Early U.S. Army armed helos

[thatguy96]

This is probably more accurate. There seemed to be some debate over whether or not this had made it to Korea. It probably is a product of things getting conflated. The test was no doubt a product of the Korean experience, where the US Army found itself woefully unprepared to deal with enemy armor.

By the time things really got into high gear, the difference between the French and the United States services branches, was that the French had an active conflict going on. The US was testing a wide array of weapon systems around the exact same time as the French were actually putting it to use in Algeria. Who comes first is still a matter for debate.

Between the Bazooka test in 1951, the grenade dispenser test in 1953, and others dating back to the mid-1940s, the US Army was definitely interested in the concept. The US Marine Corps was too. The general consensus remained for some time, and in the USMC longer than in the Army, that the helicopters available until the introduction of the UH-1 were simply underpowered for any armed application.

Why the US Army begins in earnest in the mid-1950s has much to do with the formation of the USAF in 1948, and its utter reluctance to properly fulfill the close air support role, despite refusing to let the Army have it. When it becomes clear that the USAF will resist every move toward fixed wing attack aircraft, the US Army is more or less forced to pursue helicopters in a way that no other branch has had to.

[Suhiir]

I'll repost a comment from the other thread that I think might explain "why" armed helo development was so slow.
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As early as spring of 1949 the Corps had conceived of using helos firing rockets in an anti-tank role, and by 1951 HMX-1 had tested the mounting and firing of machine guns and 2.75 inch rockets from an HTL-4.

The instability and limited development of armed helicopters was not stopped, neither did it become a front burner project. It was to be a long and winding road from these early efforts to the Corps' first fully capable and deadly gunship.

Contrary to opinions which became popular among early gunship advocates, there were valid, practical reasons for this delay. Instability and limited lift capability were engineering problems more easily solved than other issues. The combination of budget limitations and force structure provided CMC with more difficult choices. The budget limited the number of squadrons and airframes. If you want two squadrons of gunships, give up two squadrons of attack aircraft. The Corps had to be prepared to respond to a variety of threats all over the world, and the inter-related issues of force structure and doctrine were based on this. It was not at all obvious that swapping attack aircraft for the gunships which could be developed at that time would be a smart action to take.
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Hope this helps.