter-argument fails to address my argument.

Of course they had a hard time, this is war. Rarely do you see a war that's easy. The US war against the Iraqi Insurgency is no Operation Cakewalk.

I brought up Leningrad for a comparison to show what the Red Army could do. I didn't bring it up to start a debate over it. We both agreed that 640,000 civilians were supplied from scratch via a treacherous road.

In the Siege of Leningrad there was limited supply that the Soviets could give to the city, because, uhhh geez, I don't know, maybe the Great Patriotic War was still going on? When the Red Army fought against Afghanistan the USSR had no other wars. In the Vietnam War, the US had over 550,000 men in Vietnam. Why couldn't the Red Army do something similar? It took the Red Army under three months to bring over one million men, all the way across the USSR to help take out the Japanese Army in Manchuria and capture 600,000 POWs, and destroy the previously undefeated Japanese Army in a matter of weeks.

The Western Front was far more criticial then an actual war? Are you serious? After Hungary, and especially after Czeckoslovakia, it was pretty damn obvious that NATO wasn't going to invade the USSR. On the other hand, after the Berlin Airlift and the Cuban Missile Crisis, it was obvious that USSR wasn't going to go after NATO. The War in Afghanistan started in 1979. The Western Front wasn't going to be an issue. Carter wasn't going to invade. Reagan's new program focused on providing a counter to USSR nukes, and then using US nukes to threaten USSR to give their natural resources to the West. Bush followed Reagan's foreign policy until the USSR collapsed. No ground invasion was even possible here. The front was idle, not because both sides balanced each other out, but because of the strategies employed by the USSR and NATO. Major powers tried to avoid going to war after World War II, for some strange reason, maybe total devastation of the agressor had something to do with that.

So according to your logic, you keep your best troops in an idle front, while you have your average troops fight an actual war. Gorbachev and Brezhnev both supported that logic and that's how you lose wars. On the other hand, the Red Army leadership opposed it fiercely. If you have an actual war and an idle front, you send your best troops to fight in the actual war. That's how you win wars. But now I see why you agree with Brezhnev and Gorbachev.

You think there were enough ambushes. I think more could have been set. It's a difference of opinion on what's enough.

I still don't see why the Red Army couldn't switch support from an unpopular leader to a popular one. On the local level (city, neighborhood, town) the USSR actually had honest elections. Could have done the same for Afghani tribes.

If tanks no work, get better tank. Have tanks with less wear and tear, and raise the main armament. The T-34 was a product of World War II. Surely if the Soviet effort was placed towards the War, something like the T-34 could have been done. If tanks aren't useful, you make them useful. The T-34's predecessor sucked. But the T-34 model that was used at Kursk, albeit with more casualties, was able to stop the Wehrmacht tanks in a tank v. tank battle for the first time.

You still failed to address my point about using third world country militaries, in the manner that I've described, that is SpetzNatz training, fight a year in Afghanistan. You also failed to address my point of giving the local Afghani forces that were pro-USSR more responsibility.

Find you a war where the army performed at 100%? US in the Persian Gulf War. Red Army from post-Stalingrad to pre-Berlin campaign. Ike's forces at Battle of Normandy. Suvorov's campaign in the late 1700's, early 1800's.

But you and I think differently. I think in the pure military mindset; I'm against the best resources in idle fronts when actual wars are being fought.

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

I wrote

They did not fail to supply the escalation. There was no escalation in part (not exclusively but in part) precisely because they knew if there had been one THEN there would have likely been supply issues. Please take note also of the fact that the limited contingent was not the only thing they had to worry about supply wise. The afghan population under their control had to be supplied too and so the afghan army.

Now let’s examine the cases you brought up

The Red Army enjoyed secure rear areas and line sof communications in that theater of operations. Had the transiberian railroad been crawling with japanese constantly blowing it up all the day then it would not have been so easy.

Which raises two points:

First of all: it did not work, so why do the same?

