OT: Objective moral truth

[Will]

Topics like this have come up in this forum in the past, so I thought I would cash in on the various viewpoints the community offers on the subject of ethics. I have a term paper I'm writing for a philosophy course, and I've selected a passage from The Foundations of Ethics by Sir David Ross.

In the passage he is arguing that differences of opinion on ethical and moral issues does not imply that there is no objective truth. Rather, he writes that these differences can be accounted for by differing comparative values of one right or good over another, different circumstances in the culture, and difference of opinion on facts. Examples:

• comparative good: The right for a person (or animal, for that matter) to die in peace versus the good of preserving life
• opinion on facts: Vaccination being good or bad to a person largely depends on whether the person believes vaccination prevents disease
• opinion on facts: Fox hunting being moral or amoral depends on the view of the relative intensity of the hunter's enjoyment versus the fox's pain
• circumstances of society: Vigilantism and blood-feuds morality depends of the development of the society; a lawless frontier would accept these more because of the lack of government to enforce respect for life, while a settled society leaves law enforcement officials to carry out punishment for crimes

In evaluating the passage, I don't think Ross argued strongly enough that these differences account for all differences in morals between different societies and different individuals within a society. And so, I feel that his argument against the view that there is no objective moral truth is weak.

He also offers a positive argument for the existence of an objective moral truth, drawing a parallel between scientific and ethical reasoning and advancement. Each generation absorbs the progress in ethical thought from previous generations. In that way, he believes society edges closer and closer to absolute moral truth, consisting of very general principles which everyone agrees upon. The problem is that the three things that Ross argues cause differences in opinion will still apply, and ethics will still be something of a grey area, rather than being able to say with certainty that Action X is right and Action Y is wrong.

And so, your opinion. If there is objective moral truth, is it ever attainable? If so, what use is it if the causes of difference of opinion still apply to the absolute truth? If there isn't objective moral truth, how do you explain the pre-theoretic belief of many people that objective moral truth does exist?

I think I will do alright on the paper with the notes I have written now, but extra viewpoints always help. Thanks in advance to all.

[deccan]

Ah, finally, an interesting topic to discuss. Here are my two pfennigs:

I've spent a lot of time and effort on various internet discussion Groups on this particular subject, and much offline debate and discussion as well. Much hinges on the intended meaning of the term "objective morality".

On the one paw, it could be meant descriptively or passively. For example, one could say that at precisely 2.59 PM SBT 13th December 2004, all humans on planet Earth do believe that murder is wrong, therefore it is objectively true that murder is wrong. Of course, put this way, something that is objectively true at 2.59 PM SBT 13th December 2004 is not necessarily true one minute later, and it takes only one human to change it from objectively true to objectively false. Now, I know that most people don't have this meaning in mind when they talk about "objective morality", but it is still good to have this in the open so that people don't end up talking past one another.

So, on the other paw, what people usually mean by "objective morality" is a prescriptive, active form of the term. An extreme form of this might be to say that murder is wrong, always was wrong and always will be wrong, for any and all beings that are capable of intelligent, conscious, intentional thought, whether existing now, in the past or in the future, regardless of the actual thoughts, actions and beliefs of such beings.

I guess this gives away my own position of extreme skepticism about "objective morality". Put in the prescriptive, active form outlined above, one can examine some of the properties that this "objective morality" must necessarily have in other to fit the criteria described:

1) It must be timeless and eternal.
2) It must exist externally to thinking beings and independently of them.
3) In order for it to matter in any way, it must also be somehow accessible to such thinking beings.

Of course, any claim that something exists and posseses these properties sits extremely badly with the naturalistic frame of mind. (Of course, this could be interpreted as an indictment of the validity of the naturalistic view rather than an indictment of the dubiousness of the existence of such a thing, but that is another matter.)

Hmm, I'm running out of time here. But here's a link that agrees with my own thoughts on the subject quite well:

On the Nature of Morality

And let me leave with another thing to think about: it appears that much of mathematics and formal logic also possess the properties of timelessness etc. So if I claim that the weird properties possessed by an "objective morality" makes it suspect within a naturalistic frame work, would the same argument apply to mathematics and logic?

