Red Army = most effective force !

[narwan]

Marcello said:

There are others places that highways can be entered or left, especially for the combat vehicles. Service areas may have connections with the road network, there are often dirt roads within reach of highway in cultivated areas etc.. This quite beside the fact that taking out a significant numbers of off-ramps is quite a lot of work.
It is not like drilling thought the tarmac is the only problem. Even in the earth you still need to dig a lot of deep holes, or otherwise the damage will not be sufficient.The practical experience with bombing runways that I am aware of has shown that paved surfaces are more difficult to damage and quicker to repair than many (included myself before I found out) imagine.

"digging of deep trenches to block trucks"

If you have ever seen digging trenches in paved roads, you would realize that is not very practical.

If you reread my post you'll see I said digging deep trenches (easily done even with commercial diggers) to block trucks driving around blocked roads not in order to block the roads. So that'd be next to roads and in fields, not the roads themselves. Also a good and very quick way to make those exit points a lot harder to make work.

Marcello said:
"blowing up (high) buildings next to roads"

Outside urban centers that would be a pretty rare option.

But since there are plenty of those not rare at all. The large number of roads and urban centres are being used as advantages to the WP so also take into account the drawbacks. Devastated towns are hard to advance through.

On the whole your argument seems to be that it would be hard for NATO to demolish things effectively while it would be fairly easy for the WP forces to overcome them. I think you've got it the wrong way around. It is much, much easier to demolish and block than it is to clear and circumvent.
It's also being stated that the WP had prepared and developed for this, etc. Well so did NATO, the germans in particular.

Another point is the opening of hostilities itself, the assumption is, I assume, that firing will be initiated by the WP with the comencement of the cross border attack and/or preparatory artillery strikes. I doubt it would happen that way. The war would be on before any troops crossed the border. NATO wasn't stupid and would know full well what the massing of WP troops near the border would mean. Stern warnings and ultimatums would be given. When those were not met, (conventional) cruise missile and air strikes on the forces in east germany were extremely likely. I won't sepculate ont he results of those, the point is that in my opinion there would likely already be a shooting war before any WP ground forces crossed into NATO terrirtory. That would make the intial attack much harder still.

Narwan

[Siddhi]

narwan:

- good point on the technolgical equipment of the dutch, as to pointing out my reversing the belgium and dutch army traints. are you sure the dutch had leo-2s as well as massed heavy IFVs in BEFORE 1985? also, again without notes in front of me, I don`t think ANY of the category A MRR regiments deployed on the IGB at that time had more then a single BN of BTRs,if that, and the BMP is a great piece of equipment, if only for it's low profile and manuverability.

- the abilty of VII Corps (? i forget) to deploy to NORTHAG in time is seriously questionable. IIRC it would take 10 days for REFORGER to completete the first phase, the NATO Rapid Reinforcement Plan would take 30 days at least. The ability of the soviets in particular to get their units up to war strength much quicker is a very complicated debate, but in my view, true. The biggest mistake in my view is your appraisal of the political component - the ability of NATO to actually mobilise in time is by no means certain, it requires substantial political will and in RL would also require bruxelles to agree IN TOTAL for it to go ahead. In terms of "pre-emptive strikes", i think you can forget it - there is no way that such on order would be sanctioned by NATO unless there had been tensions for a long time (over a month) and enough time for political consensus to be built.

- on fortifications and obstacles. i have to admit this is actually one my old duties, and something i know a bit about. it short: it's all a bit different, people have spent over 50 years working on the problem, there is quite a lot of give and take - effectivly it comes down to terrain however. obstacles in the hills/mountains is one thing, the north german plain is another.

- as to germans willing to nuke on their border: sorry, completly, irrefutably, wrong. Not even Kohl would have agreed to it, according to him, and he was by far the most aggressive.

[narwan]

Siddhi said:
- good point on the technolgical equipment of the dutch, as to pointing out my reversing the belgium and dutch army traints. are you sure the dutch had leo-2s as well as massed heavy IFVs in BEFORE 1985? .

Yes. Starting with the second production run (which was in 1980 I think) the dutch were getting Leo 2's. The first batches received (not a lot yet) went to the heavy recon battallions (two operational with Leo 2's in 1984). Later whole tank battallions were equiped/operational. That started in 1984 and by 1988 half the armor battallions were Leo 2's (the rest Leo 1's). While not an exact match that closely resembles the operational introduction of the T80.

