Excellent article on Afghanistan

Anthony_Scott · #1 August 22nd, 2009, 12:59 PM

It details how the Soviets failed and why we are not them. We are not using terror tactics to try and beat the people into submission. Also, the vaunted SPETSNAZ were never trained as American Special Forces are to do, they were only trained to bash things.

Read the whole thing, might help with scenario design:
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Conten...qadbb.asp?pg=1

Wdll · #2 August 22nd, 2009, 01:09 PM

Some times I wonder how a modern USSR under Stalin or a Hitler's Germany (today's technology) would cope with Afghanistan.
What I mean is, perhaps the soviets were not harsh enough and that is why they lost. I hope the alliance wins, but I don't see it happening any time soon.

Anthony_Scott · #3 August 22nd, 2009, 01:14 PM

The main differance between the Red Army of 1979 and it's Western counterpart was the quality of it's training and the focus of the doctrine. The Red Army was never designed for COIN, it was a heavy army designed to bash through NATO defenses. It also had no NCO corps in the definition that we understand it, the lower officers were tasked with what should have been an NCO's job.

hoplitis · #4 August 22nd, 2009, 01:38 PM

Mr Scott,
Be patient,
Military operations and "state building" or "regime change" initiatives are judged by their results. We know that the Soviets failed in Afganistan. We don't know what will the US/West accomplish in the end.
All we know, though, is that the clock is ticking ...
In comparison our more professional and equipped armed forces (both in hardware/training and doctrine)are tunning down their presence in Iraq. Our we satisfied by our results there? Is Iraq stable? Would you take your family for vacations there?

Snipey · #5 August 22nd, 2009, 05:22 PM

More like a horrendous article that cannot get its facts straight:

"One could not have designed a military less well-prepared to deal with such a conflict than the Red Army of 1979. The Soviet military had not fought a war since 1945. Soviet company, battalion, brigade, division, and even army commanders had no experience in combat."

If you fought in the war from 1944 - 1945, you would be roughly 19 in 1945. In 1979 you would be 54 or 55. You'd be leading the army, and would still have experience, you don't retire at 55. Vyacheslav Borisov commander in the 2008 South Ossetia War at the age of 54. In addition, the Soviet divisions did fight in Hungary, Vietnam, parts of Africa, etc.

"Soviet conscripts were notoriously brutal, drunk, and unprofessional." - that just sounds like a pointless Ad Hominem that's unsourced.

"But SPETSNAZ units were not equivalent to our Special Operations Forces." - that's odd, and not true. Even this game points out it's not true.

"There was no Soviet doctrine for counter-insurgency because Soviet ideology could not foresee the USSR fighting against a revolution." - oh really? What about counter-revolution? What about Hungary in 1956? What about Nazi insurgency in 1944?

"The Red Army had recognized the limitations of its soldiers since the 1920s. It addressed them by requiring operational-level headquarters to design missions that would be relatively easy at the tactical and sub-tactical levels." - yet another fallacy, for instance see Operation Bagration.

It's a common myth I see, where the Russian Army is always underestimated. Hitler in the 1940's. Chechens in 1999 (Dagestan War). Georgians in 2008. Allies in 1920's. And that's just in the past 100 years.

The real reason for the Red Army's defeat was two-fold. The initial Red Army strategy in Afghanistan, to use shock forces to take key points and expand Soviet influence from these keypoints with the use of artillery, was not accepted by the Brezhnev Government. This left gaping holes in Soviet supply lines. The second reason was that the central government, under Brezhnev and later Gorbachev, made the same error that Nicolas I government made in the Russo-Japanese War, the army could not be properly supplied.

I want to see Al Qaeda defeated, I don't think there's a sane person out there who's rooting for Al Qaeda. But in order to defeat Al Qaeda, we cannot have military articles being called "excellent" - especially articles that constantly underestimate other armies. Pat MacArthur, the American General that brought the Phillipines under American control stated: "Never underestimate your enemy". (I think someone said that before him too.) If people constantly write articles underestimating the Red Army for political purposes, what's to stop the same people from underestimating Al Qaeda's abilities? Poor research is poor research, irrespective who you write about. We already made that mistake with Fallujah, with the Sunni Triangle, let's not make the same mistake again Al Qaeda, where it really counts. Let's stop writing crap, at least until bin Laden is toast and Al Qaeda is destroyed.

Anthony_Scott · #6 August 22nd, 2009, 10:04 PM

I respectfully disagree on several points, all of them technical. first of all, even at the height of Red Army liberties during the Great Patriotic War, they still suffered from a truly adequate professional NCO corps. Although the Red Army in 1943 and onward did allow lower ranked enlisted personnel more leeway, in the end it was the sheer numbers of men and tanks that made the destruction of Army Group Centre so decisive. Many experienced NCOs were lost due to attrition and the brutal Red Army discipline. It was a war within a war to keep experienced NCOs around to teach the raw new conscripts even the beginnings of soldiering that their Wehrmacht or Western Allied forces took so seriously.

