Morale Issues

[narwan]

Hi Krotos,
losses incurred in this game are not necessairily outright human kills. If a 10 men squad has 4 men left that does not men 6 men were killed. It means that there are 4 combat effective men left. The others are either KIA, WIA, POW, shellshocked, deserting, fleeing, gorging on captured supplies of french wine, etc. The game does call losses 'kills' but that is an abstraction to cover all possible reasons why soldiers become combat ineffective.

In other words, if 90% of the battallion is lost, not all of those have died. In fact, most probably won't have been. The troops you described with: "I think what they would be thinking is ..."holy shi*, lets bug out of here while we can"... or ... "run for your life"!!" are part of those 90% losses. Their state of mind is effectively beyond the limited time scale of the game to rally.
The 10% troops that are left constitute those soldiers who are still doing exactly what you see them doing in the game. And keep in mind they did not see 90% of their buddies being blown away; for one because only a fraction of those were actually killed and also because the troops on the field don't have the players godview. Individual troops will not be much aware of events beyond their own squad and platoon within the short time span of the game. They may very well carry on with their subunits mission when it is unlikely to affect the battles outcome. In the chaos of command breakdown a significant portion of the troops will simply carry out their last orders.
Also they will likely have seen some comrades get wounded. Besides flaming their desire for revenge they may well be motivated to fight on to buy the time needed to get their wounded comrades evacuated safely.

Narwan

[Basileus]

I decided to re-read the accounts of the Battle of the Imjin River, a meeting engagement fought by the British 29th Brigade against vastly superior numbers of Chinese in April 1951. It was a bloodbath...four battalions on a 12,000 yard front, with one, the 1st Battalion of the Gloucestershire Regiment getting cut off and wiped out. One squadron (company) of Centurion tanks supported the brigade but couldn't reach the Gloucesters on the far left. Another battalion, the Ulsters, was severely mauled. The Besa coax machineguns on the tanks were firing nearly constantly. Many Chinese got run over by the treads. Others who managed to clamber aboard with grenades and sticky bombs were hosed off by fellow tanks' machinegun fire. One tank drove through a building to knock off the Chinese. When the UN troops took casualties, they pulled back...when the Chinese took casualties, they kept on coming, wave after wave, oblivious to the murderous fire of the tanks. I'm sure that seeing their mates getting blasted by the dozen would have had a negative impact on Chinese morale, if it was daytime and they could see the fallen. But it was night action, all they could see were the tanks blazing away, a beacon for them to focus their assault on. Perhaps this was intentional on the part of the Chinese leaders? Or superhuman morale combined with a total disregard for casualties?

The Communist forces in Korea weren't always so superhuman, though. In September 1950 along the Pusan Perimeter, a few days after the Inchon landings, the lack of resupply and a newfound vigor among the UN troops caused the nearly invincible North Koreans to crack and fall apart. They were worn out, underfed, underequipped (resorting to using captured vehicles, weapons, ammo), and no amount of bleating by the Kommissars could prevent the inevitable rout. Many hardened troops fled to the hills and formed guerrilla bands that harrassed UN rear areas for months, whereas South Koreans drafted by the then-victorious North Koreans gladly surrendered to UN forces.

Taking just the experience of the Brits at the Imjin and the North Koreans at the Naktong, it would appear that it took considerably less than 90% casualties to cause one side to break and withdraw. On the other hand, US Marines storming Obong-ni Ridge on 17 August 1950 had a hell of a time...they'd climb all the way to the top of a hill, get knocked back down, then climb it again. The 2nd Battalion 5th Marines suffered 60% casualties in seven hours. One platoon managed to reach the top with 20 of the 30 men it started the attack with; as it did so, machinegun fire caused five more casualties, and the rest were ordered back off the crest. Corsairs were called in, and worked over the North Korean positions, but as soon as the planes were gone, they reoccupied their trenches. As the 15 survivors of the Marine platoon started back up the hill at 50% casualties, they took six more casualties, reducing their numbers to nine effectives. Regaining the crest, the platoon was again forced to retreat. The 2nd Battalion was combat ineffective by 1500 hours, and the 1st Battalion had to pass through them to take the hills of Obong-ni Ridge by nightfall. Seven hours is roughly 140 game turns, and in that time 60% casualties were inflicted on a battalion sized formation, finally rendering them ineffective. That one platoon suffered 70% casualties, but it was still fighting up until that time. But they weren't at 90%, no.

And yes, infantry will attack an armored enemy even when reduced by casualties. Morale tends to be the deciding factor then. Americans in July 1950 had low morale because they just couldn't seem to stop the Red Tide, so when confronted by T-34s had a propensity to run. But not always. When a North Korean tank went tear-assing through downtown Taejon, General Dean saw it, rallied some 3.5 inch bazooka teams, and led them on a tank hunt through the narrow streets of the town. That takes guts.

