A Military Book List

[Bishop746]

This is just what the world needs, another book list on the internet.

Here is a list of some of my favorite military books, some are on-topic for our game; most are not though. I would like to get your thoughts on these if you’ve read any of them or post a list of suggestions. Especially if you’re from outside the United States, I’m curious to know of books published in your home country that give a different perspective.

In no particular order:

The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the Old Guard by James Burton. This was an eye-opening book for me. Those of you who saw the excellent HBO movie should know that there is more to this than the story of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle debacle. Pentagon Wars delves deep into the ingrained mindset of buying expensive, high tech weaponry when low tech, robust weapon would be better. The chapters on air interdiction strategy versus a close support strategy (Stealth bomber vs. A10 Thunderbolt) are worth the price alone.

Misfire by William H. Hallahan. Misfire is out of print now and it goes for 50+ used on Amazon but if you can find it at a library is well worth the read. It traces the failure of the Army in procuring the best available rifle for its soldiers from the Civil War to the modern era. The chapters on what really happened to the M16 were fascinating. I disagree with the author’s use of S.L.A Marshall’s theories to support his claims. The book would have been fine without Marshall’s dubious accusations.

The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power by Max Boot. Max Boot writes a great history of the small wars of the 19th and 20th century, but the conclusions he draws at the end seem to contradict what he just wrote. His conclusions may be a political justification for modern policy but the history is outstanding. See for yourself.

Of Arms and Men: A History or War, Weapons and Aggression by Robert O’Connell. This book doesn’t just trace the evolution of weapons; it demonstrates how tactics, ideas and the perception of wars are shaped by the weapons themselves. The authors analyzes of the battleship, which he believes is the most overrated weapon in world history and he gives evidence to back it up, is thought provoking as is the entire book. Of Arms and Men was first published in 1989 so the chapter on nuclear weapons probably needs a revision in another edition but it does not detract from the overall book.

Conflict: The History of the Korean War by Robert Leckie. Prolific writer Robert Leckie gives an excellent one volume account and analyzes of the Korean War. Leckies book further strengthened my belief that Douglas McArthur is almost impossible to get a grasp on.

Ghost Soldiers: The Forgotten Epic Story of World War II’s Most Dramatic Mission by Hampton Sides. Hampton Sides tells the incredible story of the Bataan Death March and the raid on Cabanatuan. Highly recommended.

Battle Cry of Freedom by James M. McPherson is the single greatest one-volume account of the American Civil War. I couldn’t do a book list without including this one. Even if you’ve read a lot about the American Civil War, you have to read this book because it puts everything into such a context that it’s like learning it for the first time. Absolutely first rate.



I’ll add some more books later but I really want your input even if its one book. I’m always looking for a good book,

[thatguy96]

I picked up Boot's book for a paper I had to write. Found it quite useful. Didn't read his conclusions so I can't speak to that.

I've been keeping some running bibliographies, that I really should update, but I'll attach my technical reference one as its the largest.

[Mobhack]

For the ACW, then

Rally Once Again
(Battle Tactics of the American Civil War)
Paddy Griffith

Is worth a read.

Cheers
Andy

[Zocktan]

interesting for sceanrio-builders:

-the third world war, august 1985,
-the untold story, third world war,
both books are by sir john hackett (and other nato-generals)

[Bishop746]

Mobhack,

Paddy Griffith has some interesting titles that I have considered buying, particulary "Forward into Battle". The only reason I haven't is the very sharp critisism of his conclusions and research on websites such as Amazon. Of course, there are just as many good reviews but I was wondering if you found parts of his works lacking that would give weight to his critics.

[Mobhack]

Griffiths works (I have read a few) are soundly reasoned.

I suppose if anybody is criticising his results, then they may be those with a foot in the "entrenched" camp on some item or other.

e.g. - some may have some need to believe the "minie/rifle musket myth" of the ACW for real long range rifle shooting as the norm.

But Griffith proves to me (and it sounds logical) that in reality the ACW infantry fire fight was pretty much Napoleonic in character. Early war average engagement ranges of 120 or so yards, and later war ones a bit further.
No 500 yard sniping by line infantry.

