Excellent article on Afghanistan

[Wdll]

The best thing about the T-34 was that for every german panzer, the USSR could field 1.5 billion T-34s. (yes I am kidding about the numbers).

After Hungary, and especially after Czeckoslovakia, it was pretty damn obvious that NATO was going to invade the USSR.

What are you drinking and where can I get some? How was NATO ever going to invade and with what?

Now, as for the rest of your post, I am ok more or less, but the above is a bit silly.

I agree that it was mainly a matter of leadership that cost the war to the soviets. They were just too civilized about it.

NATO today doesn't seem to be as confused, they kill civilians just fine, but the problem is that while the armed forces there have been trained to kill and destroy, they ask them to do police duties and, at least on the ground, be extra careful to whom the fire, since they want to earn the hearts and minds of the populace, which is where, unless there is some huge change somewhere, will be their undoing. You do not act civilized against an enemy that will gladly slaughter you and your family in a sec if they are given the chance.
I have to say, Alexander did the smart thing. Go in, make allies and whoever doesn't agree, destroy, burn, kill. Then let them keep peace on their own and get the fudge out of there.

[Snipey]

Originally Posted by Wdll

The best thing about the T-34 was that for every german panzer, the USSR could field 1.5 billion T-34s. (yes I am kidding about the numbers).

What are you drinking and where can I get some? How was NATO ever going to invade and with what?

Now, as for the rest of your post, I am ok more or less, but the above is a bit silly.

I agree that it was mainly a matter of leadership that cost the war to the soviets. They were just too civilized about it.

At least I made the comment about the Front being idle, so that might have clued people on. But that is a horrible mistake to make. I can't enough for that mistake

NATO today doesn't seem to be as confused, they kill civilians just fine, but the problem is that while the armed forces there have been trained to kill and destroy, they ask them to do police duties and, at least on the ground, be extra careful to whom the fire, since they want to earn the hearts and minds of the populace, which is where, unless there is some huge change somewhere, will be their undoing. You do not act civilized against an enemy that will gladly slaughter you and your family in a sec if they are given the chance.
I have to say, Alexander did the smart thing. Go in, make allies and whoever doesn't agree, destroy, burn, kill. Then let them keep peace on their own and get the fudge out of there.

Wow. That was retarded. I meant to say "It was pretty damn obvious that NATO wasn't going to invade the USSR". Thank you for catching that. If you read the context of the post, you'd pick it up. But I meant to say wasn't, gah! I just pulled a McLellan.

[Snipey]

In my defense, I did say that the front was idle, which meant no one was going to attack. But...just thank you for catching that, I cannot enough for that error.

[Snipey]

Oh wow, I'm on a roll! I accidentally inserted this "At least I made the comment about the Front being idle, so that might have clued people on. But that is a horrible mistake to make. I can't enough for that mistake " into Wdll's post. Sorry about that. Anyways, not to detract from all those posts, I'll repost my argument, as it should have been written, with the "wasn't". I just put too much thought into my previous reply, reposted here, and it took away from my thinking abilities for the rest of the day. And now I took a nap, so here goes:


The didn't supply the Afghanistan contingent properly. Yes, there were supplies, but it wasn't enough. My quote was that the Stavka failed to supply the escalation. Your counter-argument is that "they did supply the limited contingent". Your counter-argument fails to address my argument.

Of course they had a hard time, this is war. Rarely do you see a war that's easy. The US war against the Iraqi Insurgency is no Operation Cakewalk.

I brought up Leningrad for a comparison to show what the Red Army could do. I didn't bring it up to start a debate over it. We both agreed that 640,000 civilians were supplied from scratch via a treacherous road.

In the Siege of Leningrad there was limited supply that the Soviets could give to the city, because, uhhh geez, I don't know, maybe the Great Patriotic War was still going on? When the Red Army fought against Afghanistan the USSR had no other wars. In the Vietnam War, the US had over 550,000 men in Vietnam. Why couldn't the Red Army do something similar? It took the Red Army under three months to bring over one million men, all the way across the USSR to help take out the Japanese Army in Manchuria and capture 600,000 POWs, and destroy the previously undefeated Japanese Army in a matter of weeks.