[Rasorow]

oooo....

BTW - for an arguement in line with no Objective Morality see John Stuart Mill's Unitarianism (spelling?) he argues much like Ross that something is only good as a measure of realitive happiness and that there are better acts and worse acts that can be assigned a point scale to measure total goodness.... While the point scale would become objective and the morality (goodness) value it assigns would be objective... it is based on an arbitary base. A base that is subject to the whims of those that make the scale (as all things involving human input are affected by our basis - for info on that one let me know and I will look it up for you but it basicly says that By observing something you have changed it.. think its the Uncertainty Principle...) Thus this objective result is based on a subjective nature and misleading if one is trying to define Objective Morality. It shows that Objective Morality, if it exists cannot be created by humans and has to exist externally from us (as the previous poster - sorry forgot who) mentioned.

Emanuel Kant (my favorite) stated that there was nothing good or moral but good will it self. If a "good" deed was done (helping an old lady accross the street) it was not moral unless it was done out of good will not some need to be nice, praise of neighbors, etc. Thus Objective Morality exists (The morality is based on the good will concept external to human influence) but whether or not it is obtainable by humans is questionable.

My personal philosophy is that there is Objective Morality, it is tied my spiritual beliefs. Without any anchor for morality external to human existance (yes - Human existance... good must always be good and evil most always be evil regardless of the situation of the preceiver). For example.. Captial punishment as an example of this. (Not trying to start another discussion but this is the best example I can think of)We punish murderers as crinmals because they killed someone, an immoral act. Yet when we sentence them to death and thus kill them. If killing is wrong, if it is not moral, then we are also performing an immoral act. Despite that we precieve in the first situation that the criminal killed outside of due process (not a soldier at war, not a police officer defending himself, etc) and the second process is precieved as moral as it followed a socially agreed process (court of law trial), the objective morality has to remain the same. Its either moral or immoral which must be anchored outside of the preciever...

Well, anyrate, something to chew on.

Rasorow

[Suicide Junkie]

deccan said:Put in the prescriptive, active form outlined above, one can examine some of the properties that this "objective morality" must necessarily have in other to fit the criteria described:

1) It must be timeless and eternal.
2) It must exist externally to thinking beings and independently of them.
3) In order for it to matter in any way, it must also be somehow accessible to such thinking beings.

And let me leave with another thing to think about: it appears that much of mathematics and formal logic also possess the properties of timelessness etc. So if I claim that the weird properties possessed by an "objective morality" makes it suspect within a naturalistic frame work, would the same argument apply to mathematics and logic?

Number 3 there...

With math, you can observe the results of adding 1+1 by putting one thing in a box and then adding one more.
Multiplication by making a grid x wide and y tall.

Is there any way to observe some sort of basic properties that could be extended into a general "objective morality"?

[Jack Simth]