Second: in Vietnam the americans had safe access to several sea ports along the coast (and Vietnam was mostly coast), their overland lines of communications were much shorter than soviet ones in Afghanistan and not as heavily harrassed.Close air support could be operated even from aircraft carriers off the coast which could be then resupplied elsewhere. Close air support in Afghanistan relied on planes that were based in the country and whose bombs/fuel had to be shipped by convoys which were constantly attacked.And so on.
Had there been, say an efficient submarine campaign against US shipping and more active Vietcong in the South then, again, it would not have been so easy

Ever heard something about “Able Archer” or “operation Ryan”, if not Google is your friend. Yes afterwards it is pretty damn easy to say that “obviously” nothing was ever going to happen but the soviet leadership could not afford to play armchair strategist with hindsight benefit. There was little to gain in Afghanistan and a lot to lose elsewhere. If things turned hot the western theater forces needed everything at hand, it could not be magically teleported back from Afghanistan.

I have never heard anything about the Red Army leadership specifically suggesting to gut (meaning, taking away the gunships,trucks and others items needed in the afghan theater) the western theater forces for Afghanistan sake.If you have any source on that, please provide it. Asking for more resources, well they did. Some asked for some additional troops or going after Pakistan but it questionable they had fully worked out the implications, these were the same dudes who initially believed the afghan army could handle the guerrillas by itself after all. Armies seldom feel they have enough of the cake. Problem was that the soviet cake was small.

Simple: because said leader would tell soviets to go and screw themselves.If not he would cease being popular.
Afghani tribes hated the Kabul regime and hated the soviet troops. Communist ideology was fundamentally at odds with traditional afghan way of life. Foreign communist troops were doubly unwelcomed.
This was such a basic reality of the afghan war that your inability to grasp it is beginning to make me wonder if I am not just wasting my time.
Kabul tried to enlist religious figures in support for example. It was a total failure.

Actually the logical thing is doing what they did: use something else which is more useful.

It does not work. Heavy tracked vehicles are inherently bad for roads and are inherently more maintenance intensive. It is a engineering reality. You might as well ask for tanks which run on cow dung.

No simply the previous post was getting long winded so I wrote

But I see that you are not convinced so let's examine it.
Giving the local Afghani forces more responsability is exactly what they wanted to do. The idea was that the soviet forces would provide support and the afghans would have most of the responsibility for actual operations. It did not work so the soviets were forced to undertake combat operations by themselves. Nobody wanted to fight for the USSR sake. When the soviets finally leaved THEN the DRA security forces started to put on a decent performance.

That’s why I wrote:

So they get a few additional battalions of Spetnaz.Big deal. Note they would still have to deploy helicopters gunships and logistical support for them.
Really they tried nearly all of the things you have suggested so far, plus some you probably don't even know about. Bribing militias? Check. Bombers based off country? Check. Shooting SCUDs at insurgents strongholds (OK more an afghan army thing actually)? Yep that was done too.

Really? I take you never heard all the polemics about the army failing to encircle the republican guard divisions for example?

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

You made a pretty clear statement to support your point (and not an unimportant one) which was factually wrong. If you cannot admit to be wrong and prefer backtracking and pretending to have said something else, then sorry I have no interest going further and I will cut it here.

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

I have no wish to go further, because this isn't about the Siege of Leningrad. You want to go off-topic, I don't. As you can see from the previous 3 posts, I admit my mistakes and I can easily counter your claim, but this from is for wars from 1946 until today. I already had several off-topic threads locked, because someone else went off-topic. Why is this so hard for you to understand?


Now, back on topic:

Once again, are you telling me that the USSR could not produce enough supplies and enough men to fight the Taliban? My point wasn't that the Stavka smoked weed 24/7. My point was that the Stavka did little to nothing to support the war. The fact that there was no escalation is a failure in itself. To claim that, if the Soviet Logistics system was devoted fully to the Afghani War, it was going to be broken over an escalation, contradicts reality. The USSR's production capacity was enough to defeat the Wehrmacht Armies, was enough to field and equip armies of millions of men. Here you are arguing that supplying half a million would have broken it's back. Really?

And if you are worried about the supply roads being attacked, why not set up ambushes at every single kilometer along the supply lines. Have more battles. Do what Grant did to the South. For every Soviet soldier that died, roughly 5 to 20 Mujaheedin died, (estimates vary). So keep on fighting. The Mujaheedin had 500,000 men at most. So you take the 100,000 casualties, and you win the war. The USSR could afford to take that many casualties.