The Western Front was far more criticial then an actual war? Are you serious? After Hungary, and especially after Czeckoslovakia, it was pretty damn obvious that NATO wasn't going to invade the USSR. On the other hand, after the Berlin Airlift and the Cuban Missile Crisis, it was obvious that USSR wasn't going to go after NATO. The War in Afghanistan started in 1979. The Western Front wasn't going to be an issue. Carter wasn't going to invade. Reagan's new program focused on providing a counter to USSR nukes, and then using US nukes to threaten USSR to give their natural resources to the West. Bush followed Reagan's foreign policy until the USSR collapsed. No ground invasion was even possible here. The front was idle, not because both sides balanced each other out, but because of the strategies employed by the USSR and NATO. Major powers tried to avoid going to war after World War II, for some strange reason, maybe total devastation of the agressor had something to do with that.

So according to your logic, you keep your best troops in an idle front, while you have your average troops fight an actual war. Gorbachev and Brezhnev both supported that logic and that's how you lose wars. On the other hand, the Red Army leadership opposed it fiercely. If you have an actual war and an idle front, you send your best troops to fight in the actual war. That's how you win wars. But now I see why you agree with Brezhnev and Gorbachev.

You think there were enough ambushes. I think more could have been set. It's a difference of opinion on what's enough.

I still don't see why the Red Army couldn't switch support from an unpopular leader to a popular one. On the local level (city, neighborhood, town) the USSR actually had honest elections. Could have done the same for Afghani tribes.

If tanks no work, get better tank. Have tanks with less wear and tear, and raise the main armament. The T-34 was a product of World War II. Surely if the Soviet effort was placed towards the War, something like the T-34 could have been done. If tanks aren't useful, you make them useful. The T-34's predecessor sucked. But the T-34 model that was used at Kursk, albeit with more casualties, was able to stop the Wehrmacht tanks in a tank v. tank battle for the first time.

You still failed to address my point about using third world country militaries, in the manner that I've described, that is SpetzNatz training, fight a year in Afghanistan. You also failed to address my point of giving the local Afghani forces that were pro-USSR more responsibility.

Find you a war where the army performed at 100%? US in the Persian Gulf War. Red Army from post-Stalingrad to pre-Berlin campaign. Ike's forces at Battle of Normandy. Suvorov's campaign in the late 1700's, early 1800's.

But you and I think differently. I think in the pure military mindset; I'm against the best resources in idle fronts when actual wars are being fought.

[Marcello]

My quote was that the Stavka failed to supply the escalation. Your counter-argument is that "they did supply the limited contingent". Your counter-argument fails to address my argument.

I wrote

Note: they DID supply their limited contingent, they DID supply the DRA army and security forces AND they DID supply the afghan population under their control, Kabul included. They had to ship half million of tons of wheat for civilian consumption during a single year. There certainly was no mass starvation in Kabul, to the best of my knowledge.
HOWEVER every single source on the matter notes that they had a hard time doing all of this. Adding, say an half million of troops or a massive reconstruction program of the 40.000 km of roads in Afghanistan or similar massive efforts would have in all likelyhood broken the back of the logistical system, even as it was the Salang pass had to be run on a one way system for example.

They did not fail to supply the escalation. There was no escalation in part (not exclusively but in part) precisely because they knew if there had been one THEN there would have likely been supply issues. Please take note also of the fact that the limited contingent was not the only thing they had to worry about supply wise. The afghan population under their control had to be supplied too and so the afghan army.

Now let’s examine the cases you brought up

Why couldn't the Red Army do something similar? It took the Red Army under three months to bring over one million men, all the way across the USSR to help take out the Japanese Army in Manchuria and capture 600,000 POWs, and destroy the previously undefeated Japanese Army in a matter of weeks.

The Red Army enjoyed secure rear areas and line sof communications in that theater of operations. Had the transiberian railroad been crawling with japanese constantly blowing it up all the day then it would not have been so easy.