By 1984 half the mech battallions had the heavy IFV, the rest a wheeled APC. By 1988 all mech battallions in the three mech infantry divisions of the dutch corps had the heavy IFV (and two of a reserve brigade aswell). Dutch recon units (of which they had a lot) also mostly employed the heavy IFV in 1984 with some lighter IFV's (M113 with 25mm gun) added.

Siddhi said:
also, again without notes in front of me, I don`t think ANY of the category A MRR regiments deployed on the IGB at that time had more then a single BN of BTRs,if that, and the BMP is a great piece of equipment, if only for it's low profile and manuverability.

In 1989 the soviet divisions still used the TO&E of 1 tank regiment, 1 bmp regiment and 2 btr regiments for the motorised rifle divisions. That includes the divisons in east germany. Add in the tank divisions whichhad no btr regiments or battallions and you end up with more or less a 50-50 spread between BTR's and BMP's. There were some reports of maybe some divisions having two bmp regiments and 1 btr regiment but I've yet to see that substantiated. Seems there weren't enough bmp's to achieve that.
No debate on the bmp being a good piece of equipment, the dutch heavy IFV is so too.

Siddhi said:
- the abilty of VII Corps (? i forget) to deploy to NORTHAG in time is seriously questionable. IIRC it would take 10 days for REFORGER to completete the first phase, the NATO Rapid Reinforcement Plan would take 30 days at least. The ability of the soviets in particular to get their units up to war strength much quicker is a very complicated debate, but in my view, true. The biggest mistake in my view is your appraisal of the political component - the ability of NATO to actually mobilise in time is by no means certain, it requires substantial political will and in RL would also require bruxelles to agree IN TOTAL for it to go ahead. In terms of "pre-emptive strikes", i think you can forget it - there is no way that such on order would be sanctioned by NATO unless there had been tensions for a long time (over a month) and enough time for political consensus to be built.

I did make reservations about the US reinforcing the north german plain myself. As I said earlier, even without them the north german plain is far from a walk over.
I also don't believe in the argument that NATO would be politically weak in replying to a soviet threat and build up. I believe that they full well realised that a weak response only calls the one thing you're trying to avoid over yourself.
You're questioning NATO's ability to mobilise, well I'm pretty sure that the WP had as much if not more problems themselves. I recall you yourself mentoning such a thing about the Hungarians a while back? The soviets would certainly need the troops of their allies in an attack so the political and mobilisational problems are not exclusive to NATO.
And such a 'pre-emptive' strike is extremely likely in my view. If there are large troop concentrations on one side of the border and aircraft with stand-off weaponry patrolling on the other side what would happen if those aircraft would light up targets on the other side with their radar (let's say anti sam missiles). I doubt the soviets would hold their fire, not all of them anyway. Only one sam needs to be fired to start a shooting war. Let's say no sam was fired. What would happen if a single NATO missile was fired (with for example the option to self destruct before hitting the target)? Now the WP troops would certainly open up. Again a shooting war with opening missiles being fired within seconds of each other with both sides accusing the other of firing first, which would happen in any case. I have a hard time not to see an air war preceding the ground war.

Siddhi said:
- on fortifications and obstacles. i have to admit this is actually one my old duties, and something i know a bit about. it short: it's all a bit different, people have spent over 50 years working on the problem, there is quite a lot of give and take - effectivly it comes down to terrain however. obstacles in the hills/mountains is one thing, the north german plain is another.

The north german plain isn't really a plain at all. It's riddled with rivers, canals and streams. There are hills, some wooded land and plenty of urban centres. And very wet ground. If it is rainy, much of the ground would get 'swampy' to swampy to be of much use to heavy vehicles. In other words, while not as good defensive terrain as further south, it still offers plenty of options to defenders.

Siddhi said:
- as to germans willing to nuke on their border: sorry, completly, irrefutably, wrong. Not even Kohl would have agreed to it, according to him, and he was by far the most aggressive.

Which is what I always thought too. With the end of the cold war not only Soviet plans started to surface. From some of these that appeared in germany it would seem the germans were in fact willing to go so far. Remember that demolition charges are very low yield with very little non local effects. They had about a dozen locations were these were called for. (If anyone can come up with some online references to these I'd be grateful since I don't have them myself).
The germans employed the strategy of forward defense (also well known). Can't do that without being ready to lay waste to that forward area... They knew that if they were succesful in that, it would/might save the area's behind from damage. In that view it makes sense.