Soviet strategy in Afghanistan was motivated by chronic supply shortages as you noted but also by a lack of effective dismounted infantry training, appropriate air assets and doctrine, and the evre-present unprofessional nature of the Soviet conscript, whose main intrests were drinking and getting home as soon as possible. Also, the STAVKA itself was out of it's element fighting a war like what they had in Afghanistan instead of fighting the mass tank war that it had trained for versus NATO. Again, Soviet military training was always more about tanks than fighting insurgents and also the last time the Red Army has to fight a counter-revolution was in the 1920's.

The ongoing lack of a truly dedicated NCO corps continues to plaque the Russian Army and that hardly seems to have gotten better. I have known individual NCO's from Russia who were utterly competent, professional, and dedicated professionals much alike our own here in the US. Day to day operations seem to be run by subaltern officers who seem to be filling billets meant for seargents and corporals. The vaunted SPETZNAZ are one of the few truly professional elements in the Russian military and they have indeed made changes to their training since Afghanistan but when they went into Afghanistan. Their training had not prepared them for what American and British specops training has always prepared for, namely creating friendly forces with locals and then using them to fight the war themselves. From the article:

Quote:

The Soviet military was self-consciously a pro-revolutionary force because the Soviet Union was ideologically a revolutionary state. There was no Soviet doctrine for counter-insurgency because Soviet ideology could not foresee the USSR fighting against a revolution. To the extent that Soviet forces thought about intervention in internal conflicts, they thought about helping Marxist revolutionaries overthrow US-backed dictators. They knew virtually nothing about setting up indigenous armies or training indigenous forces. Apart from brief interventions in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany (all executed as massive and brief mechanized operations), the Red Army had not faced an insurgency since the Basmachi Rebellion of the 1920s.

Finally, the Russians were incredibly vicious during the war. Their only recourse to failed operations seemed to be dropping mines and sowing terror amongst the Afghan populace which only caused more anger and resentment. The tales of wholesale destruction of villages and violations of Afghan women have passed into legend. With such conduct it seems only logical that the Afghanis would respond in kind. Our soldiers, airmen, Marines are fighting with far different tactics and our special forces are using far more effective methods. See these articles for more:

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...rinsurgency-o/

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...sting-afghani/

The Soviet Army of 1979 was totally incapable of doing what our specops guys are doing now because of a fundamental difference in training ethics and styles of Western and Russian Armies. Russian commanders just did not have the training or resources to nation-build.

I hope this was not too long-winded. The nature of the Russian Army continues to be one of my passions and I have a great amount of respect and admiration for the Bear. I also know that we still have so much to learn about one another.

Wdll · #7 August 23rd, 2009, 04:47 AM

While I can see how creating friendly forces from the local population could be one solution (Alexander the Great did it just fine), I disagree that pure violence wouldn't do the same. IF, USA wasn't at least trying to save innocent lives, IF USA was there to capture the land and IF there wasn't much democracy back there, an extermination strategy would work. Sure, it wouldn't make many friends elsewhere, but fear is a great motivator for peace.

I hope I am proven wrong, but I don't see any real long lasting victory in the area unless suddenly the population changes beliefs.

Wdll · #8 August 24th, 2009, 03:34 AM

Isn't that Keegan's book the one where he tries to look good by bashing Clausewitz?

Anyway, I think Snipey was more referring to propaganda and subjectivity when he talked about "politics".

Anthony_Scott · #9 August 24th, 2009, 12:59 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Wdll

Isn't that Keegan's book the one where he tries to look good by bashing Clausewitz?

No, the book central theme is trying to view warfare through the Clausewitz view that warfare is a continuation of official state political policy through another means. Clausewitz understood that politics always motivated warfare.

I have bookmarked the links that were provided and will read them later.The Soviet war in Afghanistan is a virtual unknown and the more that I can learn about it the more I can enlighten my colleagues about it.

Anthony_Scott · #10 August 24th, 2009, 01:40 PM

Michael Yon is currently in Afghanistan and is stomping about with British soldiers. He has posted this article along with excellent photos. Also, the Yon article has some excellent Google Earth screenies that might prove valuable for scenario design.

http://www.michaelyon-online.com/bad-medicine.htm

Also, I have come across an article detailing why training the ANA is taking so long. I especially like the latter part of the article where he goes a long way to demolish, in his view, many of the assumptions people have about the ANA.

http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/a...24.html#006507

Lastly, a big thank you to those of you who have posted civil and professional answers to this post. I have learned alot from the answers and hope that further articles I post will start many more robust learning sessions. We are here to learn.