Observations of a Radar Soldier

daferg · #1 May 14th, 2011, 06:32 PM

It was so easy to determine the locations of Russian (Warsaw Pact) artillery. A strict following of doctrine makes the locations of Divisional Artillery Groups (DAGS) and Regimental Artillery Groups (RAGS) an easy task. A set distance from the Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT) in the attack or defense. Terrain restrictions for set artillery types and accessibility (road networks). During the first Gulf War, the Iraq forces followed the bad guy book to the letter.

I often wonder.....I see todays Army and the enemy forces change doctrine and techniques sometimes several times a day. I wonder if the Russian Horde ever poured through the Fulda Gap in 1985 if the same would have happened. Would the Warsaw Pact be able to adapt and change its doctrine mid-fight? The US Army has proven time and time again we seldom follow the Field Manual. I would like to think we are an adaptive force. I wonder what type of Army we would have today if the "Big War" happened in the mid 80's.

Suhiir · #2 May 14th, 2011, 07:30 PM

defrag, your above comment reminds me of something I heard back in the 70's...

Seems a young Soviet officer (or officer cadet) complained that the biggest problem with countering American doctrine was the Americans didn't even follow their own doctrine

daferg · #3 May 14th, 2011, 07:56 PM

You are very correct. I think, I say again....I think the Germans in WW2 said the same thing.

The Warsaw Pacts way of thinking on artillery was very different than the American or Ally way of thinking. It was told to me this way: You are a Warsaw Pact commander and you have three separate attacks under way and all three are asking for artillery. One attack has come to a standstill and another is retreating. The third is gaining ground but is suffering murderous losses. Who do you give artillery support to? The Warsaw Pact way of thinking is only the attack that is gaining ground will get artillery support. It is the only one that is achieving its objectives. The Allied way of thinking may be to provide support to each of the three attacks. The Warsaw Pact seldom rewarded failure.

Breakerchase · #4 May 17th, 2011, 07:29 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by daferg

Would the Warsaw Pact be able to adapt and change its doctrine mid-fight? The US Army has proven time and time again we seldom follow the Field Manual. I would like to think we are an adaptive force. I wonder what type of Army we would have today if the "Big War" happened in the mid 80's.

I believe so. (At least for the Soviets, and definitely not all Soviet troops and commanders) I spoke with my history prof a few months back, who was a 2nd Lt in Germany back in the late '80s. He said that he and most of the US Army expected to face the stereotyped Soviet Army; that is the one that follows regulations to the letter, rigid, slow and predictable to be defeated decisively by our "superior free-thinking troops".

Most of our (Western) guides to the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War like the 1984 edition of the FM 100-2 series painted the stereotyped picture that you and I have described. That was dispelled to a degree when the Gorbachev era allowed Soviet military journals to produce more useful bits for organizations like the Soviet Army Studies Office to exploit, but due to the end of the Cold War a more sophisticated understanding of Soviet military art didn't get through to the US Army at large. However, that understanding did live on in the form of the NTC and BCTP OPFOR of the 1990s.

Now, I'm definitely not a subscriber to the 1970s "10 feet tall Russians" crowd, but the best Soviet units which were tasked with operating as a forward detachment or part of an operational maneuver group were expected to show a higher level of flexibility and creativity than that of "regular" motorized rifle or tank regiments. The doctrine was all there to follow, but there were some units and commanders who were able to undertake complicated missions than others.

I also found this monograph an interesting read:
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...f&AD=ADA208043

daferg · #5 May 17th, 2011, 08:21 PM

From what I have read and from what I have heard from the old vets I agree with you. When some think of the Russian Horde in the 80's they were 10 feet tall and mindless. The old story of Russian tanks only having West on their compasses.

The units of the old Russian Army that I think were given a bit more flexibility than the average unit were: Recon, Airborne/Air Assault, Spentzat (spelling?)and of course sub commanders.

I wish I had a reading list of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan that was not weighed down with propaganda. I know they changed their tactics, techniques and procedures throughout the war but have not read much about it myself.

Breakerchase · #6 May 17th, 2011, 08:54 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by daferg

From what I have read and from what I have heard from the old vets I agree with you. When some think of the Russian Horde in the 80's they were 10 feet tall and mindless. The old story of Russian tanks only having West on their compasses.

The units of the old Russian Army that I think were given a bit more flexibility than the average unit were: Recon, Airborne/Air Assault, Spentzat (spelling?)and of course sub commanders.

Yeah, I would agree due to their specialized tasks, they would have more flexibility than average in addition to the "good few" among the regular ground forces, but the Soviet beast is the mysterious thing to study.

Quote:

I wish I had a reading list of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan that was not weighed down with propaganda. I know they changed their tactics, techniques and procedures throughout the war but have not read much about it myself.

Have you read Lester Grau's "The Bear went over the Mountain"? It's a good read on exactly what you're looking for. There's also another Grau book "The Soviet-Afghan War" which is good too.

The Soviet Army changed their TTP due to Marshal Ogarkov's theory of a "revolution" in military affairs characterized by precision weapons, non-linear battlespace, reconnaissance-strike complexes and other pieces of digital technology. Afghanistan provided a testing bed for some of these new concepts like the "bronegruppa" where BMPs fight away from their infantry dismounts, and the 1991 Gulf War was their grim confirmation. There's a number of 1980s Soviet works which underlined the destructive potential of today's precision-guided weapons, even equating them to "small tactical nukes without the fallout".

This is a good read on what I said if you're looking for more info:
http://webharvest.gov/peth04/2004101....HTML#GENFORCE

daferg · #7 May 18th, 2011, 06:08 PM

QUOTE]

Have you read Lester Grau's "The Bear went over the Mountain"? It's a good read on exactly what you're looking for. There's also another Grau book "The Soviet-Afghan War" which is good too.

Th[/quote]

I could not remember the name of that book! Thank you very much.

Suhiir · #8 May 20th, 2011, 09:23 PM

During the period from the end of Vietnam to the fall of the Iron Curtain the USMC view of the Soviet military was :

They will follow their orders regardless of consequences or common sense, because if they don't they'll get a bullet in the head from the closest zampolit/KGB officer.

Destroy the command structure or communications links and you're left with essentially a mindless horde to fight, they'll carry out the last orders they received then sit on their arse waiting for new ones.

You can pretty much count on then to follow set piece battle plans, disrupt even one part of the "plan" and watch the whole thing fall apart.

Russians are NOT stupid, but Soviet Doctrine is mindless.

Soviet junior NCO's (corporals and sergeants) have basically zero experience and initiative, officers do ALL the thinking.