Narwan

[Marcello]

"If you reread my post you'll see I said digging deep trenches (easily done even with commercial diggers) to block trucks driving around blocked roads not in order to block the roads. So that'd be next to roads and in fields, not the roads themselves. Also a good and very quick way to make those exit points a lot harder to make work."

Which requires digging hundreds of meters or kilometers of deep trenches.With the commonly available commercial equipment that is a very time consuming affair, not something that can be done on the fly. The only way such task can be carried out in a reasonable timeframe is with chain escavators, like the soviet PZM series. From what I have seen this isn't the sort of equipment that your typical local construction firm will generally have in the inventory.

"On the whole your argument seems to be that it would be hard for NATO to demolish things effectively while it would be fairly easy for the WP forces to overcome them. I think you've got it the wrong way around. It is much, much easier to demolish and block than it is to clear and circumvent."

But in reality many of the actions you are describing are actually construction activities. You are calling for building obstacles requiring extensive digging and earth moving. Such activities are actually very time consuming and as they would require damaging infrastructure, infringing private property etc. it would be unlikely that they would be carried out until the war was a sure thing.By then it would be too late to carry them out in an extensive manner.

"Well so did NATO, the germans in particular"

I have no doubt that they were prepared to blow up bridges,laying minefields (much faster than trench digging) and such. What I have a lot of reservations about is much of the rest, like blowing up off ramps and so on.If they were in the plans and the necessary preparations (pits for the demolition charges etc.) had been made, by any means tell me so. If they are just ideas being tossed around, then they are not very practical.

[Marcello]

"I believe that they full well realised that a weak response only calls the one thing you're trying to avoid over yourself."

Just because it makes sense in strategic terms that does not mean the political realities of the NATO countries would make it feasible.

[narwan]

Marcello said:
Which requires digging hundreds of meters or kilometers of deep trenches.

No it doesn't. It is a common misconception that in order to significantly disrupt a supply network you need to take out every link. You don't. You only have to take out one (the weakest being the easiest target).
The capacity of a supply system is determined by the lowest capacity point along the entire chain. For example, if you have two long stretches or road of equal width, length, material, incline etc. The only difference is that one of them has an extremely sharp bend halfway. That one will have a lower capacity for the simple reason that traffic will need to slow down in order to make the turn. It doesn't matter that all the miles before and after the bend it has the same capacity as the other road. It's the choke point (the bend) that determines the capacity of the entire line. Does that mean that taking out one point suffices to make a supply chain collapse (temporarily)? Sometimes it does. A lot of WP division would be moving over very few roads in the northern sector. That means they can't easily switch roads for supply chains without disrupting each others supply. So one bridge taken out along a supply route can halt the flow along that entire supply chain. Until it's replaced. By an engineer bridge which will have a much lower capacity and which in turn can be taken out again.
Besides the capacity of a network there's the question of the absolute time which it takes for one specific unit of supply to cross the whole chain. The road example again; if you add some more curves and bends after the first one which are not as sharp you won't add a 'weaker' link than there already is. Those additional bends will cause each vehicle to slow down somewhat though again adding to the time for that vehicle (and it's load) to get to its destination. So each additional weakening of links will reduce the capacity of the part from the previous (and weaker) link.
Delaying is the whole point of obstacles and blockages. Going around them may look like a TACTICAL solution, strategically it doesn't solve the problem of being delayed. It takes time to go around, especially in war with all its uncertainties (and certainties...).

Think of the emergency exit of a public building. If it doesn't have the capacity to let through everyone on time casualties will occur. Not just because of the emergency itself (a fire for example) but also because of the crowding in front of the exit (in supply terms it means that traffic jams will happen in front of choke points and those jams themselves will reduce the capacity further). Now imagine that exit being closed (a bridge blown up or other weak link taken out). Someone can go around with a key and open it from the outside but not only will additional casualties have occurred (and huge traffic jams created) it may very well be too late all together. The door needs to be open at exactly the time you need it. Not five minutes later. Same with supply.
Logistics is NOT a simple and easy affair which tags along the combat elements. It governs the combat elements. And it is very susceptible to disruption.

