ok, some more down-time at work so i can contribute a little to this. i wish i could tell you what i do, it would make some of the coversation a little easier. nonetheless some interesting points here.
regarding obstacles (again):
as mentioned, i am completly indocterinated in the use of obstacles (this is not the correct term in english, i know, in german we have three different words for it)on the operative-strategic and tactical level. i am pretty well appraised therefore as to how practical they are (very) but also what counter-measures are available.
firstly, one link with some pics that show you an overview of different types of "sperren":
http://www.lostplaces.de/cms/verschi...llmeister.html
"digging a trench" is by far the least economical action in a operative-strategic enviornment; it is too easily filled in. to point out: most tanks can be equipped with dozer blades realtivly easily, on the attack in advanced echalon for instance even the hungarians would have put a blade on one tank in EACH PLATOON. this has serious repercations on mobility and therefore these tanks would probally have dropped out in a break-through, however by that time you do not need the blades anymore as you do not obviously build obstacles in your own rear area (it would hinder resupply or retreat). trenches are ONLY used in the tactical enviornment (anti-tank ditch) and in this capacity are superior to mines. generally speaking ALL obstacles are used in foremost in a tactical (say defensive) enviornment, and are covered by fire (even if only a squad).
the most often used "obstacle" is the "stecksperre" which is effectifly iron rails put into slots in ground. these have to be removed manually.
demolitions were everywhere, EVERY SINGLE BRIDGE, TUNNEL, etc. in austria and germany was built with this in mind, all transport infrastructure has defensive component in mind. OTOH, smaller rivers, streams etc. present no problem for WAPA, they can often be forded relativly closely to the actual briding site (forded i mean water leavel under 1m). deeper/fast rivers or more importantly concreted river banks were more of a problem, however every "spearhead" force would have had engineering capabiltiy to deal with this, those engineering bridges, which were perfectly adequate for supporting attacking "breakthrough" forces over small rivers and cannals that dominate in the north german plain. their carry capacity (actualy transit capacity) is only marginaly less then a "normal" two lane 50T carry capacity brige that represent the vast majority of bridges in the AO we are talking about, i.e. only one tank per transit. for resupply it is a larger problem, but the solution was to built onld "barge bridges" (pontoon bridges), the ratio was always at least 2 pontoon bridges to an actual bridge. all of these efforts are taken into account when one says an average advance of 40-70km per day, if there were not such concerns advancing speeds (such as in iraq, would be much, much higher. larger rivers, and more "broken" terrain (hills and woods) are a much bigger problem.
the point is not that obstacles are irrelevant - far from it - i'm a great believer in them. however one has to be aware of the whole picture. in our case for instance, despite having the heaviest fortified lines in europe, vienna would still not have been defendable as the terrain to east is basically the same as in the north german plain. obstacles without fire cover are quickly delt with, and fire cover in "open" terrain (compared with southern germany, most of ausrtria, norway, etc.) is quickly delt with and also a real "sucide" mission that most armies in the west did not really take seriously.
- mobilisation times
the hungarians had a problem with political will in the first case, and the mission they were assigned to (south west austria). later in the decade also most of their units were category B regarding mob time, in the earlier 1980s however they would still have been able to at least field one tank division immidietly to support the 4 sov division
advancing over vienna. the readyness of the czechoslovakian and especially GDR units was higher, espeically the later, and they were a fair match for the "minor" nato countries.
-equipment
this is something i am less aware of so here a question. the fabled "assault breaker" system that was designed to overcome penetrations was abandoned, if i remember correctly, and the function was taken over much latter by apache-armed hellfire tank-killers. was this realistic? i only know that for TOW equipped helis it was a losing proposition, a they would max get two shots of before having to withdraw. could the early apache really fire hellfires so quickly as to present an "assault breaker"?
also, air force: i also remember that a problem was the "lack of primary airfields" for NATO in germany. this presupposed that the main AFBs would all be hit in the opening days and rendered temporarily unsuitable. the alternative strips (civilian airfields and highways) had a much lower sortie and supply rate, but how much lower, were there any actual loadout restrictions (e.g. no LGMs?) how long could NATO have sustained operations from such limited conditions and supply constraints?
- on "arming the population"
interesting that you mention it. in austria we had during this time a full "regular" call up of 270,000 men. However we had enough arms arms (including some old WWII equipment! some of which is however great) and uniforms to arm over 1 million men. If it really had come to that a "general call-up" would have been ordered and all men with military training under the age of 45 would have been recalled and put into "general reinforcement" pools. these men would have to "re-trained" so this would only be a proposition in the "long-war" (over 30 days).
more interesting is the "total defense strategy" employed by us, the norwegians, swedes and finns (to various degree). Like the Finns (SiSi)and Norwegians (HV - Homegaurd)we had dedicated "stay-behind" forces - so called "jagdkampf battillione" that were up between 15-30,000 men. these guys spent their entire conscript training actualy training commando tactics, i.e. no "active" service at all, and would have been resupplied by a blizzard of bunkers and caches.
in terms of using civilans (incl. ex service without mob requirement) - completly out of the question. a.) they would be a liablity and a danger b.) protecting the civilian population is the whole point of the army. OTOH in occupied territories it was expected that some would join the "jagdkommando" force on their own -if they could find them they were clearly good enough to join.
Re: Red Army = most effective force !
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