The problem with objective morality (technically ethics - ethics are the rules and regs (or the way to come up with them to the nth degree) and morality is how well they are followed by a given individual - but that's nit-picking) is that we have yet to truly find a way around assumptions. You want to apply logic to the field of ethics? First you will need to assume that logic necessarily applies to questions of ethics (or assume a basis on which logic is necessarily applied, or assume a basis that makes a basis on which logic is necessary, or ...) sufficent to rule out any other basis that does not come to the EXACT same set of specific application decisions in every case (if they come up with the exact same set of specific application decisions in every case, they are the same; after all, there is more than one way to prove the pythagorean theorm under the particular set of circumstances where it works). On a fundamental level, this is also true of math (and of logic - in order to apply logic, you must first (1) assume that logic necessarily applies, and (2) assume that some set of starting conditions is true; sure, you can see that one bead plus one bead equals two beads, you need to assume that what you see reflects reality - can you prove that you are not caught up in The Matrix or something like it? If not, you must assume that what you are viewing reflects reality. Sure, it's an assumption few would question, as it's opposite is rather ridiculous - yet it is still an assumption) - sure, 1 + 1 = 2, 2 + 2 = 4; but that is because of the way the symbols are defined. You can define a consistent system under which that is not the case (such as relative velocity under relativity - (1/2) c + (1/2) c < c - check with your physics professor). In order to say that 1 + 1 = 2, you must first define the value 1, the value 2, the operation +, and the operation =. In order to say that a person killing a person without sufficient cause for such an action (one definition of murder) is wrong requires you to first define "person" "killing" and "sufficent cause for such an action". The catch is that such definitions (or the method for coming up with such definitions, or the method for coming up with the method for coming up with such definitions, and so on, and so forth) is fundamentally assumed. Can you prove that a week-old newborn is a person, without first having an already proven definition that you can use to argue on the basis of? What about a fetus 3 months after conception? A grown woman of 30? A coma patient? A mentally developmentally disabled human of 15 physical years? Even if you could concretely prove every event-statement in the Bible (God said this, God did this, this happened, et cetera), you would still need to assume that the created ought to follow the rules of the Creator before you could say The Ten Commandments ought to be followed (granted, given some way to prove all such event statements, most would agree that the rules laid out in the Bible would then become authoritative - but there is still an assumption there). You will not be able to meet those three requirements under any circumstances I could imagine without an assumption somewhere along the line. If such an assumption exists, it is no longer objective, as you can't prove it in it's entierety. You can come up with stuff that is "close enough" to proven with "makes sense" assumptions, but those don't quite qualify as objective.

[deccan]

Suicide Junkie said:
With math, you can observe the results of adding 1+1 by putting one thing in a box and then adding one more.
Multiplication by making a grid x wide and y tall.

According to your idea, if you want to prove 10 + 1 = 11, you would need to draw 10 objects, add one more, and then count them all again to prove that there is really 11, and you would need to do that all the time for every number.

The "timelessness" and "idealism" of mathematics is such that you don't need to actually do any counting, just as you don't actually need to draw or make any triangles of various different sizes to prove the axioms of trigonometry for every size and configuration possible for all triangles.

YMMV, but I believe that the "correct" answer should be this:

The "timelessness" and "idealism" of mathematics has the same metaphysical / ontological status as, say, statements relating to the gameplay mechanics of SEIV, such as "Meson beams weapons are inferior to anti-proton weapons in Version 1.91 of stock SEIV". In that sense, both are contrived, fictional systems based on arbitrary, consistent rules and so are "timeless" and "ideal" with regards to the "real" world. Therefore, statements concerning mathematics and SEIV gameplay mechanics can be objectively judged true or false in terms of the respective system without arousing any "weirdness" suspicions of their "reality".

The real "mystery" if there is one is why mathematics "works" in the real world. I think the answer is that mathematical concepts can be "mapped" to real-world concepts in a way that makes sense in that particular context, but not every possible mapping makes sense, which is why we have sayings such that we can't compare apples and oranges. This is particularly evident in applications where the mathematics need to be specifically "tweaked" to fit the situation.

An example: Greg Egan's page describing Special Relativity explains how the mathematics of rotations of objects in 2D space is adapted to fit the context of rotations in space time.

But there are dissenting opinions on this. See this discussion for example on whether or not there are real philosophical issues on the subject of imaginary numbers.

Suicide Junkie said:
Is there any way to observe some sort of basic properties that could be extended into a general "objective morality"?

I'm not sure what you mean here. I could guess, but on a subject this exotic, it might be dangerously misleading.

[Fyron]

deccan said:
According to your idea, if you want to prove 10 + 1 = 11, you would need to draw 10 objects, add one more, and then count them all again to prove that there is really 11, and you would need to do that all the time for every number.

Nope. Think, proof by induction.

[deccan]

Jack Simth said:
The problem with objective morality (technically ethics - ethics are the rules and regs (or the way to come up with them to the nth degree) and morality is how well they are followed by a given individual - but that's nit-picking) is that we have yet to truly find a way around assumptions.

An excellent post on the problems with the foundational theory of epistemic justification, Jack Simth!

But your argument seems to apply to everything and so appears to deny that there is any objective truth to anything whatsoever, leaving the door open to things like Holocaust deniers, the Moon landings never occured theorists, Masonite conspirators who are so skilled at manipulating world events that the lack of evidence of a conspiracy and itself evidence of such a conspiracy etc.