Basileus

[Krotos]

Hey Basileus,

An excellent piece on the Battle of the Imjin River.

Notice though how the Brits and Chinese reacted differently. The Brits often fell back while the Chinese advanced regardless of cost. A similar comparision could be made with the Soviets in certain battles in WW II, and the Iranians in the Iran-Iraq war. What is being described are human wave tactics. In the case of the Iranians and Soviets, Guards Units and Commisars respectively were behind the waves and shoot anyone retreating on sight -- in the case of the Soviets, even their families would be exicuted! In such a case the ordinary soldier is, to put it bluntly, screwed! He is likely dead no matter what happens, so he might as well take a bullet from the enemy as one of his own. Human wave assaults are not the usual strategy or tactic of most of the worlds armies though -- thank the gods.

I will admit, certain "motivated" opponents, and / or, extremely professional formations (like some of the Waffen SS Divisions) will rally and fight inspite of alarming losses, but such formations (and the individuals that lead them) are the exception not the rule.

Krotos

[Mobhack]

game does call losses 'kills' but that is an abstraction to cover all possible reasons why soldiers become combat ineffective.

Actually, one of the first things we did way back in spww2 days, was to change "killed" to "casualties".

Otherwise - you are correct, in that some of the casualties will be those rendered combat-innefectives for some reason or other, such as helping wounded to the rear, or being wounded or battle-shocked etc, rather than just dead.

It also answers the question some folk ask "how does a section which is reduced to one "man" fire rifles, an LMG and maybe a LAW on its first shot opportunity of a turn" - the section may have only one man listed, but there will be some "hangers on". The one man is either one effective, or better yet - think of the crew count as an indicator of "hit points remaining" rather than some accountant's bean-count view of actual men left standing. Real war is messier than that neat ledger-book approach.

So the one man remaining is effectively one hit point remaining. i.e. that section is verging on being wiped out, not that the section has only one lonely guy carrying lots of weaponry in it. Sone of the other 9 men of the section may well still be hanging around, but are not effectively contributing to the battle any more.



Cheers
Andy

[nosrac]

andy,
thanks for that clear representation of just what casualties are. just curious, if at all possible. would it be possible to have on the battle summary screen a break down of
"killed-wounded-surrendered" instead of just casualties. of course these numbers would be abstract but other games like combat mission have it in battle summarys. just a thought.

thanks
chuck

[Krotos]

This is all very illuminating -- and much appreciated. I think I now have a much better idea of what is going on with respect to casualties in the game.

I would however, echo Chuck's request for a casualty breakdown (if possible to code).

[Randy]

Another point is that of the Japanese during WWII. Faced with overwelming odds, the Japanese troops continued to fight. They fought and died for the Emperor, and to not do so, was considered to be cowardly. Also, while many knew they could no defeat the US, their purpose was to kill as many Americans as possible in order to cause so many casualties that the US would quit.

[andy1964]

Hi,

Just thought I'd put in another point on this.

During WW2, SLA Marshall (Brig General, US ARMY) conducted interviews with troops of the 7th Infantry division after Kwajalein. A book was written,whuch described this, called Island Victory.

During the interviews it was found that only about 25% of the men in any formation actually took an active part in any combat. (one stat was 36 guys out of a battalion actually fired weapons against a Japanese massed assault)

The rest didn't run or anything, but they didn't actually fire a weapon.

Marshall, with further research figured the number was closer to 5% of men were actually effective in combat. These were the guys who won the battles.

So in one way, yes we have a unit of men under arms, but the highly motivated ones will still be attacking or defending after the rest have gone to cover. The rest, with no disrespect intended, are filling in places and soaking up fire.

Training regimes were put in place to deal with this issue after this research was published. But due to differing standards across armies I would imagine this still applies in some cases.

This issue was the subject of one of the Sandhurst wargames, published back in the early 80's by a guy called Paddy Griffiths. (Designed by the Sandhurst wargames club) I Believe Paddy was a lectured there as well as an avid wargamer and writer on the military subjects.

So yes I can see justification for a force that has been beat up on to continue attacking or defending. It's not the mass who are doing it but the motivated 5%.

TY
Andy

PS and yes it still bugs the hell out of me that those guys don't run away and I have to hunt them down to win the game :-)

[Bishop746]

Marshalls book is highly controversial when it was published and has been cited by many respected historians. It wasnt until Dr. Roger Spiller did a study on Marshalls claims did anyone realize there was a problem.

Here is a link with a brief of Dr. Spillers results. I personally dont know who is right but I do know Marshalls book is not accepted by some military historians and sociologist.

http://www.warchronicle.com/us/comba...rshallfire.htm