An example of combat ineffective rates in real combat

[Mustang]

Hi all. This question has been bothering me for a while and I've brought it up before.

Infantry in WinSPMBT would seem ridiculously fragile at first glance, with a typical US infantry squad being able to cause hundreds of enemy casualties using its base ammo load. But when you consider that the vast majority of these "casualties" aren't actually killed or wounded, it starts to make sense.

Here are some examples plucked from the internet of how high combat ineffective rates are relative to direct casualties in combat.

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums...in-Combat-Loss

During the Falklands in 1982, 2nd Battalion, Scots Guards (2SG) took Mt Tumbledown vs the crack Argentine 5th Marines Bn (5-BIM). In an epic combined arms night battle in tempatures down to -22F, each battalion suffered 10-20% casualties depending on how you look at it (Argentines took 30 killed, 30 captured, 100 wounded; the Scots had 9 killed and 40+ wounded including the hard losses the LF company who took the peak after 16 hours of combat). Although both units were absolutely drained the next day, they both stood ready to fight the next day and only the conclusion of hostilities prevented that. In the battle report Argentine Marine Commander Robacio wrote: "I was convinced that we could still resist" although his force had expended most of thier ammunition and stregth was down to 68% of what had started the campaign.

During Goose Green, 2 PARA suffered 17 killed (including the battalion commander) and 64 wounded out of approx 500 that took the field, a loss rate of more than 15%. Nevertheless the battalion went into battle successfully just two weeks later at Wireless Ridge, a serious battalion vs battalion sized action in which it suffered another 14 casualties. Then there is the similar losses of the Welsh Guards (32 killed) at Bluff Cove and that of 3PARA at Mount Longdon (23 killed, 47 wounded out of 450 men, more than 15%), and in both cases the two battered units struggled forward, still operational.

So from Falklands experince, that of a modern NATO military vs some of the best units of a modern Latin American military, it can be surmised that 15%-30% casulaties spread out across a battalion suck but can be pushed through.

This implies that a battalion is ineffective after losing about a third of its strength.

http://americandigest.org/mt-archive...econd_look.php

European observers of the Civil War--many of whom were professional soldiers--were shocked at the casualties both Union and Confederate armies would suffer, but yet keep fighting. The European staff college assumption at the time was that if a unit sustained 10% casualties (dead, wounded, missing, captured), it would become combat ineffective and would have to be withdrawn from the line. Civil War units often suffered 30% casualties--sometimes higher--in the larger battles, but stayed in the fight as long as they were physically able to do so. One example from Gettysburg--the 1st Minnesota Regiment, 268 men, ordered by Gen. Hancock on July 2 to buy the Army of the Potomac five minutes to reinforce its lines. Attacking a Confederate brigade five times its size, the 1st Minnesota bought Hancock 15 minutes, by which time he had brought up enough troops to blunt the Confederate onslaught. But the 1st Minnesota paid in blood--out of 268, only 47 men were fit for duty after the engagement, an 82% casualty rate.

Apparently, it was once thought casualty rates as low as 1 in 10 could do it.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Combat_stress_reaction

The ratio of stress casualties to battle casualties varies with the intensity of the fighting, but with intense fighting it can be as high as 1:1. In low-level conflicts it can drop to 1:10 (or less).[citation needed]

So there is about one CSR casualty for every direct one.

Furthermore, there's several soldiers out of action taking care of each wounded.

And the section leader has a 50% chance of being injured once half of his squad are. So this doubles ineffectiveness rates.

http://books.google.com/books?id=XaY...ounded&f=false

In Chechnya, about 72% of soldiers suffered mental disorders after combat. That's about 3 psychological casualties for every healthy.

http://www.historynet.com/men-agains...ietnam-war.htm

From these responses it seems that Americans in Vietnam had little hesitation to engage their enemy. Yet the observations of these veterans prompt the question of why, on average, nearly two of every 10 men were not firing when their unit was in contact. The apparent problem was not of the magnitude Marshall had reported for World War II, but losing the firepower of so many soldiers was still no small matter. In a unit with 500 riflemen, some 80 would not engage. Unlike the numbers from Marshall's work, these estimates came directly from the men who had fought in the cities, jungles, firebases and rice paddies of Vietnam. Why did so many not fire?

Only about 80% of a unit will actually use its weapons.

http://boardgamegeek.com/thread/9578...-to-in-real-in

I think your thoughts regarding Suppression are about right, it represents squads finding cover, lacking cohesion and generally functioning at reduced effectiveness.

For me, Breaking a unit represents the unit realising its tactical situation is untenable and therefore it is either hunkering down to weather the storm or it is actively seeking to leave the immediate battlefield (depends which game you're playing!). Either way, the unit is certainly combat ineffective.

I don't think either situation necessarily involves casualties, or perhaps just a couple of 'light' wounds. I think eliminating a unit from a game represents squads that have taken 2-3 serious casualties / deaths, rather than the the entire unit being wiped out. In my 'real life' experience, the manpower required to stabilise, protect and evacuate multiple casualties very quickly reduces a unit's ability to conduct tactical manoeuvre beyond defending itself.

In a section of nine men, losses of about one in 4-5 can cripple its ability to maneuver.

So taken all together, a single killed or wounded casualty might wipe out an entire squad's effectiveness.

The high bullets/kill ratios in real armies may be analyzed in the same way.

http://www.ar15.com/archive/topic.ht...&f=16&t=323739

US Forced to Import Bullets from Israel as Troops Use 250,000 for Every Rebel Killed
by Andrew Buncombe in Washington

US forces have fired so many bullets in Iraq and Afghanistan - an estimated 250,000 for every insurgent killed - that American ammunition-makers cannot keep up with demand. As a result the US is having to import supplies from Israel.

Let's break this down.

For every kill, there's two wounded. That means 80,000 rounds per KIA/WIA.

For each of those, there's one CSR casualty. This means 40,000 rounds per combat ineffective.

20% of the enemy unit will not even fire its weapons in combat. So that means 30,000 rounds per each enemy actually fighting back.

There are about four people taken out of combat caring for each wounded. So that's 8,000 rounds.

After half the enemy unit is taken out, its squad leader is hit. So we're down to 4,000 rounds.

Once half of a company is taken out, the company commander is likely down. So that doubles the effectiveness of small arms fire down to 2,000 rounds.

Given that the battalion commander is likely to get hit on the front line, that's 1,000 rounds per "kill" to cripple a unit.

Finally, as little as a 10% casualty rate can make the unit ineffective. So in all, a unit can become disorganized after only 100 rounds fired at it per soldier.

Given that WinSPMBT sections have about ten men firing ten rounds each per shot, each WinSPMBT "shot" represents about 100 rounds fired. So the high hit rates in the game, near 100% with Western armies firing at targets in open terrain, make sense. Although the effects on the enemy unit may not be so evenly distributed in real life.

Anyway, this isn't really an objection to how the game works, it just shows how ingame infantry loss rates aren't that unreasonable for anyone else who may have the same question.