I think that in order to maintain that objective truth is still possible (albeit in a weakened, post-Kantian form of the term), while still denying that "objective morality" is possible, requires more elaboration on the whole Hume / G.E. Moore thesis that it is impossible to derive an "ought" from an "is".

[deccan]

Imperator Fyron said:
Nope. Think, proof by induction.

To my mind and within the context of everything that I have already posted above, the proof by induction falls squarely in the realm of the transcendental in that it is not obviously true why it is valid even within an (arbitrarily) assumed naturalistic framework. In short, to employ it would be to rely on the possession of transcendental properties (timelessness, externality etc.) which was what I was trying to avoid doing in the case of mathematics in the first place.

[Jack Simth]

deccan said:
An excellent post on the problems with the foundational theory of epistemic justification, Jack Simth!

But your argument seems to apply to everything and so appears to deny that there is any objective truth to anything whatsoever, leaving the door open to things like Holocaust deniers, the Moon landings never occured theorists, Masonite conspirators who are so skilled at manipulating world events that the lack of evidence of a conspiracy and itself evidence of such a conspiracy etc.

I think that in order to maintain that objective truth is still possible (albeit in a weakened, post-Kantian form of the term), while still denying that "objective morality" is possible, requires more elaboration on the whole Hume / G.E. Moore thesis that it is impossible to derive an "ought" from an "is".

There's a catch when using the above on logic, applied science (but not purely theoretical science or history), and math: you can test and demonstrate those to a reasonable degree, to see if they are "right". You can't do that with ethics. Take, for example, the case of the innocent fat man (for those of you unfamiliar with what I am talking about, it's a scenerio for philosophers of ethics: a fat man goes into some sea caves to rescue some lost tourists. He finds them, and leads them out. Unfortunately, he gets exceptionally stuck, with his head above the high tide mark, at the exit, with the tourists stuck inside the cave. The tourists find they have a stick of dynamite and a match. If they do nothing, they will drown, but the innocent fat man will survive. They can also blow up the innocent fat man, killing him, to unstopper the exit, so they can survive. The innocent fat man wants to survive, even knowing it would cost the tourists their lives (they wouldn't have a chance at survival anyway, were it not for him, after all). However, he can't act, and his actions are not the focus of the exercise. The actions of the tourists are. Do they blow him up, or not?). Even assuming someone was evil enough to arrange the situation as a test, all that would reveal is what those tourists would do, not what they should do.
Math is concerned with the rules of the game; what "ought to be" is immaterial compared to what the rules of the game say.
Logic is concerned with "given set A of starting conditions, and set B of operators, is it possible to prove set C of conclusions?" ... but you have to have a set A of starting conditions and set B of operators, and have them be beyond question for the discussion; lacking such, logic gets you exactly nowhere; but that's okay - Having the A and the B to get the C is what logic is all about; it's where logic lives. If A and/or B is false, the conclusions C are untrustworthy. That's implied from the start of the game. Logic is about what's true given some specified set of circumstances. If those circumstances are false, that particular logical proof simply doesn't apply.
In the applied sciences, it's all about concrete, measureable results: how much horsepower does this particular engine design produce? Build it and find out! Sure, theory is used to model and predict, but where the rubber meets the road, it's all about actually trying it, and seeing if you get the expected result. If you are caught in The Matrix, well, then you are predicting things based on that universe; it's still usefull in that context.

You can't do that with ethics. At best, emperically, you could observe that a society following a particular set of ethics is happier / sadder / wealthier / poorer / more populous / less populous (or whatever other criteria you could choose) than a society following a different set. But before you can pick one set over the other, you must first assume some criteria to pick by; beyond personal preference, you can't really defend such a criteria for long. Is a society where a lot of people die young, but the remainder are quite happy and care free "better than" or "worse than" one where most people live to a ripe old age, but are constantly sad and worried? Which is more important: the rights of the few or the wants of the many? Why? On what basis can you claim that? On what basis can you claim that basis? Why should that particular point matter?

Wait, where was I going with this? Oh well, I got lost. No biggie.