If the Red Army was given time to set up proper supply roads, as the Red Army Doctrine dictated, instead of rushed to take Kabul, as politicians dictated, than the supply lines would not be a problem. During World War II, Chuikov wanted to rush to Berlin, but Zhukov cautioned against it. Had Chuikov's tactic been employed, the Red Army supply lines would not have been secured. The reason that the Red Army supply lines were secure in WWII is because the Red Army secured them! The same wasn't done in the Afghani War.

It didn't work in Vietnam because the troops weren't used properly. The troops were used for humping, often having to take the same peice of land over and over again, land that had no strategic value. The troops were often rotated, based on guesswork, rather than an actual strategy. The people, in both cases, were ignored, and that's a crucial mistake made by both, the Soviets in Afghanistan and the American in Vietnam. However, that mistake was made by the Stavka in case of Afghanistan, or the White House, in the case of Vietnam, not by the troops and their commanders.

Just read all about "Able Archer" and "Operation Ryan". Shouldn't it be "Operation RYAN"? Anyways, the premise of troops making a difference in the nuclear war between the USSR and US, in the 1980's is a delusion. If the US and USSR go to a nuclear war, the non-nuclear armed forces won't make the difference. Also, it delusional to think that the American or Soviet Citizens would be supportive of such an effort, or that the leaders, of both USSR and US were that much bat**** insane. There are other explanations, that are sane, such as Andropov trying to use fear to bring the Politburo under his command, or the US promoting the Military Industrial Complex. As for USSR and US going to nuclear war over exercises, or Reagan's plans that were in the developmental stages, I don't buy it.

The Red Army's initial plan of invading Afghanistan was to attack all along the Soviet-Afghan border, akin to what happened in Manchuria in 1945. The initial blitz would catch the Taliban off-guard and would enable the Red Army to unite with the Afghan Army, and the non-Pashtu tribes, placing a sizable chunk of Afghanistan under Soviet control, in the first few weeks of the war. It is similar to what the Americans did in Afghanistan in 2001-2003, until the Iraqi detour, and that campaign yeilded remarkable results, for the first breaking the Taliban. And then Bush the idiot went into Iraq and the Taliban rebuilt.

As for the Red Army leadership, they didn't specify which front the units would come from, but they repeatedly asked for more units, to stabilize the situation, to stop the unnecessary loss of men, requests that were repeatedly denied by the Stavka of Brezhnev and Gorbachev. Nor was the Red Army's cake small. They had over a million men in uniform, that's not small to me.

You can always relax the ideology. During WWII Red Army was all about freedom of religion. The fact that the ideology wasn't relaxed is yet another Stavka mistake, another moronic act of Brezhnev and Gorbachev.

More men always make a difference. A few additional battalions of SpetzNatz is a big deal. The few additional battalions of SpetzNatz made a huge difference in Chechnya. Nor do they need helicopters for support. They can be dropped as parachute units and they'll act on their own.

Nor were enough Soviet Innovations geared towards the Afghani War. During WWII there were massive Soviet Innovations, the AK, the T-34, the Katuysha, the... I could just keep on going and going. What were the innovations during the Afhgani War?

My point remains. The Stavka must have done more. Take a look at the Second Chechen War. You know the one that the Russians won. What's the difference between Chechnya and Afghanistan? Aside from Afghanistan being larger? In between the two Chechen Wars, Chechnya had a heavy indoctrination of Talibanism and Wahhabism. However the Russian Army, equipped with much less than the Red Army, won the Second Chechen War.

Initially it was 93,000 Russian and allied soldier, vs. 22,000 Chechen insurgents. These men weren't as good as the Red Army troops, so the ratio was 1 to 3. The Russians went in, not afraid of the deaths, and after taking out 14,000 out of 22,000 - won the war. Sure they lost roughly 5,000 but the war was won. If your troops are constantly being killed, your leaders liquidated by a few battalions of SpetzNatz, you lose morale. So it was 93,000 vs. 22,000, but for simpler math, let's say 4 to 1. In Afghanistan it was 1 to 2. See the difference?

