The Last Battle (Okinawa) Scenarios

[MarkSheppard]

First up is an experimental one I've put together using SCENHACK and the built in features of the unit data editor.

Hell in the Night
(Best played as AMERICAN)

Date: May 1945
Location: Somewhere on Okinawa
Type: Japanese Assault vs. US delay

"All artillery personnel should receive additional training in scouting and patrolling and in setting up a perimeter defense, including the use of barbed wire, trip wires, and flares."

After Action Report, 96th Infantry Divisional Artillery, Okinawa.

This scenario is intended to represent a generic night-time defensive scenario of the type encountered by US artillery units during the Battle of Okinawa.

In addition to holding out in bypassed caves or pillboxes, Japanese troops would also launch night-time assaults against US positions.

It was during these assaults that a new piece of technology rose to prominence: Active Infrared Night Vision.

Almost all of the 1,700 Active Infrared (AIR) Scopes built by the Electronics Laboratory during World War II were shipped to either the Philippines or Okinawa, where they were used as weapon scopes on the M1 Carbine (Sniperscopes) or as stand-alone individual observation scopes (Snooperscopes).

They were first used in limited numbers by special teams to combat Japanese nighttime infiltration in the Philippines campaign; before being used on a large scale in the Battle of Okinawa, which saw III Amphibious Corps alone receiving 295 snooperscopes and 215 sniperscopes.

The effectivness of the new "Buck Rogers" weapon was rapidly proven, for during the first seven days of the Okinawa campaign, approximately 30 percent of the total Japanese casualties caused by small arms fire came from the still-limited number of Sniperscope equipped M1 Carbines.

References:
The T3 Carbine: First NVG-Equipped Fighting Rifle by Bruce Canfield in AMERICAN RIFLEMAN, 16 February 2020.

Weapon in Question

Other miscellaneous notes:

1.) The M4 Artillery Tractors are meant to represent the M5 tractors that the Army was re-equipping 105mm Divisional Artillery Battalions with; because they towed guns better in bad weather (rain/mud and across paddies) than the currently assigned 2.5 ton trucks.

2.) I'm still trying to find the best "mix" for early portable night vision; I first tried the vision values (14) off the Panther Uhu in the German OBAT; then lowered it to 6 in version 1.1 -- I think these may work.

[MarkSheppard]

A much better quality report is available here:

http://www.uscarbinecal30.com/forum/...topic4568.html

Basically by 1 JAN 1945, the following shipments had been sent out to the operational theatres:

ETO: 25 Snooperscopes and 25 Sniperscopes
CBI: 25 Snooperscopes and 25 Sniperscopes
POA: 335 Snooperscopes and 175 Sniperscopes
SPOA: 350 Snooperscopes and 150 Sniperscopes
SWPA: 50 Snooperscopes and 50 Sniperscopes

In the ETO they were kept for training purposes -- about 25 Sniperscopes were shipped to 5th Army in the first week of March 1945, for example.

In the Pacific, eventually we ended up with roughly this distribution:



The Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes were not provided to special sniper units. Decisions on how best to deploy the equipment, who would use it, and how they would use it was left to each battalion to decide based on their own experience.

Some units tried them on night-time patrols, some tried them during offensive actions. All quickly came to the same conclusion: the equipment was best suited for use with their night-time defensive perimeters, particularly when teamed up with or near machine gun or light machine gun positions.

...

On the night of 11 April, a snooperscope operator with a battalion of the 96th Division detected an infiltration attempt. One company reported 25 enemies killed, with another company reporting 16 more killed with machine-gun fire directed by another snooperscope operator in the emplacement.

On another night, a snooperscope operator with a unit of the 96th Division spotted an 8 man Japanese patrol attempting to infiltrate under cover of a sea wall. The 8 man team was wiped out by machine-gun fire directed by the snooperscope operator.

Another night when a Sniperscope operator detected a 4 man patrol attempting infiltration, communication with a nearby BAR emplacement directed fire effectively and eliminated the group.

Enemy casualties reported directly to Capt. Patterson, by the 7th and 96th Divisions for the period of 01 Apr to 16 Apr, was 150 enemy casualties directly and indirectly attributed to the Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes. The actual number killed was estimated to be higher as the 150 represented only those confirmed. This represented a total of about 3% of the total enemy casualties credited to these two divisions during this time. This estimate did not indicate if the 3% included both daytime time and night time casualties. Also absent were the casualty assessments by the other Army Divisions or the USMC Divisions. The 3% estimate was 3% of the casualties inflicted by the 7th and 96th Divisions.

Later casualty claims by the media and authors have included 30% of the enemy casualties during the first week, 33% during the first two weeks, and 33% during the first three weeks. Those who cite a source for this information indicate an article authored by William Garstang, president of Electronic Labs, published in the April 1946 issue of the Electronic Labs employee newsletter The Electronic Beacon.

There's a lot more, that link is worth looking at.