In the Vietnam War, the US had over 550,000 men in Vietnam.

Which raises two points:

First of all: it did not work, so why do the same?

Second: in Vietnam the americans had safe access to several sea ports along the coast (and Vietnam was mostly coast), their overland lines of communications were much shorter than soviet ones in Afghanistan and not as heavily harrassed.Close air support could be operated even from aircraft carriers off the coast which could be then resupplied elsewhere. Close air support in Afghanistan relied on planes that were based in the country and whose bombs/fuel had to be shipped by convoys which were constantly attacked.And so on.
Had there been, say an efficient submarine campaign against US shipping and more active Vietcong in the South then, again, it would not have been so easy

Are you serious?

Ever heard something about “Able Archer” or “operation Ryan”, if not Google is your friend. Yes afterwards it is pretty damn easy to say that “obviously” nothing was ever going to happen but the soviet leadership could not afford to play armchair strategist with hindsight benefit. There was little to gain in Afghanistan and a lot to lose elsewhere. If things turned hot the western theater forces needed everything at hand, it could not be magically teleported back from Afghanistan.

On the other hand, the Red Army leadership opposed it fiercely

I have never heard anything about the Red Army leadership specifically suggesting to gut (meaning, taking away the gunships,trucks and others items needed in the afghan theater) the western theater forces for Afghanistan sake.If you have any source on that, please provide it. Asking for more resources, well they did. Some asked for some additional troops or going after Pakistan but it questionable they had fully worked out the implications, these were the same dudes who initially believed the afghan army could handle the guerrillas by itself after all. Armies seldom feel they have enough of the cake. Problem was that the soviet cake was small.

I still don't see why the Red Army couldn't switch support from an unpopular leader to a popular one.

Simple: because said leader would tell soviets to go and screw themselves.If not he would cease being popular.
Afghani tribes hated the Kabul regime and hated the soviet troops. Communist ideology was fundamentally at odds with traditional afghan way of life. Foreign communist troops were doubly unwelcomed.
This was such a basic reality of the afghan war that your inability to grasp it is beginning to make me wonder if I am not just wasting my time.
Kabul tried to enlist religious figures in support for example. It was a total failure.

If tanks aren't useful, you make them useful.

Actually the logical thing is doing what they did: use something else which is more useful.

Have tanks with less wear and tear.

It does not work. Heavy tracked vehicles are inherently bad for roads and are inherently more maintenance intensive. It is a engineering reality. You might as well ask for tanks which run on cow dung.

You also failed to address my point of giving the local Afghani forces that were pro-USSR more responsibility.

No simply the previous post was getting long winded so I wrote

I could go on on the other points if you are interested but really, the 90% of the things you are touting as solutions or that you seem to think were never done fall into three categories:

1)They actually were the standard tactical repertoire.
2)They were tried and did not work.
3)They were obviously unworkable.

But I see that you are not convinced so let's examine it.
Giving the local Afghani forces more responsability is exactly what they wanted to do. The idea was that the soviet forces would provide support and the afghans would have most of the responsibility for actual operations. It did not work so the soviets were forced to undertake combat operations by themselves. Nobody wanted to fight for the USSR sake. When the soviets finally leaved THEN the DRA security forces started to put on a decent performance.

You still failed to address my point about using third world country militaries, in the manner that I've described, that is SpetzNatz training, fight a year in Afghanistan.

That’s why I wrote:

The remaining 10% may or may not have worked but were not enough to make a difference.

So they get a few additional battalions of Spetnaz.Big deal. Note they would still have to deploy helicopters gunships and logistical support for them.
Really they tried nearly all of the things you have suggested so far, plus some you probably don't even know about. Bribing militias? Check. Bombers based off country? Check. Shooting SCUDs at insurgents strongholds (OK more an afghan army thing actually)? Yep that was done too.

US in the Persian Gulf War

Really? I take you never heard all the polemics about the army failing to encircle the republican guard divisions for example?