Not to mention in the Second Chechen War there were new military tools used. The T-90 sent the Chechens into panic. New fire teams did their jobs. New tactics were applied.

In short, if Russia could win in Chechnya, which they did, USSR could have won in Afghanistan.

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

Taliban? in the 80's? :re:

Transportation bottleneck. I will spell it in more clear terms: traffic jam. But I guess you will just tell me: build more roads...

The idea was doing a replay of previous interventions in the Warsaw Pact.That required speed and surprise, not slow methodical occupation.Initial objectives were accomplished. Too bad Afghanistan was not Hungary or Czechoslovakia...

Fear and "better safe than sorry".

Which begs the one million dollars question: why were massive conventional forces mantained in first place throught the entire Cold War? Why was NATO boosting conventional forces in the 80's?

Taliban in 1979? Again :re:
And they did unite with the Afghan Army. Just the Afghan did not want to be united with their soviet brothers...

A lot larger. And a lot more populated. And with an other superpower funneling aid through safe havens...

Uh? T-90s were deployed in the Far East according to all sources I have seen.And even if some were sent there for some limited combat testing, Chechens into panic for that?

Any source for that?

And with this I have finished.It has been interesting and you have interesting views.Thank you very much.

Re: Excellent article on Afghanistan
 

Well it had been a fun debate :D Now my response:

I meant Mujaheedin, not Taliban. Although the Mujaheedin and the Taliban have similar organizational structure, they share similar commanders, have similar fighting tactics, although the Taliban's are a bit more advanced.

More roads do prevent traffic jams. Someone tell that to out Gubernator!

The initial objectives in Afghanistan were not accomplished. Had the Red Army Plan been followed, instead of Brezhnev's Plan, they would've been accomplished, but they weren't accomplished. In Hungary the rebels were knocked out instantly. In Czeckoslovakia, it was a different case altogether, please don't link the two, Hungary was very, very different from Czeckoslovakia. Hungary was a NATO sponsored, CIA ran rebel movement. Czeckoslovakia was an actual attempt at democratic change, and a Soviet Intervention. The rebels in Czeckoslovakia were a response to the Soviet Intervention, whereas in Hungary they preceded Soviet Intervention.

NATO/US wanted to use the Imperialist Model. Look at Serbia. Look at Iraq. What kind of forces are in Iraq? Where's the justification for Iraq? Conventional forces were also needed to defend the nation. I mean, even in an economic crisis the US wouldn't cut back on its conventional navy, because neither Mexico nor Canada pose a threat to the US, and the US Navy, being the best in the World, prevent any other points of invasion.

I agree that conventional force on a massive scale is overrated, but parts of these massive armies should be maintained for self-defense. Or, for instance, if the US and China fight over Taiwan, that war will not be nuclear. India's war with China over Tibet was conventional. I agree that conventional forces didn't need to be so damn big, for both sides, but smaller conventional forces were necessary. They also conventional forces that fought in Afghanistan.

You're telling me no one funneled aid to Chechnya? Granted, it was done discreetly and professionally, but the Russian Army was finding interesting things on dead Chechen bodies, of equiptment that couldn't have possibly been made in Chechnya. And I've agreed that Afghanistan is a lot larger and a lot more populated. Hence I said: use a force that's a lot bigger.

Ahh, the T-90s. In order to understand that, you have to read the Moscow Defense Brief, and realize that the Second Chechen War had a trigger. That trigger was the Chechen Invasion of Dagestan. The Moscow Defense Brief confirms the use of the T-90 in the Dagestan War, where Russia fought Chechnya for the control of Dagestan.

"The use of T-90S tanks in Dagestan deserves mention. A group of these vehicles consisting of 8 to 12 units according to different sources was supposed to be delivered to India. Folªlowing a sharp aggravation of the situation in the Caucaªsus, however, the tanks were transferred to Dagestan. In the Kadari zone one T-90 was hit by seven RPG anti-tank rockets but remained in action. This indicates that with regular equipªment T-90S is the best protected Russian tank, especially if Shtora and Arena defensive protection systems are integrated in it." http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/3-2002/ac/raowdsmcc/