Hi Ian
Here are some relevant pasages form
http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/car...er/doubler.asp
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Despite successes in Tunisia and Sicily, the U.S. Army that assaulted the Normandy beaches was still far from being a well-oiled, coordinated fighting machine. Shortcomings in prebattle training and battlefield coordination during 1942 and 1943 prevented the U.S. Army from developing its full potential as an effective fighting force. One of the major problems discovered was the surprising lack of aggressiveness displayed by infantry units. Instead of employing techniques of fire and maneuver to close with and destroy the enemy, infantry attacks often merely located and pinned down the enemy. Artillery fire was then called on to finish the infantry's job of destroying the defenders. Instead of relying on their organic weapons, infantrymen trusted in the big guns of the field artillery to deliver the coups de grace.16
Another problem compounded the infantry's reliance on artillery support. The purpose of the infantry division's mortars and assault guns was to support the attacks of the riflemen. Consequently, these weapons were usually employed close to the fighting front and became favorite targets for German artillery, tanks, and other heavy weapons. American mortar, antitank, and assault-gun crews often suffered heavy casualties. A tendency developed in which these weapons remained hidden and silent until the salvos of the supporting artillery landed on the defenders' positions. Artillery fires suppressed and neutralized the Germans, and only then would the infantry's organic heavy weapons join in the battle.17
Even more disturbing was the poor coordination that existed during tank-infantry attacks. Experience in combat painfully showed that stateside training lacked emphasis on the planning and execution of combined arms attacks. Infantry commanders habitually failed to exploit the mobility and firepower of the tanks attached to their units. Conversely, tankers operating with infantry were often reluctant to aggressively advance, taking the burden of the attack away from the riflemen.18
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Training presented a problem because of these numbers.
In sept 1939 Hitler has 108 fully trained fully equipped divisions.
In june 1941 Stalin has 178 on the western front alone.
In Sept 1939 the American Army has 5 divisions thats 188500 men and 14400 officers.
So recruiting training and equipping all started too late. Lend lease added to the problem because equipment that should have been used for training was flowing overseas.
from
http://stonebooks.com/archives/000716.shtml
"Even with two BARs, however, the U.S. infantry squad could not match the German firepower, since the MG42 had a greater effective range and twice the BAR's rate of fire. In fact, the MG42 alone could almost match the rate of fire of every weapon in a U.S. infantry squad shooting at once."
Ive been asking for the BAR to be downgraded to reflect this but to no avail so far.
So in short the americans infantry had every reason to rely on divisional artillery, they didnt have smokeless powder (and so were easily spotted) the germans did. The MG34 and 42 were murder the BAR wasnt. The germans infantry was bristling with hand held AT and the shermans burnt easily. The germans had better training.
Considering this I find the American experience 65 morale 75 a bit high compared to the German experience 70 morale 65
AFAIK the British did OK in the field, they had a high level of training throughout. But as the war ended there was a lot of political pressure to minimise casualties. The hideous attrition policy of WWI was public knowledge by now and the current party wanted to be voted back in.
This site is also interesting
http://www.army.mil/cmh/collections/USAWW2.htm
Best Regards Chuck.
Re: Realism vs \"Winning\"
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