Narwan

[Marcello]

"No it doesn't."

Ok, let's see if I get this.You are proposing to create obstacles on the roads and in order to prevent said obstacles to be easily bypassed you are proposing digging trenches

"to block trucks driving around blocked roads"

Right?

Now, it seems pretty evident to me that this requires a a trench long, deep and wide enough that either going off road and driving around it or filling it to create a passage would be a significant nuisance and time wasting, thus creating a bottleneck. A ten meters long trench simply will not do the trick.
The little problem is that this might require a significant amount of time with commercial equipment. And time is a commodity very in short supply in such scenario.
Never mind you need to plan in advance so that unit X knowns that in wartime is going to commandeer two bulldozers from Schmidt & Co to dig a couple of hundreds of meters of trenches on both sides of Autobahn Y at Km Z.
The rest of your post is true,if a little overstated, and at the same time totally irrilevant to the practical solution of the problem described above.
Now:was it actually planned? I have not got any indication that it was.Neither you have told me.
Yourself quoted the use of nuclear demolition mines:if conventional demolition was so quick and effective as you make it to be why bother with them?
Finally when the problem was keeping columns bottled on roads minefields were the standard solution AFAIK. Not digging trenches. Laying mines is much faster and simpler.

"It is much, much easier to demolish and block than it is to clear and circumvent."

It depends exactly on what sort of blocks are being talked about.The israelis spent a couple of years building the
Bar-Lev line. The egyptians breached it in matter of hours.

[Smersh]

NATO would have about 48 hours or less warning of a Soviet attack. I don't think enough logistical damage and scortched earth could have been performed in that time to seriosly stop an offensive, even if there was strong enough political will (which is questionable).

You have to remember that Soviet strategy depended on total and overwhelming commitment to win a possible war within a week or two. again I don't think a few blown bridges and cratered highway would have stopped the 'show'.

But we should also consider that CPSU remained against a war of conquest in Europe, and there wasn't much support among the general population for one either. So, talking about a unprovoked suprise WP attack is a little unrealistic. I can only see war between NATO and WP happening a result of a smaller European conflict escalating into a general war.

[PlasmaKrab]

People, just found an essay regarding nuclear weapons drawdown that sheds a different light on that "nuclear demolition charges" business:

[ulr]http://www.npec-web.org/Essays/Paper050202BerlinRuehlTheFutureofUSTacticalNuclear Weapons.pdf[/url]

These things are mentioned in the beginning (lumped together with nuclear mines) but further down (middle of page 18) a paragraph states that the concept was tried out in the 60s but never implemented whether in Germany or in Turkey, where it could have been useful too.
Would it turn out that it was one of those crazy early-cold-war nuke projects?

[narwan]

Smersh said:
NATO would have about 48 hours or less warning of a Soviet attack. I don't think enough logistical damage and scortched earth could have been performed in that time to seriosly stop an offensive, even if there was strong enough political will (which is questionable).

You have to remember that Soviet strategy depended on total and overwhelming commitment to win a possible war within a week or two. again I don't think a few blown bridges and cratered highway would have stopped the 'show'.

But we should also consider that CPSU remained against a war of conquest in Europe, and there wasn't much support among the general population for one either. So, talking about a unprovoked suprise WP attack is a little unrealistic. I can only see war between NATO and WP happening a result of a smaller European conflict escalating into a general war.

True, the whole debate of a WP vs NATO conflict in europe does sidestep the cause and lead up to a war. Many scenario's can be imagined and much of the subsequent combat would depend on it.
Unprovoked is a tricky term though. I can see an WP attack as a reaction on severe economic setbacks within the SU (possibly influenced or engineered by the west). That could imo have led to a WP attack, and very possibly one they were not ready for themselves. Many possibilities and the ones we all have in our respective heads probably have a great influence in how we see a further conflict develop.

For example I don't believe in a WP surprise attack, which your 48 hour warning time would amount to. They simply would not have enough forces available in such a short time. As far as I know it would have taken them at least a month to prepare and get ready (that month refering to noticeable preparations, in other words indicating to the west that something was afoot). So either no surprise but a lot of troops or surprise and very few troops. While they'd need both to have a chance of defeating NATO... That at least is the context in which I see such a conflict.

Narwan