And his supporting facts seem to support it. Due to ammunition shortages, the infantry did nothing but drill until thier first battle (not even using blanks for musketry drill), with that being where they saw live rounds for the first time. There was no ammo for basic arms drill, let alone the number of rounds required to achieve proficiency in using a rifled weapon (no firing ranges etc).

Lack of familiarity with live ammo helped with the large number of multiply-loaded weapons found on battlefields, where several shots had been rammed, but not discharged.

So the rifle musket was, in these untrained hands, a slightly better wepon than a smoothbore with the lock exchanged for a cap. (Not having to deal with a flint lock was a big help!). But the accuracy and the fact the troops were armed with a "rifle" did not magically transpose itself into the situation where everyone was now one of Sharpe's greenjackets of the Peninsular war.

Of course - for the small number of troops used to rifles, or who did get trained up in them - then these would be riflemen. But most were city guys with no previous familiarity with firearms.

Been a while since last reading - but that I think covers his views on the infantry fire fight. Napoleopnic in character, both sides lined up 60-120 or so yards apart, firing for about an hour or so in swirling clouds of black powder, till the ammo ran out.

I cannot recal if he goes into the differences between American and British Napoleonic "systems" (this may be remebered stuff from Hughe's firepower ?). But here is my take on it, anyway. There was no "doctrine of closing" like the British had. When ACW forces started a fire fight, then they blazed away at 100 yds or so with no use of the bayonet even considered.

The British system, which worked very well for black powder weapons (and the rifled musket if no riflemanship was taught, was simply a musket) was to get as close as possible (even accept a few volleys if advancing to do so) and at 50-60 yards fire one concerted volley, maybe 2, and then immediately follow up with a bayonet charge, even if defending. It was the bayonet charge that would break the enemy (with the help of the "preparation" of the volley fire, bt fire alone would not break the enemy), or at least convince them to retire. No bayonet charge to decide the issue, and then you got the ACW inconclusive hour long fire fight. The French column of the napoleonic wars was a different approach to breaking a line - and like the british was designed to bring the threat of the bayonet (together with a threatening mass of soldiers) into the enemys "space" and trigger the "fight or flight" response.

The bayonet is a weapon of morale effect (which the critics of the weapon as a useless thing in terms of casualtied inflicted seem to forget or not understand). Advancing on an enemy (charging) announces to him that you intend to invade his "personal space" and get personal with him, and so it helps to trigger his fight/flight reponse. If the enemy is sufficiently shocked and awed by your initial volley, he will tend to retrograde action as you close. If not sufficiently prepared, or steady enough then the enemy will stand. So the act of attemting to close may well break the enemy - but with bayonets fixed, the litle bits of pointy metal on your rifle adds "bonus points" to the "tipping point" equation of the enemy's fight/flight internal morale decision. The fact that the fleeing enemy are not actually contacted, but are then hacked down by your supporting cavalry is irrelevant - the charge with bayonets was a proximate cause of the casualties inflicted, though the surgeon's reports on wounds inflicted will then show sabre and not bayonet wounds.

The American forces, as a rule, did not emphasise closing, or the bayonet. They were trained as engineers and had perhaps an over respect of fortifications (which the French or British would simply have stormed with the bayonet), and tended therefore to develop the infantry fight into uncontrolled "firefights". If one side did decide to break and run away, there was no doctrine of the cavalry present as a "corps de chasse" to cut these fugitives down, and perhaps open a hole in the enemy army's line. (US cavalry were used in the "dragoon" role which they did fine at, but not in the "charging" role with the arme blanche to any real extent)

If all the US infantry was trained a bit more "agressively" perhaps like the British, then I wonder what the ACW would be like. That they could do so is shown by a few actions, such as the 24th(?) Maine infantry on round top - these used agressive bayonet charges together with musketry rather than simply get into a "firefight", and achieved extremely good results.


Of course, the rifled musket if and only if the infantry were actually well-trained in musketry, was a revolution in technology. Just see what the "Thin Red Line" did to an attacking Russian cavalry brigade in the Crimea for example.

But for the average ACW infantryman, who had only "gone through the motions" of small arms loading drill that was a pipe-dream. An emphasis on closing with the bayonet in those circumstances may well have produced more decisive results in ACW battles, as the enemy (and yourselves) were only going to hit with ball ammo by sheer statistical chance.

The option to train in a course of musketry, with maybe a hundred or so rounds expended per man just to achieve basic proficiency, was not really an option due to the chronic shortages of gunpowder. But that probably applied to European (or any other - eg ACW) mass conscript armies as well in that era, with only the relatively small professional armies like the British being able to invest in musketry courses. BP was always a slow and difficult thing to produce (and store!) in great quantity, it was only later with propellants made by mass chemical processes (the smokeless era) that that bottleneck could be reduced.

Andy

[Bishop746]

Well Done, Mobhack.
While I'm not well read enough on the American Civil War to back up or dispute your claim.(One reason why I'm looking into Griffiths books) I respect that your argument was based on logic and evaluation of actuall field conditions and not text book enviroments.

From what little I have read, I agree that a ACW firefight would have occurred at ranges closer to 150 yards than the the Springfields maximum range. There is a big difference between a weapons maximum range and its combat effective range.

One thought did occur to me while reading your post concering entrenchments and the ease that these could be overcome by a more aggressive force. A regiment fighting in 1860 is not the same as the same regiment fighting 2 to 3 years later. Casualities were high but a core of veterans would survive who could deliver a murdurous fire to an advancing force. Would this account for the heavy entrenchments towards the end of the war?

Excellent post because it made me think.

More book recommnedations:

The Myth of the Great War by John Mosier. Mr. Mosiers book generates controversy and passion by calling into question many accepted beliefs concerning the Great War. Not a good book to start with if you have no background in World War One but a must read if you do. I'm not educated enough to speak to all of the books themes but it is backed up with documentation and it is a fasinating read.

Military Experience in the Age of Reason by Christopher Duffy. I dont read books twice very often; there are just too many good books out there I have to read, but this is one of the few that I have. Learning how wars were waged with the technological and buruacratic limits of their time is fasinating. One example, Prussian cavalry units were not formed based on need but on the types of horses that were available that year. If it had been a good year with no droughts then big horses were available to form heavy cavalry squadrons. No rain, sparse feeding resulted in horses only suitable for scouting.

[Mobhack]

One thought did occur to me while reading your post concering entrenchments and the ease that these could be overcome by a more aggressive force. A regiment fighting in 1860 is not the same as the same regiment fighting 2 to 3 years later. Casualities were high but a core of veterans would survive who could deliver a murdurous fire to an advancing force. Would this account for the heavy entrenchments towards the end of the war?

Griffiths notes an increase in average range from 120 or so yards early war to 150 later war (68 in the pines and so on, but that was close country). Coukd be that some veterans influenced this, but maybe in the "we have been here before, let's hang back" sort of way?. i.e these guys may have been to the well a few times too often.

Cheers
Andy

[Mustang]

Black Hawk Down by Mark Bowden

Also, has anyone read Thunder Run? It's a very interesting Black Hawk Down-style story of the American tank assault into Baghdad. If you ever want to make a scenario on this battle, buy this book.

Another good read would be Threat: Soviet capabilites in the mid-90's by Steven Zaloga. Zaloga must be one of the most knowledgeable people on tanks in the world, and his book covers a hypothetical NATO vs. WarPac war around 1993-95 in central europe by walking through a few fictional battles novel-style. It has a lot of interesting insights, like how the Warsaw Pact logistics system was poorly defended against chemical warfare and how the BMP-2, with a height of only 2 meters, would probably not be able to shoot over its own soldiers and would kill them if they got in the way.

[pdoktar]

I second that Mark Bowdens book. Very good IMO.

So that´s why tanks have to be 2,5 - 3 meters tall. That you wouldn´t kill your own soldiers.. But what if those russian mech inf guys would dash and crawl and crouch and run.. hmm [img]/threads/images/Graemlins/Teddy.gif[/img]

Okay if they got in the way. But you can get into way of almost anything, so how does that make a bmp-2 more dangerous than, say, a bradley?